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INTRODUCTION
"Catastrophic" illness has recently been recognized as a major problem of
public policy. Diseases may be considered "catastrophic" for policy purposes
simply because of their calamitous nature or because of their high treatment
costs. Early steps extending protection against catastrophic illness were con-
fined to identifying specific diseases as catastrophic so as to concentrate gov-
ernmental efforts on a limited class of patients;' the advantage of this categor-
ical approach was the greater control that it provided over the government's
financial commitment, which could be gradually expanded as political pres-
sures built on behalf of new diseases and as resources became available. Now,
however, concern about catastrophic illness seems to be focused not on
specific diseases but on the general hazard of financial disaster associated with
high health care costs. A patient's disease is considered catastrophic in this
sense only if it is extraordinarily expensive to treat. Thus, contrary to popular
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1. In 1965, Congress enacted disease-specific legislation aimed at improving care for heart
disease, cancer, and strokes. Heart Disease, Cancer, and Stroke Amendments of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-239, 79 Stat. 926 [codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299-299i (1970)]. In 1969, Congress voted to
assist miners suffering from another specific disease, "black lung" (pneumoconiosis), Federal Coal
Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969, P.L. 91-173, 83 Stat. 792 [codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-36
(1970)], an effort continued by the 1972 black lung amendments, Black Lung Benefits Act of
1972, P.L. 92-303, 86 Stat. 153 [codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-41 (Supp. IV 1974)]. See gtenerally
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding black lung amendments).
In 1972, most victims of end-stage kidney disease were brought under Medicare. Social Security
Amendments of 1972, P.L. 92-603, § 2991, 86 Stat. 1463, 42 U.S.C. § 426(f)-§ 4 26(g) (Supp. IV
1974). See generally Rettig, Valuing Lives: The Policy Debate on Patient Care Financing for Victims of
End-Stage Renal Disease, 40 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 196 (1976). The disease-by-disease approach,
however, has been extensively criticized. See Office of the Ass't. Sec'y for Planning and Evalua-
tion, Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Task Force Report on Catastrophic Illnesses and Costs (W.
Herman, director, May 1971) [hereinafter cited as Catastrophic Illnesses and Costs]; INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DISEASE BY DISEASE TOWARD NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE? (Panel Report, June 1973).
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usage, a sudden fatal heart attack would not be deemed catastrophic, while a
chronic but nonfatal condition might be-if the accepted therapy or rehabil-
itative regimen were very costly.2 Medical costs have risen in recent years sig-
nificantly faster than the rate of general inflation,3 so that many illnesses, in-
cluding some that were previously untreatable, now threaten bankruptcy,
even for persons covered by private insurance or government programs. Re-
sulting public concern has given rise to a variety of proposals to transfer
more, or even all, of the costs of catastrophic illness from individuals and
families to a deeper pocket, either a private insurance fund or a government
financing program.
The thesis of this article is that, although there are good reasons for our
society to seek to spare its individual members catastrophic health care costs,
in doing so it will almost inevitably commit more resources than it really wants
to commit,4 or should commit,5 to such a purpose. This result is probable
2. Our discussion will focus primarily on life-threatening or terminal illnesses rather than on
chronic diseases, since lifesaving efforts illustrate most graphically the major financing
problem-the difficulty of setting the appropriate level of funding, especially where government
financing is available. Long-term care for those with nonfatal chronic illness, on the other hand,
may be quite expensive, and if a government program defines illnesses as "catastrophic" accord-
ing to their cost, it will probably be more concerned with chronic than with life-threatening cases.
See Congressional Budget Office, Catastrophic Health Insurance 9 (Budget Issue Paper, Jan.
1977) [hereinafter cited as CBO Issue Paper] ("long term care ... is the most frequent cause of
catastrophic expense.") Because long-term care as presently understood includes a host of
services-both in and out of institutions-not traditionally considered medical, see Murnaghan,
Review of the Conference Proceedings, 14 MED. CARE, Supp., May 1976, at 1 (1976), cost control is
especially difficult, and family bankruptcy may be induced by more problems than meeting medi-
cal bills.
3. See, e.g., Council on Wage and Price Stability, Executive Office of the President, The Prob-
lem of Rising Health Care Costs (Staff Report, April 1976).
4. The notion that a democratic society's collective decision on catastrophic health insurance
might cause unintended overspending may strike some as a contradiction, since in theory the
legislature accurately represents societal desires. But, even though a democratic legislature speaks
for the people in some general sense, it is capable of creating conditions under which serious and
largely unintended misallocations of resources can occur. Uncritical acceptance of the allocative
consequences of a democratic process is comparable to blind faith in the invisible hand of a
laissez-faire marketplace. See T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 294-97 (1969). See also J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
5. The normative benchmark applied here is the hypothetical optimal allocation of resources
which would result from the purchasing decisions of reasonable and knowledgeable individuals
(none with less than a specified income) in a smoothly functioning marketplace for both insur-
ance and medical care. See Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical
Care: The Role of PSRO's, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 6, 15-20 & nn. 35, 36, 45 (1975). This notion primar-
ily illustrates the distorting effect of third-party payment for medical care, but it also reveals "the
enormity of the practical problem presented and the social and political dynamics of [attempting
to achieve optimality] through nonmarket mechanisms." Id. at 6 n. 1. The general idea that health
policy should strive for providing a "decent minimum" rather than everything possible, or all that
might be desired, or perfect equality, has recently been well stated by Professor Charles Fried,
who nevertheless stops short of considering how the necessary lines can or should be drawn.
Fried, Equality and Rights in Medical Care, in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, IMPLICATIONS OF GUARANTEEING MEDICAL CARE 3 (J. Perpich ed. 1975). See also
Rosenthal, Setting the Floor: A Missing Ingredient in an Effective Health Policy, I J. HEALTH POLITICS,
POLICY & LAW 2 (1976).
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because government will find it difficult to impose, or even tolerate, needed
limits on very expensive medical efforts to save lives and preserve health
without seeming to deny the sanctity of human life. The challenge is thus to
design social institutions which neither unduly sacrifice society's humanitarian
ideals nor overspend on medical services not warranted by the benefits they
yield. It is our view that government cannot safely assume too central a role
in decisionmaking on life-and-death and similar issues and that society will be
better off if institutional arrangements are such that death and suffering from
catastrophic disease continue to be perceived as "more an act of God than of
the legislature. ' 6 Careful attention to program details and to the allocation of
decisionmaking responsibility is necessary if society is to succeed, in the con-
text of expanded protection against catastrophic medical expenses, in preserv-
ing both humanitarian values and democratic government's benign-if not its
beneficent-image.
This article reviews current and proposed efforts to help those faced with
catastrophic medical expenses, focusing particularly on methods of contain-
ing program costs. It identifies a critical need to keep government's profile
low in order to facilitate saying "no" when it is appropriate to do so. In ex-
amining some possible techniques for doing this, the article seeks to help gov-
ernment limit its moral as well as its financial exposure while honoring a sub-
stantial commitment to assist victims of catastrophic disease.
I
PRESENT COVERAGE OF CATASTROPHIC MEDICAL EXPENSE
A. Private Health Insurance
Health care expenditures-particularly when catastrophically high-are a
classic example of the type of risk people attempt to insure against. By the
very nature of illness and accident, most people are unsure of the future state
of their health and their prospective demand for medical services and must
protect themselves against an unexpected medical-financial calamity. Rational
consumers can therefore be expected to purchase insurance as a means of
converting unpredictable, episodic medical expenses into fixed periodic pre-
miums and of pooling their risks with others in roughly similar circumstances. 7
Further incentive to purchase insurance comes from the rapidly rising cost
and sophistication of medical care itself (which increase potential costs and in-
6. ARTIFICIAL HEART ASSESSMENT PANEL, NAT'L HEART & LUNG INST., THE TOTALLY
IMPLANTABLE ARTIFICIAL HEART 247 (DHEW Pub. No. (NIH) 74-191, 1973) (separate views of C.
Havighurst).
7. See generally Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. 53 AM. ECON. REV.
941 (1963).
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surable risks)8 and from tax subsidies (which decrease the net premium). 9
Most Americans are in fact covered by some form of private health care
insurance. In 1974, over three-quarters of the population had substantial
economic protection through private health insurance against the expenses of
hospital and surgical care, including in-hospital physician visits, whereas a
generation ago, comparatively few had such protection.'" Although the popu-
lation covered is broad and growing, a major drawback of private health in-
surance remains-namely, its emphasis on "shallow" coverage. Insurance has
concentrated on paying for short hospital stays and other modest bills while
insufficiently protecting against large medical expenses, which, being both less
predictable and more burdensome when they occur, would seem to be more
appropriate for insurance coverage. 1 The recent trend toward more com-
prehensive "major medical" insurance, first introduced on a large scale in the
early 1950s and extending in some form to fully 130 million people in 1974,12
8. The precise relationship between increasing prices and the actual demand for medical in-
surance is still the subject of empirical debate. See Newhouse, Inflation and Health Insurance, in
HEALTH: A VICTIM OR CAUSE OF INFLATION? 210, 212-13 (M. Zubkoff ed. 1976).
9. See B. Mitchell & R. Vogel, Health and Taxes (Rand Report No. R-1222-OEO, Aug. 1973),
partially reprinted in 41 So. ECONOMIC J. 660 (1975); see also K. DAvis, NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE 14-17 (1975); Feldstein, The Medical Economy, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 1973, at 151.
10. Mueller & Piro, Private Health Insurance in 1974: A Review of Coverage Enrollment, and Fi-
nancial Experience, SOC. SECURITY BULL., Mar. 1976, at 3. See also HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTE,
SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH DATA 1975-76, at 21-28. Though still substantial, coverage was less for
various types of outpatient care. In all, consumers pay out of pocket only about one third of
personal health care expenditures. Mueller & Gibson, National Health Expenditures, Fiscal Year
1975, Soc. SECURITY BULL., Feb. 1976, at 3, 14. The private health insurance industry has ex-
perienced very rapid growth as, encouraged by the tax laws, such insurance has become a major
fringe benefit for working Americans. See sources cited note 9 supra. Moreover, provider
interests-reflected in Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans-have also encouraged coverage as a
means of improving patients' ability to pay for services received. See S. LAw, BLUE CROSS: WHAT
WENT WRONG? 6-12 (2d ed. 1976); Kessel, Price Discrimination in Medicine, I J. LAW & ECON. 20,
32-33 (1958).
11. Normally, one would expect people to seek to pool mainly the larger risks through "deep"
insurance, covering smaller bills out of pocket to avoid the high administrative and other costs of
insuring them. However, because tax subsidies make insurance seem such a bargain (more than
compensating for administrative costs, K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 16), various interests can more
easily indulge their preference for "first dollar" coverage of routine expenses. Insureds may opt
for shallow coverage because they wish to use insurance premiums as easy and convenient forced
savings budgeted for health care, e.g., V. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? 135 (1974), but see Blumstein
& Zubkoff, Perspectives on Government Policy in the Health Sector, 51 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q.:
HEALTH & Soc'y 395, 410-11 (1973), or because they underrate the probability of serious illness
or accident, or because they rely on government or charity to provide for them in such cases.
Both employers and the unions with which they bargain over the provision of much insurance
may prefer to benefit everyone with high-visibility shallow coverage rather than deep coverage of
direct benefit to only a few. Finally, medical providers clearly prefer insurance that pays the first
dollar (or nearly so) of their bills, simplifying their collection problems and reducing consumer
cost consciousness. And the private health insurance market has long been dominated by Blue
Cross and Blue Shield plans, originated by providers and operated largely in their interest. See
generally S. LAW, supra note 10.
12. Mueller & Piro, supra note 10, at 10, Table 8. See also HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTE,
1975-76, supra note 10, at 12, 24-28.
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has reduced the shallowness of coverage somewhat; but, despite its name, a
major medical policy does not necessarily provide complete catastrophic
coverage. Beneficiaries share costs through deductibles, coinsurance, and
"internal limits" on subcategories of expenses; 13 and coverage may often be
restricted or terminated under certain conditions. Moreover, although benefit
maximums have grown and now range as high as $250 thousand or $1 mil-
lion, with a few plans providing unlimited coverage,1 4 many major medical
insureds may still face high medical care costs from expenses above low over-
all policy limits.1
5
The final recourse of uninsured or underinsured private patients can be
described as charity, although providers often benefit from treating "charity
patients" in teaching or experimental contexts.'" Individual physicians, hospi-
tals, and medical centers have traditionally dispensed a great deal of charita-
ble care, relying on other patients to pay substantially more than the cost of
service, on complaisant third-party payers to support such services through
bad-debt allowances or otherwise, and on such sources as research and other
grants, local government, or private philanthropy to help fund institutional
deficits. This unrationalized "system" undoubtedly continues to meet many
important health needs, though others may be neglected for lack of a pro-
vider with the requisite resources and willingness to accept the financial bur-
den. In particular, the ability of hospitals to act as "monopolistic charities" has
been substantially eroded by higher costs and a range of developments limit-
ing internal cross-subsidization."7 Nonetheless, there are probably many com-
13. "Internal limits" are coverage maximums for defined subgroups of expenses; certain ben-
efits (for example, mental health care coverage) may thus be exhausted even before the overall
coverage limit is reached.
14. HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTE, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 1974-75, at
10-11. This deeper coverage is a significant improvement over early limits of $5,000 to $10,000
designed to provide improved shallow coverage by supplementing basic hospital-surgical insur-
ance. Id. Nonetheless, by 1973 over half of all Americans under age sixty-five did not have even
"near catastrophic" coverage ($25,000 or more lifetime benefits). 1 A.D. Little, Inc., Financing of
Catastrophically Expensive Health Care at 33 (Rep. No. NCHSR-75/104 to DHEW, HRA, Nat'l
Ctr. for Health Services Research, Jan. 1975). 36.7 million persons are estimated to have major
medical limits of $250,000 or above in fiscal 1978. CBO Issue Paper, supra note 2, at 19.
15. See generally Hallman, True Catastrophe Medical Expense Insurance, 39 J. RISK & INS., Mar.
1972, at 1.
16. Kessel, The A.M.A. and the Supply of Physicians, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 267, 273 (1970).
17. Potentially one of the most significant of these developments is the National Health Plan-
ning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 [codified at 42
U.S.C. § 300 (Supp. IV 1974)]. It requires the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to
develop a uniform institutional rate system reflecting the true cost of providing each type of
insured service: "[R]evenues derived from patients in one category shall not be used to support
the provision of services to patients in any other category." 42 U.S.C. § 300n-2(d)(3)(b) (Supp. IV
1974). This could substantially alter the currently widespread practice of internal cross-
subsidization. See generally Newhouse & Acton, Compulsory Health Planning Laws and National
Health Insurance, in REGULATING HEALTH FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION 217, 228-30 (C. Havighurst
ed. 1974); Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by "Certificate of Need," 59 VA. L.
REV. 1143, 1164-65, 1188-94 (1973); Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. SCI.
22 (1971).
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munities where uninsured residents still have reasonable expectations of being
privately cared for in cases of medical emergency or catastrophically high
cost, and reliance on this support may in turn lead some people not to insure
against catastrophic risks. 1 8
B. Government Programs
Government is already heavily involved in financing health care, with pub-
lic programs of various types contributing more than private insurers to total
outlays. In fiscal 1975, government spending (two thirds federal, one third
state and local) totaled over $45 billion and covered about forty percent of
total personal health care expenditures.19 Although some programs-such as
the Veterans Administration, public hospitals, public health activities, and
numerous other special programs-provide care directly to recipients, the
major governmental role is that of a third-party payer for health care services
rendered by private sector providers. The most important such programs are,
of course, Medicare and Medicaid, which account for sixty percent of all gov-
ernment health spending." The federal tax system, by allowing deductions
for medical expenses in excess of three percent of adjusted gross income,2 1
also provides a kind of catastrophic health insurance-with a high coinsurance
rate inversely related to income. 22 A variety of government programs has
also addressed the problem of income lost by sick or disabled people. 23
Most Americans sixty-five or over are covered by Medicare, as are Social
Security disability beneficiaries-those disabled for twenty-four months or
having end-stage kidney disease. 24 Hospital insurance is automatically avail-
able under Part A, and voluntary supplementary medical insurance may be
18. See note 38 and accompanying text infra.
19. Mueller & Gibson, supra note 10, at 6, table 1; 8, table 3; & table 5.
20. See generally id. at 6-11.
21. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 213(a)(1). See also sources cited note 9 supra. The deductibility
of medical expenses is estimated to cost $2.3 billion in lost tax revenues for fiscal 1978. CBO
Issue Paper, supra note 2, at 27.
22. See geneally Mitchell & Vogel, supra note 9. The "coinsurance rate" is the portion of medi-
cal expenses borne by taxpayers, rather than by the government "insurer." Because the federal
tax scale is progressive and medical deductions reduce the last dollars of income, upper-income
taxpayers pay the lowest coinsurance rate.
23. The federal government provides, mandates, or otherwise encourages income support
payments to categorically defined groups of eligible citizens through such programs as Social
Security, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970) (old age, survivors, and disability) and 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et
seq. (Supp. IV 1974) (supplemental security income for the aged, blind, and disabled); public
assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1970) (aid to families with dependent children) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1201 et seq. (Supp. IV 1974) (blind); Workmen's Compensation, 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. (1970)
(federal employees) and 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1970) (railroad employees); unemployment com-
pensation, 5 U.S.C. § 8501 et seq. (1970) (federal) and 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1970) (state); and
black lung disability, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1970).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq. (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 426 (Supp. IV 1974). On Medicare coverage,
see generally I MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 1000 et seq. (1976). On the kidney provi-
sions, see generally Rettig, supra note 2.
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purchased at a subsidized rate under Part B. Like the Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans after which it is patterned, Medicare emphasizes shallow cover-
age, though it provides for more hospitalization than do many private plans.
Hospital days are limited to 150, skilled nursing facility days and home health
care visits to 100.25 Medicare also requires considerable cost sharing, particu-
larly under Part B.
Medicaid covers categorically defined groups of needy persons-the aged,
blind, disabled, and families with dependent children. 21 The program varies
considerably among states under the joint federal-state arrangement, but all
states must cover people receiving welfare aid tinder the Social Security Act
(the categorically needy), and about half have exercised their option to cover
similar persons with income somewhat above welfare levels (the medically
needy) as well.2-7 Required benefits include hospital and physician services,
skilled nursing facility care, and lab and X-ray fees; dental andi many other
health care services are optional. There are no patient cost-sharing require-
ments for the categorically needy, but states may place limits on coverage
even of basic services.28
Neither Medicare nor Medicaid fully protects beneficiaries against cata-
strophic medical expenses. (Moreover, since Medicaid is a categorical pro-
gram, man\' low-income people are ineligible for benefits. ' 9 ) Under either
program, a victim of catastrophic illness may exhaust his coverage and be left
to rely upon personal resources and providers' charity. Coverage for hospital
25. Under Part A, home health visits are covered only after a hospital stay of at least three
days' duration. One hundred home health visits are also reimbursable tinder Part B, without a
hospitalization prerequisite, but subject to the coinsurance provisions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395d, 1395k,
I 395x(n) (1970).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 el seq. (1970). On Medicaid coverage, see generalv 2 MEDICARE &
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 14,000 et seq. (1976).
27. i addition, a complicated 'spend down- provision helps protect victims of large medical
bills in states covering the medically needv. Persons otherwise eligible for Medicaid but for having
an income above welfare levels may nonetheless receive benefits after they "spend down" to the
requisite level in paying for health care. 45 C.F.R. §§ 248.1(b)(2)(iii), 248.3(l)(ii)(C): 2 MEDICARE
& MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 14,31 1.73 (1976): Urban Systerns Research & Engineering, Evalia-
tion of Medical Spend-down (DHEW Contract No. SRS 74-58). For a short and lucid explanation,
see R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA 63-65 (1974). For those eligible,
this is a form of catastrophic coverage with a deductible equal to the amount by which their in-
come exceeds the Medicaid level. New York's Medicaid program provides catastrophic coverage
for all inpatient expenses exceeding twenty-five per cent of the eligible beneficiary's annual net
income where this figure is lower than the "spend down" otherwise required. N.Y. SOCIAL SER-
VICE LAW § 366(2)(c) (McKinney 1976).
28. Although states nay limit coverage they "niay not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount,
duration. or scope of, such services . .. solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness or condi-
tion." 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)(5)(i) (1976). 3 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 21,610 (1976).
[Ihis would seem to indicate resistance to the disease-oriented approach to containing costs dis-
cussed in note 2 supra and in section V.B. infra.
29. Over 6 million people below the poverty line are not covered by Medicaid. K. DAvis, Supra
note 9, at 2. 43-44.
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days under Medicaid, for example, is determined by the individual states and
may be as little as fifteen days per year.3
II
PROPOSALS FOR EXPANDED COVERAGE
Although most Americans thus have some form of public or private pro-
tection against health care costs, only a minority are well protected against the
financial catastrophe which might occur. The inadequacy is clear enough to
have caused public concern and new proposals to address the problem. There
is reason to expect some form of mandatory coverage encompassing cata-
strophic illness to be enacted in the next few years.31 The design of any plan
must take into account the powerful pull of the myth that life is beyond price
and must seek institutional structures which will effectively neutralize the
myth if optimal resource allocation is to be achieved.
Before analyzing specific proposals, it is useful to consider the rationale
for an expanded governmental role in protecting against catastrophic medical
costs.
A. A Role for Government
Viewing catastrophic illness as an independent policy problem calling for
independent financing appears to presuppose that government's obligation to
assure the provision of medical services is not unlimited. For this reason,
proponents of a national cradle-to-grave health care system, typically regard-
ing all health care as a "right"32 (or at least a "merit good" 33 ), would not
regard particular illnesses or particular levels of expenditure as a separate
problem. 34 In their view, equity requires a redistributive allocation of in-
30. 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 15,592 (1976). There is of course great disparity
among the states; Massachusetts, for example, offers virtually unlimited hospital days. Id. at
15,598.
31. Catastrophic coverage may be provided either as the upper end of a fully comprehensive
system or as a free-standing, independently financed program. See section II.B infra. Although
the policy justifications for the two approaches are quite different, see section I1.A infra, the
implications for social involvement in decisions involving human life and health and the problems
of correctly allocating resources at the highest level of expenditure are not dissimilar.
32. See e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, IMPLICATIONS OF
GUARANTEEING MEDICAL CARE. (J. Perpich ed. 1975).
33. A "merit" good is one whose governmental provision or funding is justified by explicit
political choice, not by traditional public finance criteria (e.g., externality, public good, monopoly,
or market imperfection). Its provision reflects a communal, paternalistic judgment about what
people should consume, regardless of their actual consumption decisions, and is thus similar to,
but distinct from, concern for equitable distribution of resources. See Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra
note 11, at 400-12; see also Fein, On Achieving Access and Equit'T in Health Care, in ECONOMIC
ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE 23 (J. McKinlay ed. 1973); Musgrave, Provision for Social Goods in the
Market System, 26 PuB. FINANCE 304, 312-13 (1971).
34. For example, one comprehensive system (West Germany's) apparently does not even keep
data that distinguish catastrophically expensive from other health expenditures. Interview with U.
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kind medical benefits across the board to assure equal access to all types of
health care, whatever the health problem. Focusing on catastrophic care may
be seen as betraying a fundamental tenet, unacceptably providing only half a
loaf.
35
In the absence of philosophical or political consensus in favor of a univer-
sal comprehensive government role, however, a catastrophic coverage ap-
proach might well seem justified by the perception that the current lack of
protection against extremely high costs is a deficiency in current health care
financing that warrants governmental redress. Such a plan may have wide-
spread political appeal, since it protects middle-class families against financial
hardship or disaster while assuring poorer families of the means of paying for
treatment which they otherwise might not get at all. 3 6 This approach also
comports with the view that government intervention should proceed only
incrementally, with each increment justified separately and each program tail-
ored to fit the articulated rationale.
3 7
Given a widespread acceptance of some governmental role in financing
catastrophic health care, the nature of that role remains to be considered.
Market-oriented advocates of limited government involvement might argue
that catastrophically expensive illness is an insurable risk most efficiently dealt
with in a private insurance market. Government, in this view, should inter-
vene as necessary to improve the functioning of the market so as to allow
those who wished catastrophic protection to buy it, but not to impose cover-
age on those who prefer to bear risks on their own. Equity concerns could be
met by income supplements rather than by in-kind benefits, so that even the
poor could make a free choice between risk-taking and insurance.
But such a limited role for government does not take into account the
larger burden which society frequently assumes voluntarily when an indi-
vidual is afflicted with a medical catastrophe. Through a variety of charitable
acts and public agencies, as a society we do often act to help those who have
not helped themselves. Knowing this, many individuals might not buy insur-
ance, however readily available and fairly priced, because they know that
Geissler. Ministrv of Labor & Social Affairs. in Bonn, West German\, June 1975.
35. Others who favor comprehensive national health insurance nonetheless support
catastrophic-only coverage on the theory that half a loaf is better than none, at least as a first step
toward a more inclusive program. This stance reflects both a political judgment that a com-
prehensive program is not fiscally feasible at present and a willingness to compromise by accept-
ing one piece of the larger package they seek. See generolly Meyer, The National Health Insurance
Debate: Shifts Towards Reality? I J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY & LAw 13 (1976).
36. Catastrophic illness also typically causes considerable functional dislocation-inability to
perform normal work or family roles. Many see this as a serious social disruption, warranting
governmental action. See generall. Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 1I, at 399, 423-25.
37. See Blumstein & Zubkoff, Public Choice in Health: Problems, Politics and Perspectives On Form-
ulating National Health Policy, INT'L J. OF HEALTH SERVICES (forthcoming); Blumstein & Zubkoff,
supra note 11, at 395-96, 400-01, 418, 426. See also note 35 supra.
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some protection already exists in the willingness of others to come to their aid
in an emergency . 3  For persons having other uses for the cash, forgoing in-
surance might be quite rational, and mandating contributions by all may be
the only way of preventing such "free riders" from taking advantage of
society's good nature in this way. Moreover, regularizing financial support for
such services better distributes these social costs, relieving particular provid-
ers, notably community hospitals, of their disproportionate financial burdens
and of the even greater burden of turning away needy patients when the
available resources are insufficient.
Individual decisions to self-insure have other types of social consequences
as well, such as the "impact of a mistaken choice by a head of a household ...
on others who are dependent";3 9 society may well question whether that de-
termination should be left solely in private hands. These externalities are
especially significant for children, who do not have independent funds or suf-
ficient information or experience to make an informed private choice.
Moreover, the state has accepted a special responsibility for the welfare of
children and will have to care for them if their parents are incapacitated or if
their health needs are neglected by their parents. Given its own direct in-
terest, the government might appropriately require some individual contribu-
tion toward catastrophic coverage.4 °
Although the theoretical underpinnings of a government catastrophic dis-
ease program are strong, there remain many practical questions of its design
and potential cost.
B. Current Proposals
Almost all national health insurance proposals provide some form of
coverage for catastrophic medical expense. A number of proposals, including
the Kennedy-Corman Health Security Act, would not treat catastrophic ex-
pense as a separate category, but would instead cover it together with ordi-
nary expenses under a unified plan with very extensive benefits.4 1 In contrast,
38. See Blurnstein & Zubkoff, supra note 11, at 421-25.
39. Id. at 423-24.
40. Id. See also V. FUCHS, sapra note 11, at 133, 150 (compulsorv coverage grounded in con-
cern over "free riders" and children).
41. S. 3 & H.R. 21, 94th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1975) in Heanags on National Health Ilisiance Major
Proposals Before the Sabcooii. oa Health & the Environiamet of the Hose Coma,. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings]. The former
Nixon Administration plan, S. 2970 & H.R. 12684, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) in i Hearings on
National Health Insurance Bejore the Hoose Comm. on Ways & Means, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 262 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings], and others are likewise comprehensive plans. Broad com-
parisons among bills are more easily made from summary treatments of insurance proposals than
from the actual bills. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 80-128; OFFICE OF RESEARCH &
STATISTICS, Soc. SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE PROPOSALS (DHEW Pub. No. (SSA) 76-11920, 1976) [hereinafter cited as DHEW
Summary]; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93d CONG., 2d SESS., NATIONAL HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE: BRIEF OUTLINE OF PENDING BILLS (Comm. Print 1974).
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several other plans now under active consideration address catastrophic ex-
penses as a separate category, though they may also envision additional basic
health insurance underlying the proposed catastrophic coverage. 42
Such proposals are quite complex and may profitably be analyzed from
many points of view. This article is primarily concerned with the boundaries
of any undertaking to meet catastrophic medical expenses. From this perspec-
tive two attributes of the proposals are salient-whether and how they estab-
lish lower and upper bounds to the financing commitment and what expenses
or types of care (if any) are excluded from full coverage.
A proposal's deductible feature (for catastrophic-only plans, the coverage
threshold) affects its total program cost, but does not directly limit total ex-
penditures on the treatment of catastrophic disease. That function may be
performed by upper limits of various sorts, by cost-sharing requirements, or
by exclusions from coverage. Most plans would establish no total exclusions of
care from catastrophic coverage,4 3 but internal limits on particular services are
not uncommon. 44 Many proposals include cost sharing for particular benefits,
either as coinsurance percentages or as fixed deductible or copayment
amounts, but cost-sharing requirements are typically eliminated entirely in
catastrophic ranges.
45
42. The Long-Ribicoff proposal, the leading catastrophic-only plan, would assure the availabil-
ity of basic health insurance meeting minimum federal criteria. S. 2470, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Title III (1975). Professor Feldstein's Major Risk Insurance (MRI) proposal, on the other hand,
was designed in part to induce patient self-insurance below the sizeable deductible. Feldstein,
A New Approach to National Health Insurance, 23 PuB. INTEREST 93 (Spr. 1971). The basic MRI
goal was to limit family liability for medical expenses to a reasonable proportion of income, yet
to maintain cost consciousness below that level. Given unlimited MRI coverage above a family's
limit, families should not find it attractive to insure expenses below the MRI threshold, since
coverage would cost almost as much as their maximum liability under MRI (and more than their
expected average liability). Id. at 100. Coinsurance above a basic deductible was proposed to in-
crease the range of expenses for which a family would have some responsibility. Id. at 103-04.
Professor Feldstein has recently up-dated his analysis and re-emphasized the virtues of MRI.
Address by Martin Feldstein, Carl Snyder Memorial Lecture, Univ. of Cal. at Santa Barbara,
(Jan. 18, 1977). Patient responsibility for ordinary rather than catastrophic expenditures is still
emphasized, but coinsurance would apply beginning with the first dollar of expenses rather than
only above a deductible. Id. at 28.
43. It is not uncommon, however, for plans to exclude some relatively low-expense but high-
frequency categories, such as outpatient drugs or eyeglasses. E.g., H.R. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) in 1975 Hearings, supra note 41, at 302 (eyeglasses excluded for those aged thirteen and
over).
44. These limit coverage of one kind without affecting maxinmum benefits for all care or
treatment. See note 13 supra. Thus, the Long-Ribicoff bill would limit psychiatric hospital inpa-
tient treatment to one hundred and ninety lifetime days and set a maximum of two hundred and
fifty dollars payable for outpatient mental health care. S. 2470, 94th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1975). The
1974 Nixon Administration plan would have limited skilled nursing facility days to one hundred
per year. S. 2970 & H.R. 12684. 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) in 1974 Hearings, supra note 41, at
262.
45. For example, the 1974 Kennedy-Mills proposal, H.R. 13870 & S. 3286, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974) in 1974 Hearings, supra note 41, at 4, called for twenty-five per cent coinsurance, but
limited yearly cost sharing to a maximum of one thousand dollars per family. Similarly, tinder
[Vol. 40: No. 4
Page 122: Autumn 1976] COSTS OF CATASTROPHIC DISEASE
Almost all federal bills to cover catastrophic medical expenses have
theoretically unlimited overall benefits.4" This does not, however, constitute
an unbounded financial commitment; it does mean that other cost-control
mechanisms must be looked to. Cost sharing and internal limits have already
been mentioned. A number of plans call for Professional Standards Review
Organization (PSRO) or other review, which would set some individual limits
(on days of hospitalization, redundant diagnostic tests, and so forth) indepen-
dent of listed program benefits.4 7 Moreover, the Health Security proposal,
though it would not directly limit benefits to any individual, does contemplate
fixed, advance payments to designated health service areas, in which adminis-
trative processes would in turn have to limit overall payments to providers. 48
Provision for care rendered by health maintenance organizations, a feature of
several plans, would have a similar effect.4'
Some proposals do set ceilings on total dollar expenditures per beneficiary
per specified time period, such as spell of illness, year, or lifetime. The Nixon
Administration's early proposal for a National Health Insurance Partnership
Act, for example, would have imposed such a limit on supplemental cata-
strophic payments (above broad basic benefits).5" "
Interestingly, benefit limitations are seldom related to specific policy goals
(other than the obvious cost savings). No distinction is made, for example,
among types of care according to any social valuation of the lives threatened
or saved or according to any estimate of the value of treating particular ill-
nesses or of adopting particular modes of treatment. ' Although Congress
the Long-Ribicoff bill, patients would face no coinsoura nce payments after meeting the deductible
amounts. S. 2470, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
46. For example, neither the Healhh Security proposal, S. 3 & H.R. 21, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1975) in 1975 Heaings, snpra note 41, at 475 (a comiprehensive plan), not the Long- Ribicoff bill,
S. 2470, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (catastr'ophic oinl) would plce a ceiling Ol total expendi-
tures in catastrophic ranges on behalf of an individual insured. in partictilar, hospital and physi-
cian services are fulls covered.
47. See section III.B.2. and note 1I 1i/a.
48. S. 3 & H.R. 21, 94th Cong.. 1st Sess. §§ 61-90 (1975) in 1975 Heari,,s, supra note 41, at
475. See also Section IV.C. itifta.
49. Id. at § 87; H.R. 2049 & 2050, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) (Rep. Staggers-10 per cent
pIemium iubsidy). Se also section I It.3. itra
50. S. 1623 & H.R. 7741, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). H.R. 2618, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
(Rep. Railsback) had a similar provision. The lifetime maximum was $50 thousand and was to be
reduced by the anmount of each catastrophic expendittue (i.e., one not covered under the broad
basic coverage). But maximum coverage was to be restored at the rate of two thousand dollars
each succeeding year (less anv further catastrophic outlays in a given year). For example, a
beneficiary who receives $20 thousand under the catastrophic coverage thus redtices to $30
thousand the lifetime amount thereafter available to hint Under the catastrophic coverage. The
full $50 thousand maxitnim will be restored, however, after ten years without any further cata-
strophic expenditures. This add-back nechanism is a feattitre of the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Act plans (high option), sometimes suggested as a model for comprehensive national
health insurance. See 2 A.D. Little, supra note 14. at 33.
51. Cf. note 28 supra (no such "arbitratry" distinctions allowed).
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frequently makes such judgments, at least implicitly, in establishing priorities
for biomedical research and in defining eligibility for income support pro-
grams, policymakers apparently feel that treatment priorities should be de-
termined by some other means. Although the commonly found restriction on
mental health services may reflect an exception to this generalization, it can
also be seen as a defense against the very high costs possible as a result of the
high degree of patient discretion about the consumption of such services. The
only catastrophic insurance "plan" seeming to embody a judgment about the
worth of specific care is the current end-stage renal disease program under
Medicare, and this start toward a "disease-by-disease" approach to cata-
strophic coverage has been much criticized.-2
C. Predicting Potential Costs
The current incidence of catastrophic illness and its costs, however de-
fined, are poorly understood. The expected experience under some form of
national program covering high expenses is therefore difficult to predict. Dif-
ferent methods of extrapolating from present knowledge yield varying esti-
mates of catastrophic health insurance costs, ranging from very low to ex-
tremely high. All methods have deficiencies, perhaps the most important one
being the ubiquitous problem of how to assess "induced" costs-those gener-
ated by creation of a new financing system.
Consideration of the present costs of treating various diseases and condi-
tions thought to be "catastrophic" yields a rough idea of potential costs, even
though current proposals themselves are not condition-specific. An annual $1
billion for kidney disease (under current programs alone) is a widely cited
figure. 53 A like amount could easily go for joint replacement surgery.5 4 If all
potential beneficiaries were treated, the coronary bypass operation alone
could cost some $20 billion in the first years of a catastrophic insurance pro-
gram, and $2 to 4 billion per year thereafter.5 5 The average cost of caring for
a terminal cancer patient is $20,000, according to one source.5 6 The expense
52. See note I sipra.
53. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE. supra note 1, at 1: see also ESRD: A Billion a Year fo Direct Kidney
Care, MED. WORLD NEWS, May 3. 1974, at 16: Iglehart, Kidney Trea/ment Problem Readies HEJV for
National Health Insurance. 8 NAT'L J. 895 (1976). Some sources foresee an ultimate annual cost of
$2 billion. Long-Term Dialysis Programs: NeW Selection Criteria, New Problems, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
June 1976, at 8, 11.
54. NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH HEALTH RESOURCES ADMIN., PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, REPORT, CATASTROPHIC ILLNESS
CONFERENCE, Dec. 1-3, 1974, at 12 (DHEW Pub. No. HRA 76-3133 1974).
55. McClure, The Medical Care System undei Natioiial Health Insurance: Four Models, I J. HEALTH
POLITICS, POLICY & LAW 22, 24 (1976).
56. K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 4. Terminally ill long-term alcoholics may also receive very ex-
tensive care. Those with bleeding esophageal varices can be kept from bleeding to death by many
transfusions and two operations, although they usually die from kidney failure soon thereafter.
"The cost per case may approach $20,000 and the cost per year of life saved may approach a mil-
lion dollars." Neuhauser, The REALLY Effective Health Service Delivey System, HEALTH CARE MAN-
AGEMENT REVIEW, Winter 1976, at 25, 27-28.
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of rehabilitating a quadriplegic accident victim is said to average $12,000 (with
success in one case out of four).5 7 The cost of as yet unavailable therapies,
such as bone marrow transplants, cancer treatments and the often-cited artifi-
cial heart, 58 is incalculable. Such a piecemeal recitation of potential expendi-
tures is methodologically unsatisfying but does illustrate the potential of the
health care system to absorb resources in vast quantities.
5 9
A 1974 study by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(DHEW) estimated the costs of eight then-current proposals by adding to pres-
ent expenditures the increased demand for services brought about by extra
insurance coverage. That estimate, for fiscal 1975, was that the catastrophic
coverage of the Long-Ribicoff bill would induce expenditures of only $4.4
billion, raising the total national health bill only some 3.8 per cent.6 0 A major
1975 study by Arthur D. Little, Inc. estimated the cost of providing cata-
strophic coverage to the entire American population under age sixty-five. The
study analyzed the 1970 experience of the Federal Employees Health Benefits
Program, which provides very comprehensive coverage. Generalizing from
data under an existing catastrophic plan was thought to justify ignoring in-
duced costs on the assumption that demand under the private and any public
plan would be very similar. This calculation led to an estimated incremental
1975 cost of only $1.94 billion for Senator Long's catastrophic health insur-
ance program." A 1976 study for DHEW foresaw a rise of $7.9 billion by
57. 1974 Hearings, siipra note 41, vol. 2, at 925 (statement of W. Spencer). Of course high
costs are not unique to diseases or conditions commonly thought catastrophic. Long-term care has
already been mentioned. See note 2 supra. Short-term intensive care for a variety of conditions
is also very expensive. In one large urban teaching hospital, a recent study of two hundred
twienty-six critically ill (primarily postoperative) patients showed an average hospital charge ot
$14,304, of which onhs' six per cent swas paid by patients. Over half died within a month: nearly
three-quarters within a year: only one-eighth fully recovered. Cullen. Ferlrara, Brigs, Walker &
Gilbert, Survival, Hospitalization Charges and Follow-Up Resnlts in Critically Ill Patients, 294 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 982, 982, 986 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Collen, et at.]: accord, Scott, Letter to the Editor,
295 NEw ENG. J. MEl). 398 (1976).
58. See ARTIFICIAL HEART ASSESSMENT PANEL. siipia note 6.
59. Walter McClure notes that under a regime of universal and unlimited entitlement, "we
run the risk of ou mledical care system becoming a kind of vast vactitim cleaner, sucking Uncon-
trollable amounts of GN P and scatce tax dollatrs-urgently needed for other equally pressing
national priorities-and putting them to medical care.- McClure, sopra note 55, at 25.
60. U.S. Dept. of' Health, EdtIc. & Welfare. Estimated Health Expendittres Under Selected
National Health Insurance Bills 3, 12 (Juls 1974). The particular version of the bill used for the
estimates evidently was S. 2513, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), an earlier vetrsion of S. 2470 (1975),
supra note 42. The figures for the more comprehensive Nixon Administration plan and the
Health Security Act were $6.5 aind $13 billion, respectively. /d. All figures were projected from
fiscal 1973 data. yielding an estimated 1975 total health care expenditure of $1 16.4 billion, of
which $103 billion was for personal health care-excltisiVe of research, construction, public
health, and the like. The actual 1975 figures turned ott to be $118.5 and 103.2 billion, respec-
tively. Mueller & Gibson, supra note 10. at 3. 14.
61. 1 A.D. Little, supra note 14, at 163. The bill evaluated was Senator Long's S. 1416, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See also notes 14, 60 .supra. The data and research design of the A.D.
Little study have, however, been severely criticized. The Director of the National Center for
Health Services Research, for which the study was done, inserted an introductory memorandum
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
1980 under catastrophic coverage. 62 Although such estimates indicate that a
catastrophic health insurance plan might be instituted at a relatively small ini-
tial cost, a circumstance in no small measure responsible for the political ap-
peal of catastrophic plans, the most difficult aspects of projecting costs are not
satisfactorily dealt with by existing estimates.
Direct extrapolation from current insurance experience does not fully ac-
count for the impact of universal coverage with virtually no upper limits be-
cause emphasis on deep coverage could considerably alter medical care deliv-
ery as it now exists. Not only might cost inflation result from the infusion of
virtually unlimited new financing into highly specialized institutional care, but
inflationary pressure might extend to noncovered care as well, to the extent
that there is added competition for scarce medical resources in the short run.
Moreover, any program insuring upper-level expenditures may create a spec-
tacular incentive for providers to offer the highest possible quality regardless
of cost all along the line in the expectation that insurance would take over just
as the patient begins to feel the pinch. In the long run, catastrophic-only
coverage might skew resource allocation toward institutional care and away
from outpatient care, home health care, and health maintenance, just at a
time when the system's bias toward hospital-based acute care and its tradi-
tional failure to provide primary and preventive care are widely deplored. 63
Expenditure increases of some magnitude could also be expected because im-
proved catastrophic care will save some people who would otherwise have
perished and who then must be maintained in a subnormal state at great cost.
Although the value of cures achieved and lives prolonged should be recog-
nized, expensive medical intervention may in some cases be more accurately
seen as postponing death than as prolonging life.
The most significant and least predictable variable, however, is the change
in medical practice or technology that might be induced by extensive cata-
strophic coverage. If a new program simply altered financing arrangements,
into the final report cautioning readers of its limitations, notably "that the cost estimates are
inherently downward-biased." Id. at i-A.
Another study, Newhouse, Phelps & Schwartz, Policy Options and the Impact of National Health
Istinance. 290 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1345 (19741), while giving no long-term dollar estimates, con-
cluded that full' comprehensive coverage would cause only a small increase (aboit five to fifteen
per cent) in demand for inpatient services (likely to compose the bulk of catastrophic expendi-
tures). Id. at 1346.
62. Total national health care expenditures of S233.3 billion were projected for 1980 under
the Long-Ribicoff bill, compared with S223.5 billion Under present law. GORDON R. TRAPNELL
ASSOCIATES, A COMPARISON OF THE COSTS OF MAJOR NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE PROPOSALS,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (DHEW Rep't No. PB-259-153, Oct. 1976). The Congressional Budget Of-
fice has estimated the new costs generated by a variety of hypothetical catastrophic plans; they
range fi-om only $0.4 billion to S 16.0 billion for fiscal 1978. CBO Issue Paper, supra note 2, at 38.
42.
63. See, e.g., Somers, Catastrophic Health Insurance? I Catastrophe! MEDICAL ECONOMICS, May 10,
1971. at 213.
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one might expect the increase in aggregate costs to be manageable, since
there are comparatively few catastrophes involved. But it is not reasonable to
expect doctors' and patients' definition of a medical catastrophe to remain
unchanged. Just as shallow hospital "insurance coverage has unnecessarily
shifted many vertical ambulatory-care patients into the more expensive hori-
zontal treatment in the hospital bed," deep insurance for large expenditures
only may create "a raging epidemic of bigger and better medical catastrophes
with a sharp increase in cost."'6 4 Moreover, the deep governmental or insurer
pocket under any form of catastrophic illness program, by removing the fi-
nancial constraint on demand, would stimulate heavy private investment in
research to develop new forms of lifesaving and health-promoting tech-
nology." Not all new developments would generate benefits commensurate
with their costs, yet, once they existed, their use would be difficult to
control.66
For a variety of reasons, therefore, predicting the ultimate cost of a cata-
strophic health insurance plan is even more difficult than predicting first-year
64. Rutstein, Letter to the Editor, 294 NEw ENG. J. MED. 346 (1976). The author, a doctor at
Harvard Medical School, was responding to Harris & Wissman, Impact of Nationwide Catastrophic
Health Insurance. 293 NEw ENG. J. MED. 721 (1975), which summarized the A.D. Little report,
supra note 14.
65. If catastrophic care were well financed, government would lose the control it potentially
enjoys to influence the course of basic and applied biomedical research through its setting of
ftnding priorities, since guaranteed insurance payments Would probably attract sufficient risk
capital even without specific grant funds. Such control has not been exercised in the past so as to
prevent discoveries whose implementation would be costly and whose benefits would be small. See
Gruenberg, The Failure of Success, 55 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q: HEALTH & Soc'Y 3 (1977); Inglehart,
Is It Time for Biomedical Research to Hunt for New Fields? 8 NAT'L J. 1217 (1976). Recent years, how-
ever, have seen a growing interest in controlling medical technology, although technology assess-
ment is a relatively new field, and "biomedical technology has been almost totally ignored."
Walters, Technology Assessment and Genetics, 33 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 666, 672 & n.21 (1972).
Some specific medical technologies have been scrutinized, e.g., ARTIFICIAL HEART ASSESSMENT
PANEL, supra note 6, and calls are beginning to be heard for more general reviews of research and
development. See, e.g., C. TAFT, P. GERTMAN, & R. EGDAHL, HEALTH CARE TECHNOLOGY (1977);
Iglehart, The Cost and Regulation of Medical Technology: Future Policy Directions, 55 MILBANK MEM.
FUND Q.: HEALTH & Soc'Y 25 (1977); Gaus, What Goes into Technology Must Come Out in Costs in
NATIONAL LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON AMERICA'S HEALTH POLICY 12 (1976); Hiatt, Too Much
Medical Technology? Wall St. J., June 24, 1976, at 16, col. 4; Schwartz, On Medical Progress, N.Y.
Times, April 13. 1976, at 33, col. 5; Ebert, The New Technology-How Far, HoW Fast? Am. Med.
News/Inpact, June 28, 1976, at 2, col. 1.
66. The major theme of this article is the difficulty of limiting low-value catastrophic spend-
ing, given the natural impulse to do everything possible for identified patients whose lives are
endangered. Once a treatment is past the experimental stage, suppressing its application as too
costly is extraordinarily difficult. See also notes 63 supra and Ill infra.
Of course, the prevalence of expensive therapies and maintenance is in itself an incentive for
basic research on cures or prevention, as in the classic case of polio vaccine's supplanting very
expensive iron-lung treatment. See Rettig, supra note 1, at 211 & n.48. The iron lung is a "half-
way technology," an expensive treatment of symptoms after the fact, whereas the vaccine is an
example of "full technology," a comparatively simple measure born of "genuine understanding of
disease mechanisms. "Thomas, Guessing and Knowing: Reflections on the Science and Technology of
Medicine, SATURDAY REVIEW 54, (Jan. 1973), discussed in Rettig, supra note 1, at 209.
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costs. It does seem appropriate to worry that unlimited financing of expensive
hospital-based care could easily yield powerful inflationary effects, much as
hospital costs have risen in the past in response to increasing insurance
coverage.67 There is some evidence that medical costs are already rising faster
in catastrophic ranges than in general.6 8 Without some constraint, chronic
pressure for cost escalation would continue and could even increase, with no
equilibrium in sight, because of the capacity of technology to expand almost
indefinitely to meet virtually unconstrained demand.6 9
III
THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING COSTS
IN A CATASTROPHIC DISEASE PROGRAM
Although expanding government's role in financing catastrophic care
could be very expensive, high costs alone would not be objectionable if there
were some assurance that particular expenditures would yield roughly com-
mensurate benefits. 7 0 Even without an expectation that a new program would
routinely make such sophisticated evaluations of individual services, it could
be considered worthwhile if its benefits outweighed its costs in the aggregate
and if no practical alternative offered better control of marginal expendi-
tures.7 1 It would be wrong, however, to maintain that any prospect (no matter
67. See generall M. FELDSTEIN, THE RISING COST OF HOSPITAL CARE (1971).
68. People with catastrophic expenses claim a very large and growing share of all medical
spending. In 1970, the top one per cent of the population in amount of medical expenses ac-
counted for fully twenty-six per cent of total medical expenses. (The bottom twenty-five per cent
accounted for only one per cent of spending). R. ANDERSON, J. LION, & 0. ANDERSON, Two
DECADES OF HEALTH SERVICES 96. Table 3-11 (1976). For the 1963-70 period, the growth in total
medical expenditures for the top one per cent was 17.2 per cent per year. compared with "only"
11.2 per cent for the population at large. Id. at 97, Fable 3-12. See also CBO Issue Paper, supra
note 2, at 45-46 (the higher the catastrophic expenditure category, the faster spending increased
in 1970-75).
69. The Congressional Budget Office, CBO Issue Paper, supra note 2, at 44, summarizes:
Fifteen sears' experience with private health insurance coverage, medicare, and
medicaid suggests that catastrophic health insurance (or comprehensive national health
insurance) would stimulate the use of high-cost treatments and the growth of expensive
facilities, particularly hospitals....
The supply of medical services will probably expand rapidly to meet whatever demand
is generated b a new insurance system. Expensive techniques and services will be
adopted as rapidly as there are funds to pay for them....
.. . [T]he costs implied in an expansion of high technology treatments are very sub-
stantial.
70. This statement is less self-evident than it seems. One person's benefits must typically be
weighed against costs to someone else, contrary to the neoclassical economic axiom that interper-
sonal comparisons of utility are unwarranted. Utilitarian benefit-cost comparisons nonetheless
provide a very useful analytical framework and are widely used. The textual statement is,
moreover, oversimplified, since many potential government expenditures may have benefits ex-
ceeding their costs. Other, possibly more beneficial programs must be considered, and normative
questions about who should pay for what and who should receive what must be addressed.
71. The overall program would thus be justified on benefit-cost grounds; and no achievable
program change could do better, even though some uncontrollable marginal expenditures would
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how improbable) of prolonging even a few lives is itself a priceless benefit that
would justify any expenditure under a catastrophic health care program.
Although our society appropriately values lifesaving very highly, signifi-
cant questions about the value of catastrophic health care expenditures can
arise on at least three levels:
First, doubts can be raised about the effectiveness of, and necessity for,
many of the particular medical services which would be subsidized: Not all
possible medical services contribute meaningfully or in the same measure to
patients' survival.72
Second, the value of the benefits derived in individual cases is highly vari-
able: Not all catastrophic disease is actually life-threatening; 73 not all lives
threatened are in fact saved; 7  and not all prolongations of life achieved are
quantitatively or (qualitatively alike, since some patients are maintained in
states of health which they would not value highly. 75
Third, once a program has made us feel collectively responsible, we may
over-exalt particular lifesaving efforts, almost independently of their benefit
to patients, as a way of affirming our society's deeply felt reverence for the
sanctity of life. Society obviously cannot indefinitely afford to indulge this
propensity-which we label the "lifesaving imperative" 6 -by applying all
available means of modern medical technology to every case, but neither can
society afford overtly to breach such a fundamental tenet. As a compassionate
society seeking to do the most good with limited resources, we must be espe-
cially careful not to create a no-win dilemma where the only apparent alterna-
tives are unlimited spending of questionable effectiveness or overt public sac-
rifice of human life. The former Would surely prove unacceptably expensive,
but the latter (which high costs could help to precipitate) would be ethically
demoralizing.
not be worthwhile. The benefit-cost ratios of entirelh different government programs should not,
however, be forgotten.
72. Some expensive treatmrents may achieve at best only ver small reductions in the probabil-
ity of death or small increases in the likelihood of improved recovery. For example, recent re-
search questions the value of intensive institutional care for heart attack victims. E.g.. Mather,
Pearson. Read, Shaw. Steed. Thorne. Jones. Guerrier. Eraut, McHugh, Chowdhurv Jafary, &
Wallace, Acute Myocardial Iafrctio: Howe mid Hospital Treatetepl, 1971-3 BRITr. MED. J. 334,
336-37. See also A. COCHRANE. ' FFECTIVENESS ANi) EFFICIENCY 50-54 (1972).
73. See note 2 sapra.
74. One study found that almost three-qtartetrs of the intensive-care patients treated at great
expense survived less than a year, Cullen, et al., stpra note 57, at 983. Physicians can and often
must make critical distinctions among patients and set treatment priorities. The patients just
cited, for example, were chosen to receive the most intensive postoperative care; three other
categories of lesser degrees of care were established. Id.
75. Indeed, many patients might be "saved" only to be maintained in states of "health" which
they would not value highly. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976)
(most irreversibly comatose people would, if they could, choose to discontinue life-supporting
treatment). Cf. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (wrongful life claim).
76. See generally section III.A. infra & passim.
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Avoiding this dilemma is not an easy task; this section of the article details
the immense practical difficulty of using regulatory or other decisionmaking
mechanisms to contend with the lifesaving imperative, an ethic which colors
all attempts at realistic appraisal of risks, benefits, and costs. It is only natural
for medical care providers to seek to frame all catastrophic care issues in
lifesaving terms. They naturally prefer to take any step that might conceivably
promote health or prolong life; indeed they fear legal liability for omitting
any particular measure. Likewise, individual patients and their families cannot
be expected to deny themselves any catastrophic ministration of potential
medical value when it would be financed by others-except in circumstances
where more fundamental ethical or religious values take precedence, as may
sometimes occur in hopeless or terminal cases. 77 And serious problems are
encountered if some third party, particularly government, must take upon
itself the responsibility for a decision setting a low value-or any value, for
that matter-on an individual's survival, comfort, or welfare. The social, polit-
ical, and legal dynamics of controlling catastrophic health care costs in this
highly charged context present a major challenge to policymakers intent on
achieving efficient and humane catastrophic treatment without offending
deeply held values. Meeting the challenge requires considerable attention to
the nature of government's role as it is expressed in the institutional structure
of any program for softening the blow of catastrophically expensive, debilitat-
ing illness.
A. The Lifesaving Imperative
It is a basic tenet of our society that we will not give up a life to save
dollars, even a great many dollars. 78 This strong belief in the sanctity of life
leads us to reject our usual weighing of benefits and costs when human life
appears to be in our hands. Thus, whenever government is obviously placed
in a position to undertake a specific lifesaving effort, we would all feel collec-
tively responsible for the resulting loss of life if action were not taken. Be-
cause of this "lifesaving imperative," government is unlikely to allow an indi-
vidual in jeopardy to perish for reasons of economy where any expenditure
might save him. 79 We are likely to be similarly uncomfortable if we observe
77. See generallv section IV. D. infra.
78. See, e.g., Zeckhauser, Coverage Jot Catastrophic Illness. 21 PUB. POLICY 149 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Zeckhauser, Catastrophic Illness]; Zeckhauser, Procedures for Valuing Lives, 23
PUB. POLICY 419 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Zeckhauser, Valuing Lives].
79. In medicine, the lifesaving imperative is strengthened by the professional ethic of physi-
cians that everything possible should be done for their patients-a similar phenomenon elsewhere
called the "quality imperative," Havighurst & Blumstein. supra note 5, at 20-30, or the "technolog-
ical imperative." V. Fuchs, supra note 11, at 60; Fuchs, The Growing Demand for Medical Care in
ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE 61, 66 (V. Fuchs ed. 1972). See also
Hiatt, Protecting the Medical Commons: Who is Responsible?, 293 NEW ENG. J. MED. 235 (1975). But
see sources cited note 251 in!fra (when physician may terminate care).
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government making close calculations about whether it is in fact worthwhile to
take other, more general measures which might save lives.
We may recognize that the lifesaving imperative is to some extent a myth.
While we do occasionally invest great amounts in saving identified lives in
jeopardy, we also accept the loss of many "statistical" lives as part of the price
of the many benefits of industrial society. 80 But even if it is in part a myth,
belief that life is beyond price is an important feature of our collective exis-
tence: Our treating identified victims differently from statistical victims should
not be dismissed as a simple case of hypocrisy or as a mistake in valuing
lives,8 t for it is in large part a ritual homage paid to the sanctity of human life
and to our collective commitment to maintain it. Policy actions that seemed
80. It has long been recognized that societv's devotion to lifesaving is greatest where the
threat is to identifiable individuals, like trapped miners--t the victims of cata-
strophic disease. See, e.g., Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616. 623
(1949). See also Fried, The Value of Lfe. 88 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1969): Havightirst & BlumstCin,
supra note 5, at 21-25; Schelling, The Iile You Save May Be Your Own. in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (S. Chase ed. 1968); Zeckhauser, Valuing Lives, supra note 78, at 447,
458-59.
Not only does society spend more in attempting to save identified lives than statistical ones, but
it also considers identified death a greater cost. Thus, the FDA has been ver restrictive of new
drugs-in part because the deaths that may result from allowing a drug to be marketed are
clearly visible, whereas those who die because a drug is not available are impossible to identify.
See D. Seidman, Protection and Overprotection: The Politics and Economics of Pharmaceutical
Regulation 30 (paper presented at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Ass'n, April 29-May 1, 1976). Indeed, the highly personalized and visible horrors of
thalidomide-averted in the United States by FDA caution-are often cited as strong support for
continuing the current policy of stringent FDA review.
81. The "myth'" is easilx described, but the riddle of how a society might rationally choose to
spend more to save identified than statistical lives has been addressed onlx inconclusively. The
phenomenon has been seen as a means of concentrating limited iesotii ces on symbolically main-
taining the sanctity of life in the affordable identified cases. Calabresi, Toward a Theory of
Tragic Choices, April 1973 (lectures at U. Pa. Law School) [hereinafier cited as Calabresi, Tragic
Choices]. Zeckhauser has described the myth as an all-or-nothing prloposition (either life is
beyond price or it isn't), calling it an "on-off variable." Overspending on identified lives, then.
results from an "eflfort to maintain the variable in an on status . . ." Zeckhauser, Catastrophic
Illess, supra note 78, at 164. Neither of these formulations fully describes the reason as wx ell as
the result.
It is difficult to improve significantly on the more commonplace observations that human be-
ings cannot empathize with faceless abstractions and that 'squeaking wheels--the complaints of
known victims, such as the very vigorous lobbying of kidney-disease patients-not the silence of
statistical unknowns, will get the governmental grease. Spending "millions of dollars to save a fool
who has chosen to row across the Atlantic has external benefits'" lacking from highway safety
spending. Calabresi, Commeuta', in ETHICS OF HEALTiH CARE 48, 53 (L. Taucredi ed. 1974). For
one thing, the single rescued rower will give a more dramatic and moving interview than millions
of better protected motorists.
In any case, although mans decisions, particularly in health and safety matters, reflect implicit
finite valuations of human health and life, the importance of out society's belief in the sanctity of
life should not be undervalued. Institutional arrangements foir the financing of catastrophic ill-
ness must take this into account. See genraliv section V infra. But see C. FRIED, MEDICAL
EXPERIMENTATION 69 (1974) (rejects "uteh, any "preference for the immediate and palpable
[Victim] over the statistical" solely to symbolize "concern for the individual" but supports such
preference on other grounds).
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overtly to deny such an important value would impose significant costs not
only on the politically vulnerable decisionmakers themselves but also on the
society as a whole, whose faith in the benignity of government would be
shaken. Yet such damage to the fabric of society is threatened whenever soci-
ety directly confronts what Guido Calabresi calls "tragic choices"S2-that is,
dilemmas which require either overt sacrifice of a fundamental tenet, such as
the sanctity of life, or the acceptance of such large costs of other kinds that
this alternative will not seem satisfactory either.
Where "tragic choices" are confronted, the manner in which decisions are
made may significantly influence the substantive outcome. Thus, when a case
like that of Karen Quinlan becomes a public issue,"3 a considerable overlay of
symbolism may affect the decision whether to keep her "alive." 84 The de-
cisionmaking process, whether formal or informal and whether consciously
designed or simply evolved over time, largely determines the degree to which
society's deeply held symbolic values come into play in particular cases, and
this circumstance provides the policy analyst with a crucial insight: "There
may be important results that stem from the choice of one procedure rather
than another for assigning values to human life. And the decision whether to
make this valuation process either visible or explicit may itself have a signifi-
cant effect on the ultimate value assigned to human life."85
Calabresi points out that some "tragic choices" are in fact finessed by soci-
ety. This can occur when society's mores and institutions do not require that
such choices be openly formulated and explicitly faced. As an example,
Calabresi notes the operation of subtle societal pressures and incentives which
ultimately determine the number of children individual families will have. 6
The important point is that these choices occasion little or no discontent be-
cause there is no single, visible mechanism of choice.8 7 He argues, however,
82. Tragic choices" arise in "Situations where there is no tight decision" because of conflict-
ing fundamental values, and include, for example, deciding who shall be picked to fight in a
limited \war or who shall be allowed to use a limited number of kidney machines. Calabresi,
Commentary, supra note 81. Calabresi, Tragic Choices, supra note 81.
83. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), discussed in section IV.D. infra.
84. When "death" occurs or should be deemed to occur is a complicated question. See generally'
section IV.A. infra. But expert witnesses generally agreed that Karen Quinlan was "alive" under
prevailing legal and medical definitions. See notes 231-33 infra and accompanying text. But ef.
Lachs, Humane Treatment and the T"reatment of' Humans, 294 NEW ENG. J. \lED. 838 (1976) (some-
times prospects for "life" may be so bad, as for very severely deformed newborns, that thes
should not be treated as persons).
85. Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Government Decisions Affecting Human Life and
Health, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 233 (1976).
86. Calabresi, Commentary, supra note 6 1, at 54.
87. When, however, the results of private decisions are particularly consequential and unusual
circumstances bring them into public focus, considerable discontent may arise. See Tsukahara &
Siegel, Case Studies in Bioethics: Baby Making and the Public Interest, HASTINGS CTR. REP. Aug. 1976,
at 13 (debate on propriety of choosing hazardous fertility-drug pregnancy, intentionally passing
on to group insurance plan the great financial risk).
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that once tragic choices become explicit-are dragged into the open, as it
were-no formal decisionmaking mechanism can be wholly stable over the
long run, since each decision will be unsatisfying in some respect, either
breaching some core societal value, such as equality, or perhaps just costing
too much and offending our preference for efficiency s. 8  He foresees a
dynamic process of continual, cyclical change: Protesters will argue that a cer-
tain value is being ignored, prompting modification to take it into account but
thereby sacrificing some other value, whose defenders will eventually appeal
successfully for its reassertion. In this way, no important value or interest
need be permanently sacrificed, and at least some of the demoralization costs
which would flow from final rejection of a fundamental value are avoided by
the prospect of its restoration.
Among the institutions Calabresi suggests to help avoid obvious breaches
of fundamental values are "a-responsible" decisionmaking bodies, like juries,
which, while in a sense representative, are not held publicly accountable or
compelled to explain either their factual conclusions or the values which they
apply. 19 Such an institution is an attractive one for making some "tragic
choices" because it lessens the likelihood of offending public sensibilities
-precisely because it does not articulate priorities and keeps the basis of its
decisions unclear. 90 Moreover, government itself can effectively be kept in the
background as long as these nongovernmental bodies have clearly cir-
cumscribed authority and draw legitimacy from tradition and consensus as
well as from their legal mandate. 91
Because direct government involvement in catastrophic medical care raises
the prospect of inordinate spending in very many cases pursuant to the
lifesaving imperative, it is arguable that government should seek to remain in
the background as much as possible, playing its role in such a way as to avoid
the destructive symbolic effect of its identification with specific human suffer-
ing. This would mean carefully selecting among a variety of agencies and
88. Calabresi, Tragic Choices, supra note 81. Although -it may [sometimes] be desirable for
society to spend an inordinate amIount on each of a few lives to preserve a comforting myth." cost
concerns are always present. Zeckhauser, Valuing Lives, supra note 78. at 447.
89. Calabresi, Tragic Choices. supra note 81.
90. C/. Zeckhauser. Valuing Lives, sipra note 78. at 458: "In situations in which the lives-for-
dollars tradeoff can be fuzzed over. decisions to sacrifice lives can be less discomforting." But cf.
sources cited at notes 92-94 infra (favoring open and explicit due process) and accompanying text.
91. Although informal mechanisms such as those influencing family size may evolve and ac-
ceptably make implicit choices without people's being aware of them, similar decisionmaking by
responsible agencies may be difficult to establish as a matter of conscious policy, since the accept-
ability of decisions made with limited accountability appears to depend on a legitimizing consen-
sus and tradition, which cannot be fabricated. Nevertheless, some existing institutions alteady
have a claim to legitimacy as a-responsible decisionmakers-the affected individual himself, his
family, and his ph ysician, for example-and might be allowed to continue hearing responsibility
for some difficult choices.
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types of procedures for decisionmaking, deferring as much as possible to
nongovernmental action, and giving government a generally low profile.
A policy of governmental nonassertiveness and delegation of flexible de-
cisionmaking powers is not without risks, however. Failure to articulate openly
and in easily understood terms what values are to be assigned to whose life
-and on what criteria-might sometimes produce inefficient or inequitable
results. One commentator recognizes that, "[g]iven that many of our received
values deny the possibility of ranking the worth of individual human lives, it
would conceivably be safer to conceal the process of decision from the pub-
lic"; she nonetheless prefers openness because it allows comment, criticism,
and perhaps "more efficient spending on medical resources."' '92 In a similar
vein, Jay Katz and Alexander Capron express their "preference for open,
'visible' decisionmaking." They acknowledge that the "complex and hard
choices" made in tragic situations may have a "less devastating impact on
members of society and its institutions if they are arrived at by 'low visibility'
rather than 'high visibility' decisionmaking." But they opt for "open" de-
cisionmaking because of their concern about the potential for hidden abuse,
"particularly of those groups within society who are traditionally the objects of
neglect and mistreatment. 9 3
As government's role in these matters becomes attenuated, there is indeed
an increased risk that the decisions made will be insufficiently sensitive to
some core societal goals, since private decentralized decisionmaking always al-
lows and indeed contemplates some inconsistency.9 4 But it is our belief that
this risk is outweighed by the advantages of decentralization, the very flexibil-
ity of which allows decisions to be open, visible, and accountable when so
desired-as might be elected in a particular hospital, for example. Decen-
tralized decisionmaking on the issues confronted in treating catastrophic dis-
ease would help to reduce both the nonpecuniary (but significant) costs to
society of breaching important values through governmental action and the
pecuniary costs of obeisance to symbolic values. It would also preserve the
image of government as the provider of funds rather than the arbiter of life,
while allowing private choice of and experimentation with different tech-
niques for resolving tragic situations. The importance of not relying exclu-
sively on governmental mechanisms for cost control in this difficult area may
be illustrated by existing mechanisms for controlling health care costs and the
92. Note, Due Process in the Allocation oJ Scarce Lifesaving Medical Resources, 84 YALE L.J. 1734,
1749 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Due Process].
93. J. KATZ & A. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES 3 [hereinafter cited as KATZ & CAPRON].
See also id. at 178-79, 189-92, 194-95, 217.
94. Private decisionmakers may also use criteria that would be unacceptable if employed by
government officials. See Sections II1.C. & IV. D. in/ra and accompanying text. Cf. Note, Scarce
Medical Resources, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 620, 635 (1969) (favoring allocation of scarce resources under
clear legislative guidelines, without which there is only "a collection of ad hoc procedures which
may not serve any worthy values at all").
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likely extent of their effectiveness in dealing with the costs of treating cata-
strophic disease.
B. Current Cost-Control Strategies and Their Limitations
Cost-sharing requirements and flat dollar or categorical limits on the
coverage of public financing programs of the type found in some of the
proposals outlined earlier are not the only cost-limiting strategies available to
the health care system. Some more selective mechanisms are already in place
or are being implemented under recently enacted legislation.9 5 In addition to
offering hope that some obviously unnecessary health care spending can be
curbed, these mechanisms provide some opportunities for reducing the provi-
sion of marginally beneficial care whose cost nevertheless exceeds a reason-
able estimate of its benefit. It is quite possible, however, that these cost-control
techniques will be less effective in dealing with catastrophic disease treatments
than in dealing with the routine medical practice for which they are primarily
designed. Indeed, those charged with implementing these approaches will
have particular difficulty, given the lifesaving imperative, in forthrightly fac-
ing up to the benefit-cost issues presented by demands for medical manage-
ment of life-threatening disease.
1. Health Planning and Controls on Investment
One important cost-control device currently in use is regulatory control
over new capital investments in health facilities and equipment and over the
introduction of new health services. Such regulation exists in over half the
states, those already having so-called "certificate-of-need" laws, 96 and will soon
be universal as a result of obligations imposed on the states by the National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974. 9 7 Certificate-of-
need requirements have been primarily employed to rationalize growth and
prevent duplication of services, but they might also be used to impose strict
resource constraints on providers of care, forcing them to ration available
facilities so that the clearest needs are attended to and more doubtful de-
mands are not. 98 It is thus at least theoretically possible to compensate
through regulation for the system's weak cost consciousness by introducing
resource constraints based on health planners' estimates of the amount of re-
95. This section reviews existing programs, not all potential cost-containment strategies. For
brief discussions of other proposed cost-containment techniques, see note 11l and section V.
infra.
96. AM. MED. ASS'N, STATE HEALTH LEGISLATION REP. 12 (Nov. 1976) (32 states had such laws
as of August 1976). See generally Havighurst, supra note 17; Salkever & Bice, The Impact of
Certificate-of-Need Controls on Hospital Investment, 54 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q.: HEALTH & SOC'Y 185
(1976).
97. Pub. L. No. 93-641. 88 Stat. 2225 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (Supp. IV 1974)).
98. See generally Curran, A National Survey and Analysis of State Certificate-of-Need Laws for Health
Facilities, in REGULATING HEALTH FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION 85 (C. Havighurst ed. 1974).
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sources required to meet essential needs without inviting "unnecessary care"
and "overutilization." 99 It is relevant to consider whether planning-cum-
regulation can be counted upon to impose any reasonable limit on a societal
commitment to the financing of medical care for catastrophic disease.
A strict limitation on the number of hospital beds, probably the most
achievable cost-control measure, is unlikely to have much impact on the
treatment of catastrophic disease, since patients with serious illnesses can be
expected to get high-priority treatment in any event.10 0 On the other hand,
limitation of facilities which are more closely associated with catastrophic care
than are hospital beds could be expected to affect the provision of cata-
strophic care somewhat more significantly. For example, without regulatory
restraint and with unlimited financing for treating catastrophic disease, hospi-
tals would probably expand their intensive-care units (ICUs) to accommodate
all potential patients at peak loads. Under regulation, the health planners
might well be able to divert some of those resources to meeting needs they
consider more important even if a few potential ICU users had to wait or
were denied access altogether and even if an occasional death occurred in the
queue.
Although responsibility for the adverse health consequences of planning
decisions may sometimes be sufficiently diffused to minimize the effect of the
lifesaving imperative, powerful forces continue to, push decisionmakers away
from effective overall cost control. Since the decisionmakers are not them-
selves responsible for paying the costs of care, they have no strong reason to
implement rigorous cost counting. Providers and advocates for interests most
directly affected are frequently able to invoke the lifesaving imperative with
skill and impact, and the planners are understandably reluctant to offer in
rebuttal benefit-cost analyses featuring specific values for the lives to be saved
or lost or for the varying qualities of human life affected. l0 1 Even though the
99. But see Salkever & Bice, supra note 96 (hospital spending seems little affected).
100. This is apparently the case in Britain, where stringency results from limiting both beds
and budgets. See section V.C. infra. According to a former Secretary of State for Social Services,
all the priority" is on 'prolonging life in desperate cases" and not on "enabling healthy people to
do their work by removing minor things which are wrong with them. .. .- R. CROSSMA,. A
POLITICIAN'S VIEW OF HEALTH SERVICE PLANNING 26 (1972). See also Bosanquet. Inequalities in the
Health Service, 17 NEW Soc'y 809 (1971): "This evidence also suggests that the NHS may be
showing a bias towards more elaborate, specialized and technologically advanced types of care
and neglecting less glamorous care." Id. at 912.
101. See generally Marmor, Wittman & Heagy, Politics, Public Policy, and Medical Inflation, in
HEALTH: A VICTIM OR CAUSE OF INFLATION? Recently another public group did overtly refer to
the value of life. The Council on Wage and Price Stability opposed pending standards governing
workers' exposure to emissions from coke ovens, arguing that the regulations "implicitly assign
a value to human life" that is "extremely high, considering the amounts spent in other health and
safety areas." Wall St. J., May 12, 1976, at 4, col. 2. The Council may have been able to take this
unusual stance in part because it is only advisory, having no operational authority and lacking ac-
countability to any identifiable political constituency. Notably, however, no explicit lower value of
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planners, distant from actual medical decisions, are in a better position to
consider lifesaving in statistical terms and to focus on overall health benefits
and costs, advocates for more and better services can easily castigate such
analysis as callous, can frequently introduce anecdotal evidence to personify
the victims, and can dramatize potential life-and-death issues in the media.
1 0 2
Such tactics are likely to be quite effective, given the highly political environ-
ment of health planning. The planners' best defense is to frame issues in
"either-or" rather than "yes-no" terms, so that conferring a particular health
benefit is clearly seen to require denying another benefit and is not simply
perceived as costing merely dollars, which are raised impersonally from a
large number of taxpayers and premium payers, each of whom is only very
slightly affected. It is not yet clear whether the mode of administration of the
new system of planning and regulation will lend itself to framing issues in this
way. 103
Although saying "no" to new investments in health facilities will rarely be
easy-except perhaps where unused, duplicative capacity would be created-
planners will probably have particular difficulty in limiting the supply of
equipment which is used to treat only a single disease. Unlike the case of the
ICU, which serves a variety of patients, a limited supply of disease-specific
equipment compels treatments to be allocated among patients who seem to be
similarly situated medically, thus inviting concern about discrimination. The
seeming unfairness of saving only some of the victims of an identifiable dis-
ease is simply too great for health planners either to ignore or deny. 10 4 Be-
cause explicit rationing of lifesaving treatments on any basis is nearly intoler-
able to contemplate, the only viable alternatives will usually be for planners
either to approve enough facilities to treat everyone or to treat no one with a
particular condition.i °0 However, local planners are likely to find it difficult to
life was specified; even so, the reporter noted the agency's "awkward position" in opposing efforts
to save steelworkers from cancer because it says the costs are too high." Id. See also note 102 infra.
102. This indeed occurred in the coke oven emission controversy discussed in note 101 supba.
The United Steelworkers of America promptly derided the Council on Wage and Price Stability
for "putting dollars ahead of human values" and implying that "the lives of coke oven workers
aren't worth saving." Id.
103. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 5, at 33-35. See also section V.C. infra. If Health
Systems Agencies rely heavily on their long-range, areawide health systems plans in reviewing
individual projects, the system could emphasize "either-or" decisionmaking; if most decisions are
made on a more ad hoc basis as approval for each project is sought, the "Yes-no" approach could
predominate.
104. See Calabresi, Tragic Choices, supra note 81.
105. For a discussion critical of the ethical proposition that "all should die when not all can be
saved," see P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 259-66 (1970). The idea that medical benefits,
especially under public programs, should be equally available to all people similarly situated
under medical criteria is nonetheless a deep-seated one-a viewpoint which lends support to a
program of federal financing on a disease-specific basis. See section IV.B.2. infra; but see note 28
supra.
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deny their region expensive benefits available in other regions (and perhaps
financed by nationwide taxes)."0 6 Moreover, any refusal by local planners to
provide services for catastrophic disease victims may simply cause patients to
migrate to an area where facilities are available. 10 7 Even one major medical
center possessing new equipment or providing a new service-initially as a
research endeavor but eventually as a regular service-would represent a leak
in the health planning system, a leak which could quickly become a flood if an
open-ended insurance program would pay providers for the catastrophic costs
of ultra-sophisticated care, wherever provided.
10 8
In this climate, planning for certain types of service would have to be
coordinated at the national level10 9 unless society could be content with the
rationing achieved by high travel costs and by the comparative disadvantages
of some in obtaining information on the availability of such treatments and
the needed referrals. New forms of treatment, typified by coronary bypass
surgery,10 would have to receive some kind of national clearance before their
Some commentators favor other means of allocating limited lifesaving efforts-including ran-
domization or judgments of social worth. See, e.g., Childress, Who Shall Live When Not all Can
Live?, 13 SOUNDINGS 339 (Winter 1970). The Seattle experience of weighing social factors in
selecting kidney dialysis patients prior to nearly universal federal funding is often seen as highly
undesirable. See, e.g., Rettig, supra note 1, at 196. Note, Scarce Medical Resources, supra note 94, at
658, 622-66.
106. Cf. Blumstein, Inflation and Qualitv: The Case of PSROs, in HEALTH: A VICTIM OR CAUSE
OF 1NFLATION' 245. 283-85 (M. Zubkoff ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Blumstein, The Case of
PSROs] (local PSROs have no incentive to deny their areas' claims for federally funded services to
save money at a national level).
107. The right to migrate and settle is a "fundamental interest" entitled to a high degree of
constitutional protection. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969). In particular, a state cannot condition its support of nonemergency medical
services for indigents on their length of residence in a county. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
108. A recent news story provides an international analogy. Washington Post, June 26, 1976.
at A8, col. 1. Under Holland's national health insurance plan, access to complicated heart
surgery-largely controversial bypass operations, see note 110 infra-has been limited. The seven
medical centers performing such procedures have been able to accommodate only 1,600 of the
6,000 patients who "need" them each year. After Houston's Dr. Denton A. Coolev was persuaded
to accept Dutch patients at his Texas Health Institute (which performs some 5,500 operations a
year), a Dutch lobbying group won an agreement for their governlment to pay flr such opera-
tions in Texas-at a cost, including air fare, about the same as that incurred in Holland. The
ensuing publicity has prompted the Dutch government to open two new centers for heart
surgery. Id.
109. Cf. Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 5, at 47-51 (need for federal oversight of PSROs).
110. The bypass operation replaces one or more diseased coronary arteries with a transplant
of a patient's own healthy arteries. It is controversial for several reasons. (1) It is very
expensive--about $10,000 per operation. New Studies Should Settle Bypass Surgery Debate, 235 J. AM.
MED. Ass'N 895 (1976) [hereinafter cited as New Studies]. (2) There are many potential patients,
perhaps up to 4 million candidates. McClure, supra note 55, at 24. Sixt) thousand operations
were projected for 1976. New Studies, supra. (3) The procedure's efficacy in prolonging lives is not
well established, although higher risk patients (with multiple-vessel disease) appear to have lower
mortality with surgery than with medical treatment. See Corday, Status of Coronar Bypass Surgers,
231 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1245 (1975); Mundth & Austen, Surgical Measures for Coronary Heart
Disease, 293 NEw ENG. J. MED. 124. 125 (1975). But see Selden, Neill, Ritzmann, Okies & Ander-
son, Medical Versus Surgical Therapy for Acute Coronary Insufficiency, 293 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1329
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costs could be made reimbursable, and new types of equipment would have to
be subjected to premarket screening not only for safety and efficacy but also
for cost effectiveness.' t As yet, the mechanisms for imposing such controls
(1975) (small randomized study showed higher short-run mortality after surgery). (4) Coronary
artery disease is progressive and cannot be cured by surgery, although painful symptoms of an-
gina can be alleviated for some years. See Nei Studies, supra. Further operations may be needed.
(5) Despite symptomatic and functional improvement, surgical patients often do not return to
work. Rimm . Barboriak, Anderson & Simon, Chatnges in Occupation Aftei .4ortocoronary Veo-Bypass
Operation, 236 J. AM. MEn. ASS'N 361, 363 (1976) (bypass patients returned to work at same rate
as survivors of heart attack).
111. It is, however, undeniably difficult to suppress even very costly technology, once it has
developed beyond the experimental stage and doctors and patients have learned of it. A priori
restraint of technological research and developimnt ma ' thus seem to be the best control. Ill-
deed, the high cost of treating catastrophic disease would not be a policy issue of its current
magnitude but for the astonishing recent advances in medical science. Technological proliferation
may now be outpacing not only our ability to pay for it but also our tatreftil consideration of its
other ef fetts on outr way of life (and death). See section IV.A. ifIa. Policy ainalvsts are beginning
to qjuestion tile wisdom of unbridled-indeed, heavily subsidized-medical research and de-
velopment. See sources cited note 65 supra.
The essential concern is that existing technology develops its own lobby and nearlv irresistile
pressure for its widespread, even universal, adoption-at public expense. if' necessary. See gener-
allv Calabresi. Tragic Choices. supira note 81. One response to this insight is to review proposed
research. either addressing dispassionately in advance tile veitual benefits and costs of achieving
particular research goals or establishing general guidelines or criteria fOr tie same purpose. Un-
desirable technology could theoretically be nipped in the bud, therebv' sticcessfulhl limiting its
application to catastrophic disease. This would save considerable investrient and treatment r-c
sources and patients would not need to be denied access to known therapies by planners' fiat,
PSRO order, or simple lack of cash.
Effectuating such a system poses some problems. Even though pubi s)eriding Supplies almost
two-thirds of medical research dollars. PUBLic HEALTH SERVICE. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, FORWARD PLAN FOR HEALTH FY 1977-81, at 62 (June 1975), controlling research
through federal funding has not proved effective, and private investment stimulated by a univer-
sal system of governmentally endowed entitlements Would further weaken federal leverage. See
note 65 supra and accomipanying text. Control over private sector research could rot be achieved
without a drastic change inl tile regulatory envirorment. Denying reiibursemint for tr eatment
modalities resuting from disapproved research-after the analogy of health planning-itight
well be insufficient, and our ight prohibition of' research, perhaps with ciurinal sanctions, might
prove necessary. Such restraints on the freedom of thought and investigation would offend
deeply rooted and constitutionally recognized Values, making administrative problems, themselves
immense, seem to pale in comparison. For an argument favoring freedom of inquiry with respect
to recombinant DNA research (gene manipulation), see, e.g., Cohen, Whe, May Research Be Stopped?,
296 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1203 (977). But see, e.g., Goldstein, Public-Health Policy and Recombinant
DNA, 296 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 1226 (1977) (favors caution and reasonable restraint).
Nonetheless, interest iii infposing sonie constraints ol technology IllaV well Contintue to gross,
and ans detailed proposals will iierit serious contsidceration as a stppleiernt to more direct cost-
contaiment approaches. But such control is at best a partial and long-term hope. Even a Itotl
nior atorittirs of further research-a highlI unlikel,\ prospect-would tot a fect the application of
existing knowledge, and currently available or developing technology is probably far enough
advanced aireads to call forth vastly expanded treatment expenditures, if stifficient resources
become available. Selective controls would flace the difficult problem of predicting %%,here basic
research wsill lead, and a new breakthrough might, on balance, just as casils be beneficial as
detrimental. See note 66 supra. Controls could be limited to applied resear( Is and development,
whose outcomes are more predictable, but even here advance judgments oi the desirability oI
proposals wot Ild be extraordinarily difficut to make. if' only because of tie manifold raiifica-
tions involved: witness the struggles of the government panel trying to decide only whether to
fund development, not Universal availabilitv, of the artificial heart. See ARTIFICIAL HEART
ASSESSMENT PANEL, sop)ra note 6. As difficuth as it will be to implement effective health planning
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have not been devised, though the developing PSRO program is a candidate
to assume the responsibility for establishing national policy on new therapies
and the utilization of equipment of questionable value. t 1'
2. Professional Standards Review Organizations
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) are federally man-
dated regional organizations of practicing physicians assigned responsibility
for supervising the utilization and quality of inpatient care under the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs.' 1 3 Though few PSROs have yet become fully
operational, many proposals have already suggested that they be maintained
as cost and quality monitors under national health programs.14
PSROs are charged with assuring that federally funded health care ser-
vices are medically necessary, meet professional standards, and are rendered
in the proper institutional setting.'1 5 They will act both as rulemakers and as
adjudicatory agencies, establishing general guidelines for medical practice and
also reviewing specific cases for compliance. t 16 Variances from general
guidelines may be allowed if found justified in particular cases; otherwise,
compliance is to be enforced by withholding federal payment for the disal-
lowed services.' t 7 PSRO review does succeed in keeping government itself
from intruding in individual medical decisions, but PSRO's may nevertheless
be perceived by many doctors as a form of government interference, even
though they are largely under the control of local physicians." 8
PSROs were designed primarily to regulate not catastrophic care but the
more routine care that occasions the bulk of current federal health spending.
Their principal cost-related concerns are preventing unnecessary hospital ad-
missions and setting and enforcing length-of-stay standards for typical diag-
noses. The standard of "medical necessity" which they are to employ is not
likely to lead them, at least at the outset, to question what and how much care
and controls on investment, it would be an order of magnitude more difficult to carry out COIl-
prehensive controls on research. Some technological restraints might serve as one compotnent of
an oxerall cost-containment strategy, but such controls probably cannot succeed as the major
element of such a strategy.
112. Another means of control is suggested by the recent Medical Device Amendments of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Star. 593 [codified in scattered sections of 5, 21 U.S.C.], which re-
quires administrative approval of certain medical devices prior to marketing.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c el seq. (Supp. IV 1974). See generally BlUmstein, The Case of PSROs,
sipra note 106: Havighurst & BILInusCin s ulipra note 5.
114. E.g. H.R. 14079 & S. 2513, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 12684 & S. 2970, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) in 1974 Heaings. supia note 41. at 262. See. e.g.. Greenberg, PSRO-On
the Wax. But to Where., 290 NEW. ENG. J. MEnD. 1493 (1974).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). See BlUmstein, The Case tf PSROs. spra note
106. at 263-67.
116. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 5, at 52-54.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9 (Snpp. IV 1974). See Blumstein. The Case aJ/ PSROs. supra note 106,
at 288-90.
118. See Havighurs & Blumstein, sipra note 5. at 57 and n.196.
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for seriously ill patients is properly paid for under federal programs. 1 9
Moreover, PSROs are to enforce professional rather than social norms,t 20 and
cases of catastrophic illness will seldom present obvious problems under this
standard. Also, because PSROs have no stake in the cost consequences of their
decisions, they are unlikely to weigh cost as heavily as potential patient ben-
efits in evaluating any level of care, routine or catastrophic.' 2 1 But, with ex-
tensive governmental financing of catastrophic disease treatments, cost issues
will ultimately have to be addressed in some way.
PSROs are likely to have great difficulty in setting proper limits in dealing
with catastrophic, life-threatening cases. In adjudicating the appropriate level
of catastrophic care in a particular case, PSRO reviewers will frequently con-
front an individual patient whose survival is arguably dependent on treat-
ments already begun and whose doctor is urging continuation of those
treatments.' 2 2 The lifesaving imperative applies with full force here: The sur-
vival and well-being of an identified patient will appear to hang upon the
PSRO decision, and PSROs in such circumstances will face enormous pressure
to avoid overtly placing a limited value on such lives. Moreover, PSRO physi-
cians will have nothing to gain from saying "no" and nothing to lose by saying
"yes" to continued treatment. PSROs have no authority either to reallocate or
to capture any cost savings they achieve, 2 3 savings which accrue instead to the
federal treasury. Although strong federal oversight might bring more cost
consciousness to bear, it is still uncertain whether PSROs will be required to
reflect national policy in their norms.
124
119. Id. at 43. The notion of niedical necessity, however, can be made to teflect some degree
of economic awareness. See id. at 31-33. Stuart & Stockton. Control aver the Utilization of Mledical
Services, 51 MILBANK ME'l. FUND Q.: HEALTH & Soc",, 341, 342-43, 359-76 (1973).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a) (Supp. IV 1974). See Blumstein, The Case of PSROs. supra note
106. at 282.
121. Blumsteini, The Case ofPSROs, stpia note 106, at 283-86: Havighurst & Blumstein, supra
note 5, at 66-68.
122. Although the statute authorizes prior review. 42 U.S.C. § 13 20c-4(a) (2)(B) (Supp. IV
1974), PSROs will t ypically consider whether a specific therapy is necessary and appropriate only
after treatment is begun. DHEW's implementing guidelines emphasize concurretnt and continut-
ing. periodic reviews. Bureau of Quality Assurance, Health Services Adnin., Public Health Ser-
vice. U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, PSRO Program Manual §§ 701, 705 (1974).
Moreover, a patient's doctor will typically support continued therapy: otherwise. the isstue could
not arise for PSRO resiew, since only physicians may order hospital treatment.
The diffic Its Of publicIy ceasing catastrophic, life-sustaining treatment once begun is shown b
the Quinlan case, discussed in section IV.D. intra. Karen Quinlan was irreversibly comatose, and
her parents sought court approval for removing life-supporting machinery against her physicians'
wishes. The opposition by the State of New Jersey to discontinuing life support Under those
circumstances indicates just how difficult it could be for a PSRO's quasi-governmental reviewers
to oppose treatment in the more usual case %%,here patients or relatives as well as doctors seek
continued funding. See generally In le Quinlan. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
123. See Blutmstein, The Case of PSROs, supra note 106, at 256-58, 290-92: Havighurst &
Blumstein, supra note 5, at 50-5 1.
124. Bltustein, The Case of PSROs, supra note 106, at 256-58, 290-92: Havighurst & Bhtntn-
stein, supra note 5, at 47-49 and n. 166.
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Given these influences on their decisions in cases of catastrophic illness,
PSROs would probably be able to refuse further financial support only where
there was virtual professional unanimity that treatment is ineffective and
wasteful. 125 Indeed, the lifesaving imperative might still be difficult to over-
come unless this consensus had been previously formulated in a clear rule
directly applicable to the case and therefore did not have to be faced as a
matter of first impression in the context of a particular patient's case. Thus,
although providers are understandably concerned that PSRO rules will en-
gender "cookbook medicine," the rulemaking function of PSROs may increase
their ability to consider the value of catastrophic treatments dispassionately
-in abstract statistical terms rather than with respect to identified patients. 126
If decisions were made in this way, PSRO decisionmakers might be persuaded
to view themselves not as arbiters of life and death itself but simply as de-
lineators of federal reimbursement policy-that is, as particularizers of the
proper scope and coverage of welfare programs designed to provide decent
and adequate, but not unlimited, care to large populations at reasonable
cost. 127 Moreover, because PSROs' performance of their rulemaking function
is more easily supervised by federal authorities than are their adjudicative
activities, federal policy emphasizing statistical analysis and careful balancing
of benefits and costs could be more readily implemented. On the other hand,
PSRO doctors, as advocates for patient interests, could serve as an effective
counterweight to possibly excessive concern for cost at the impersonal federal
level and thereby help to achieve a proper balance.
Prediction of the ultimate impact of the PSRO program is difficult, but the
prospects for approaching an optimal level of health care spending seem
poor. To date, the medical profession has vigorously promoted the lifesaving
and quality-of-care imperatives, causing federal administrators of the PSRO
program to change the program's primary emphasis from cost control to qual-
ity assurance. 128 Indeed, many anticipate increased rather than decreased
125. Indeed, the former head of the PSRO program spoke in just such terms: "PSRO is not a
cost-control program-it is a waste control program....- Address by Dr. Henry Simmons,
"PSRO and the Quality of Medical Care." before the Indiana Medical Association, May 16, 1974
[hereinafter cited as Simmons speech]. Waste control concerns only unproductive and coutier-
productive treatments, ignoring the difficult and important decisions regarding marginally pro-
ductive care. Id. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 5, at 17-18 & Figs. la & lb. See also
Blumstein, The Case ol PSROs, supra note 106, at 264-65. 286-87; notes 70-75 supra and accom-
panying text.
Professional consensus that a "patient'* was technically dead could also ease a cut-off of federal
funding. See section IV.A. infro.
126. See HavighUrst & Blumstein. supra note 5. at 52-54. The lifesaving imperative is strongest
where identified patients are involved. See notes 75, 78, 79 supra and accompan ying text.
127. See Blumstein, The Case (?f PSROs, supra note 106, at 288-90; Havighurst & Blutastein,
supra note 5, at 54-58 & n.196.
128. QUALT ASSURANCE IN HiosPirALs 4 (R. Egdahl, P. Gertnian. C. Taft & D. Giller eds.
1976); Havighurst & Blumstein, supa note 5, at 40-45.
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costs as a result of giving doctors such power to regulate themselves. 129
Oriented by training, tradition, and the nature of their practice 130 (and in
some cases by their economic and professional self-interest 31 ) to perceiv-
ing medical care in "micro" rather than "macro" terms-that is, as a problem
of protecting individual patients' lives and health rather than as a problem
of allocating society's resources to their best use---doctors are powerful an-
tagonists in any quality-versus-cost debate. Moreover, PSRO decisions are
structured so that issues are perceived only in "yes-no," never in "either-or,"
terms.' 32 PSROs, integrated as they are likely to be with the infrastructure of
organized medicine, may thus become lobbyists for more and better services
and for perpetuating the medical tradition that cost should be no object when
health and particularly life itself may be at stake.' 33
3. Health Maintenance Organizations
A promising nongovernmental mechanism for containing the cost of
health care while maintaining good quality is the Health Maintenance Organi-
zation (HMO).'1 3 The special feature of HMOs is their commitment to pro-
vide all needed care for a fixed price paid in advance. 1 3 The consequent
129. Under PSROs, "the total cost of medical care in this nation may well rise, and if it
does, it will not mean that PSRO has failed. Total cost is not the key issue." Simmons speech,
supra note 125. According to another DHEIW official. PSROs could "induce a ratcheting up pro-
cess, in which the most expensive levels of care would become the norms." Interview with S.
Fleming, DHEW Ass't Sec'y for Policy Development, Am. Med. News, Feb. 26, 1973, at 3. See also
QUALITY ASSURANCE IN HOSPITALS, supra note 128, at 10.
130. Havighurst & Blumstein. supra note 5, at 25-28.
131. Blumstein, The Case of PSROs, suipra note 106, at 270, 286. Nearly open-ended financing
by third-party payers (including Medicare and Medicaid) encourages physicians to achieve the
best care technically possible for their patients with little attention to weighing benefits and costs.
"This is a comfortable position for the physician. The arrangement is made even more cozy by
the coincidence of the physician's pecuniary interest with the welfare maximization interest of the
patient." Id. at 270. See also McClure, spra note 55, at 25.
132. See Havighurst & Blumstein, snpra note 5, at 33-34, 36, 50-51. 53, 63.
133. "Indeed, instead of serving as watch-dogs on behalf of the public at large. PSROs might
well become potent, and virtually unopposed, political instruments for increasing rather than
containing costs." Id. at 66. See also Stone, Professionalism and Accountability: Controlling Health Ser-
vices in the United States and West German y, J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY & LAW (forthcoming 1977).
134. Dr. Paul Ellwood and his colleagues at the Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies (Inter-
Study) in Minneapolis coined the ternm "HMO" to include prepaid group practice, foundations
for iedical care. and other organizations with similar incentives. E.g., Ellwood, Anderson, Bil-
lings, Carlson, Hoagberg, & McClUre Health Alaintenance Strategy, 9 MEn. CARE 291 (1971). See
generallv INSTITUTE OF NIEDICINE, NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HMOs: TOWARD A FAIR MARKET
TEST (policy statenlent, 1974); Egdahl, Fonndations for Medical Care, 288 NEW ENG. J. MED. 491
(1973); Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Services, 35 LAW &
CONTENMP. PROB. 716 (1970); McNeil & Schlenker, HMOs, Competition and Government, 53 MILBANK
MEM. FUND Q.: HEALTH & SOC'Y 195 (1975).
135. This section is concerned with the cost-containing abilities of HMOs, which conventional
wisdon attributes to prepayment. See generall' sources cited note 134 supra. Some analysts, how-
ever, now attach as much importance to the incentives of group practice as to those of prepay-
ment alone. Gaus, Cooper, & Hirschman, Contrasts in HMO and Fee-for-Service Performance, SOCIAL
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necessity for allocating the fixed pool of subscriber prepayments to achieve
the most benefit for subscribers is thought to lead HMOs to strive for effi-
ciency and to pursue only the most cost-effective treatments. More than any
other element in the health care system, HMOs face "either-or" choices and
must decide whether particular treatments or particular risk-reducing mea-
sures, including those for catastrophic diseases, are better investments than,
say, better prenatal care or consumer health education. For these reasons,
HMOs would seem well situated to make the difficult decisions which are
needed if health care costs are to be reasonably controlled.
Unlike the typical private health insurance plans with which they compete
for subscribers, HMOs are heavily committed to caring for catastrophic illness
under their basic contractual undertaking to provide all needed care.
Nevertheless, some HMOs have expressly excluded coverage of organ trans-
plants, psychiatric services beyond a certain amount, and long-term care. 136
Moreover, their contractual obligations would probably be construed to cover
only what was standard in the community, so that exotic treatments such as
heart transplants or other measures still in the experimental stage would not
have to be supplied at plan expense.137 By the same token, expanded cover-
age of catastrophic illness in the fee-for-service sector would probably cause
an expansion of HMOs' obligations unless varied in some way by contract.
Without the incentives to overtreat which are implicit in third-party-
financed fee-for-service medicine, HMOs have featured less hospitalization
and lower overall costs than the fee-for-service sector.13 8 Their performance
probably reflects in part some success in reducing hospital stays in the treat-
ment of catastrophic disease and in employing outpatient and nursing home
facilities to good advantage. Despite their success in controlling these costs,
HMOs are inhibited in several ways from appropriately omitting in the name
of economy any measures which, if taken, might arguably increase by even
the smallest amount the probability of recovery or survival in catastrophic
cases. For one thing, the law of medical malpractice, drawing its standard of
care from medical practice in the larger fee-for-service marketplace, might
SECURITY BULL., May 1976, at 3; The Biggest H.M.O. Advocate Backs Off on Prepayment, MEDICAL
ECONOMICS, Aug. 9, 1976, at 29 (interview with Dr. Ellwood). Finally, it should be noted that
many HMO supporters view the cost-containment capabilities of HMOs as far less important than
the potential of HMOs to increase access to and quality of care. See Havighurst & Bovbjerg,
Professional Standards Review Organizations and Health Maintenance Organizations: Are They
Compatible?, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 381, 383-87.
136. See J. KRESS & J. SINGER, HMO HANDBOOK 114-15 (1975); Yohey, Developing a "Benefits"
Package, in HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE, 1972, at 49
(Medical Group Management Ass'n, 1972).
137. See Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975
DUKE L.J. 1375, 1386-88 & n.36.
138. See generally Donabedian, An Evaluation of Prepaid Group Practice, 6 INQUIRY, Sept. 1969,
at 3; Roemer & Shonick, HMO Performance: The Recent Evidence, 51 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q.: HEALTH
& SOC'Y 21 (1973).
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penalize and thus deter all omissions, even those which were justified on
benefit-cost grounds, by requiring damages to be paid whenever a jury
thought that the omission did not conform to standards of customary practice
and contributed to an injury or death. 139 In addition, regulatory oversight by
PSROs may also force HMOs to adopt prevailing fee-for-service practices.t 40
Finally, a reputable HMO must be concerned about its public image, which
would be damaged by any allegation of corner-cutting in the treating of life-
threatening illness.14 Each of these problems can be expected to become sub-
stantially greater as the fee-for-service sector comes to provide ever more ex-
pensive catastrophic care in response to increased insurance coverage.
Despite these handicaps, HMOs remain a most promising cost-control
mechanism. t 42 If (a big if in the current climate) consumers in the future are
left any reason to consider cost in selecting a health care plan, HMOs could
play an important role in holding down costs to their subscribers and
perhaps, through competition, in the fee-for-service sector as well. Reasonable
HMO innovations and departures from majority practice should therefore be
acceptable, even in the treatment of catastrophic disease. Both legally and
operationally, however, HMOs are now far from being in a position to supply
the needed check on health care cost escalation. Other mechanisms will have
to be relied on, at least in the short run, to control costs under a scheme of
catastrophic coverage.
C. The Impact of Due Process Requirements
The difficulty of making sensitive decisions on the care of particular des-
perately ill individuals-or even on the allocation of resources to lifesaving
purposes in general-could be greatly increased if constitutional procedural
"due process" requirements were held to apply. The more deeply government
becomes involved in decisions about the initiation, conduct, and termination
of catastrophic disease treatments, the more likely it is that such constitutional
guarantees of fair procedures-applicable only to governmental action-could
139. Bovbjerg, supra note 137, at 1389-1407.
140. See Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 135, at 401-11.
141. An HMO's economizing efforts can readily be characterized as unjustified stining on
patient welfare, especially where life may be at stake or where the HMO or its doctors appear to
profit in any way from the savings. Public authorities, consumer advocates, plaintiffs' lawyers, and
fee-for-ser'vice physicians (either supporting quality at any cost or simply opposing their HMO
competitors) will thus Find it easy to stigmatize an' departures fiom customary practices. Only
HMOs with very secure reputations or explicit subscriber acceptance of their policies will be able
to take even the most appropriate gambles with the health or lives of patients. Even well-
established health plans apparently regard themselves as less free than fee-for-service doctors to
"pull the plug" on a moribund patient. Possibly HMOs which are organized as cooperatives or
otherwise have significant consumer participation could more realistically assess the worth of par-
ticular increments of expensive care in critical cases.
142. Other approaches featuring closed-end financing similar to that of HMOs are discussed
in Section V.C. and the Conclusion inrfra.
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be invoked by or on behalf of a patient whose constitutionally protected in-
terests would be threatened by an adverse decision.' 43 If procedural due pro-
cess requirements were applied, great complexities might be introduced, and
the impact of the lifesaving imperative might be substantially increased, for
decisions would then be subject to the glare of publicity, making a stance
seeming to deny or qualify the sanctity of life difficult to maintain.
It is not clear precisely what the due process clause, if applicable,' 4 4 would
be held to require in the circumstances of decisionmaking on financing cata-
strophic disease treatment. Because such decisions are highly sensitive and
complex and frequently must be made under intense time pressure, the
courts would be well advised not to press the requirements too far, despite
the importance of the patient's interest. In recognition of exigencies such as
these in other settings, courts have been flexible in delineating procedural
requirements in varying contexts, and could be expected not to be too de-
manding here.1 45 Nevertheless, a number of troublesome problems would be
encountered even if only the most minimal requirements of notice and hear-
ing were routinely imposed.1 46
Among the other requirements which might be mandated under the due
process clause is prospective specification of standards through rulemaking, a
way of confining discretion that might otherwise be abused. 4 7 Similarly, de-
cisionmakers might be required to make explicit findings of fact and to ex-
plain their reasons for actions taken. 48 In the context of catastrophic illness,
143. U.S. CONST. amend. V.: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " See generally Blumstein, supra
note 85, at 238. The protections of the due process clause (or the equal protection clause, note
184 infra) attach only if state involvement or accountability is sufficient to warrant a finding of
"state action." See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). Normally, a
hospital's mere receipt of federal funds, for example, is not enough to subject it to due process
requirements. Compare, e.g., Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1976) and Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Med. Center Inc.,
507 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1974) (majority rule) with, e.g., Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp.
Assoc. Inc., 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974). See generally Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp.,
423 U.S. 1000 (1976) (dissenting opinion). See also PUB. L. No. 9345, § 401(b), (c), 87 Stat. 95
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (Supp. IV 1974)).
144. Courts must find not only state action but also an interest in life, liberty, or property
before due process safeguards are applied. It is not altogether clear that a decision adverse to a
patient seeking lifesaving treatment would be held to have deprived him of such an interest, but
a strong argument to that effect could be mounted. See Blumstein, supra note 85. at 239: Note,
Due Process, supra note 92.
145. See, e.g.. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school suspensions); Wolff %. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974) (withdrawal of prisoners' credit for good time served).
146. Once it has been determined that due process is required, the issue becomes what pro-
cess is due. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973). Notice and hearing are the most basic requirements. See Blumstein, supra note 85, at 241;
Note, Due Process, supra note 92, at 1744 & n. 53.
147. See generals. K. Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969).
148. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Holmes v. New York City Housing
Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
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however, detailed articulation of standards and reasons pursuant to such
requirements would be highly objectionable: Not only would it gravely inter-
fere with medical practice, 49 but it would also require both explicit ordering
of sensitive priorities and overt interpersonal comparisons, which are bound
to have significant demoralizing effects in an egalitarian democratic society.' 50
In life-and-death cases, adherence to such procedural requirements could
amount to legalistic indecency.1 5 1
Although courts usually make an effort not to impose procedural re-
quirements which are unduly burdensome, ' 2 the difficulties addressed here
could be more surely avoided if the decisions made or the actions taken were
found to be not governmental, but private-that is, found not to constitute
"state action" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 153 The
locus of decisionmaking is thus of paramount importance in determining
whether life-and-death decisions will be dragged into the open for all to see
and for lawyers to contest by the many means at their disposal. As later dis-
cussion will reveal, recent Supreme Court decisions have evidenced a willing-
ness to recognize a large realm of private behavior which is not subject to
procedural requirements. This suggests that structural arrangements which
allow wide scope for private decisionmaking in the provision of care will allow
government to finance catastrophic medical care and yet avoid the worst dis-
tortions attributable to the lifesaving imperative.' 5 '
IV
MAINTAINING GOVERNMENT'S DISTANCE FROM LIFE-AND-DEATiH DECISIONS:
THE EFFECT OF LEGAl DOCTRINE
Public attempts to contain health care costs thus risk direct government
involvement in individual tragic choices; this involvement, in turn, inevitably
creates pressure for ever-increasing spending on catastrophic disease.' 55 But
government's involvement in a human death or suffering can be greater or
less depending on how the financing program is structured and how resource
constraints are given effect. Our sense is that government ought, if possible,
to discharge its responsibilities without placing itself in the position of having
to accept apparent responsibility for every delayable death and preventable
149. CJ Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976) (Court
invalidated prohibition on use of saline amniocentesis technique of abortion, in part because it
arbitrarily interfered with prevailing medical practice).
150. See notes 88-90 supra and accom panving text.
151. But cf. Note, Due Process, supia note 92 (favors such requirements).
152. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
153. See note 143 supra.
154. See section IV.B. & n. 182 inia.
155. Cf Cooper, Health Costs apid Expenditures in the United Kiigdoi, in INTERNATIONAi. HEArliH
COSTS AND EXPENDITURES 93, 102 (Teh-Wei HU ed. 1976) (Fogarty Int'l Ctr. for Advanced Study
in the Health Sciences). (As the "provision gap" between what medical services are possible and
which are available becomes more obvious, pressures for increased services, arise.)
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hurt. Such distancing of government from decisionmaking is directly at odds,
however, with a widely held belief that openness, explicitness, and account-
ability are always virtues which should not be compromised 1 56 and that gov-
ernment has a responsibility to monitor delivery of the services it finances so
as to impose consensually derived, uniform standards of conduct. Neverthe-
less, deep governmental involvement may have high costs, including not only
potentially excessive dollar outlays but a moral and political toll as well.
1 5 7
Avoiding governmental entanglement requires judicial and legislative in-
genuity in allocating decisionmaking authority between the public and private
sectors and in designing programs of public support. In dealing with cata-
strophic disease, this may mean entrusting broad discretion to such private
decisionmakers as patients, their families, and physicians or to more formal
but still "a-responsible" agencies, such as hospital ethics committees. Careful
preservation of areas of private responsibility might be dictated by, among
other considerations, a pragmatic sense that government and courts can do no
better in making sensitive decisions, that openly debating such decisions on
the "merits" would be socially demoralizing and ultimately inconclusive, and
that, in the absence of anything approaching a consensus on such highly
charged questions, it is better to agree to disagree, leaving people to act pri-
vately in accordance with their own beliefs and preferences.
The law determines the extent of the state's involvement in private deci-
sions affecting life and death in many ways, and doctrinal changes could be
made to shield certain such decisions from close public scrutiny. The legal
definition of death is one influence; an altered definition might clarify the
acceptable scope of medical decisionmaking with respect to some moribund
patients. The law of torts and criminal law also influence how catastrophic
care is provided and might be adjusted in subtle ways to make more secure
the current range of private discretion. The most important potential legal
developments, however, are those of constitutional law. Judicially developed
constitutional principles could define a realm of less closely supervised action,
both 1) by confining the reach of constitutional obligations through narrowing
the "state action" concept and 2) by employing the "right of privacy" to de-
marcate an area protected against governmental intrusion. It is useful to con-
sider how certain legal doctrines bear at least indirectly on the problem of
catastrophic disease costs and on the need to achieve an appropriate balance
between public and private decisionmaking in this emotion-laden area.
A. Definitional Approaches
The legal definition of death was, until quite recently, of remarkably little
significance, a matter one might simply look up in Black's Law Dictionary or
156. See, e.g., KATZ & CAPRON, supra note 93, at 3; Note, Due Process, supra note 92, at 1749.
157. See Burt, Authorizing Death for Anomalous Newboras, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 435 (A.
Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976); Calabresi, Tragic Choices, supra note 81.
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Words and Phrases. Doctors traditionally determined when death occurred for
most purposes. 15 8 The time of death as a legal issue seems to have arisen
principally in property disputes, such as in determining which of two joint
tenants died first, allowing the other's heirs to claim the property.'5 9 While
courts fashioned rules for deciding such cases, scholars did not wrestle with
the issue, and no one regarded it as momentous-that is, until the sudden
appearance of cadaver organ transplantation sent everyone scurrying to the
lawbooks, where they found only definitions formulated without much
thought and for very different purposes.' 6 0 Increased interest in searching
for a definition of death reflected in part a new doubt concerning the
physician's trustworthiness: For nearly the first time, physicians faced a strong
conflict of interests-a severe temptation to neglect one patient's rights in
their haste to procure a transplantable organ for another. Whereas a physi-
cian had previously been viewed as wholly dedicated to his dying patient's
welfare, he was now perceived as having developed a worrisome eagerness to
get at the patient's vital parts.
161
The definitional debate also shows the importance of language and per-
ception in shaping policy. Applying the term "dead" to a particular physiolog-
ical state is not merely a mechanical determination of fact by a physician or
other decisionmaker, but is also a normative judgment implicating important
social values.' 1 2 Clearly, our society could not countenance taking vital organs
from a moribund but "live" donor who would thereupon "die." Popular per-
158. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) recognizes "death" as being "defined bv
physicians." See also Frioux, Death, When Does It Occur? 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 10 (1975).
159. See, e.g., In re Estate of Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1968)
(whether husband and wife died simultaneously); Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 587, 317 S.W.2d
275, 279 (1958) (whether testators who named each other in theii respective wills (lied simultane-
ousi). See generally, Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, 8 U.L.A. 605 (1972).
160. Traditional definitions adopted for other purposes do little to clarify transplantation is-
sues. See KATZ & CAPRON, supra note 93, at 205-17; D. MEYERS. THE HUMAN Bony AND THE LAW
97-138 (1970): P. RAMSEY. supra note 105, at 59-112. See general/v Capron & Kass, A Statutory
Definition of the Standards for Deter mining Hunman Death: A Applraisal and a Proposal, 12 1 U. PA. L.
REV. 87 (1972); Sadler & Sadler, Transportation and the Law: The Need for Organized Sensitivity, 57
GEo. L.J. 5 (1968).
161. See, e.g., Corday, Life-Death in Human Transplantation, 55 A.B.A.J. 629, 632 (1969):
[Clertain actions by transplant surgeons in establishing time of death on death certifi-
cates and hospital records have shaken public confidence. Coroners have denounced
them in the press for signing a death certificate in one county when the beating heart
was removed a day later in a far off city. The public wonders what the "item" was that
was transplanted across the state line and later registered as a person iii the operating
See also Shillito. Tie Organ Donors Doctor: A New Role for tie Neirosurgeon, 281 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1071 (1969).
162. See, e.g., KATZ & CAPRON, supra note 93. at 211 ("The formulation of a concept of death
is neither simply a technical matter nor one susceptible of empirical verification. The idea of
death is at least partly a philosophical question, related to such ideas as 'organism,' 'human,' and
'living.' ") See also R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING, AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 24-29 (1976);
Capron & Kass, supra note 160; McCoy, Logic vs. Value Judgment in Legal and Ethical Thought, 23
VAND. L. REV. 1277 (1970).
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ceptions therefore had to be altered so that "dead" persons' organs could be
used to restore life to others threatened by death. The same physiological
state could then be permitted to justify transplantation, so long as the defini-
tional label had been modified to conform to deeply held societal values re-
garding the sanctity of "life."1 63 The new medical notion of "brain death"'16 4
provided a useful definitional shield for the fundamental value choices neces-
sitated by the decision to transplant organs.
This use of definition is one way that difficult life-and-death decisions
have been kept from public scrutiny. The recent prosecution of Dr. Kenneth
Edelin for "killing" an aborted (but arguably "live") fetus' 61 5 highlights the
political importance associated with definitional labels. The prosecutor con-
vinced a jury that Dr. Edelin was guilty of killing a "person," but, in revers-
ing, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that only a fetus "born
alive outside its mother" can be "a 'person' within the meaning of the
[manslaughter] statute."'6 6 The label "nonperson" has the comforting effect
of allowing us to avoid the potentially shocking confrontation with the deeply
held notion that taking a life is impermissible.
The larger public policy debate over abortion similarly reflects the impor-
tance of definitional perceptions. Like the Edelin prosecutor, "right-to-life"
groups have acclaimed the fetus as a living "person," whose civil rights must
be constitutionally protected. Those who favor permitting abortions counter
that the fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a position adopted bv the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.'67
Either Edeli or Roe could have been resolved by a recognition that the fetus
has the requisite elements of "personhood" but that abortion is nonetheless
justifiable. This, however, would have risked a much more substantial breach
of a basic tenet-namely, that the taking of life is illegitimate except in the
most extreme circumstances. The definitional approach has the advantage of
channeling disagreement into the process of categorization itself, not directly
threatening fundamental belief in the sanctity of human "life."
The case of Karen Quinlan' 6 8 illustrates both the symbolic significance of
163. See genralfi
' 
McCoy, supra note 162. at 1290-94. For an express suggestion that the moral
dilemma of' whether to treat defective newborns be defined awa y. see Lachs. stpra note 84. argu-
ing that a -hydrocephalic- infant "is not a person. and the fundanental error of out % ays consists
in thinking that it is one." Id. at 839. But see Heyman & Holtz, "lThe S verelv Defective Newborn: The
Dilemma and the Deci.iia Process,. 23 PUB. PocICs 381. 415 (1975): Llteri' tothe Editor. 295 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 115 (1976). In rebuttal, Lachs conceded that he had meant "hydranencephalic"
infants. but reiterated his major thesis. Id. at 116.
164. Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death.
Report: A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968).
165. Commonwealth %. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d 4 (Mass. 1976). On the impact of the trial court
conviction, see generally Abortion: The Edelin Shock Wave, TIME Mar. 3, 1975, at 54: Culliton,
Manslaughter: The Chaige Against Edelin oj Boston Cit Hospital, 186 SCIENCE 327 (1974).
166. 359 N.E.2d at 12.
167. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
168. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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the life or death label and its limitations as a device for avoiding problems.
Quite clearly, no question about the legality of disconnecting the respirator
which was artificially maintaining her vital signs would have arisen if there
had been a consensus that she was already "dead." Legal complications arose
only because, by accepted medical standards (designed with organ transplan-
tation in mind), Karen Quinlan was "alive." u "'" Yet, as the New Jersey StI-
preme Court realized, she was not living a normal and functional human life
but rather was being maintained in an irreversibly comatose and "persistent
vegetative state.""" While insufficient for transplant "death," this was enough
for the court to realize that the state's interest in preserving her existence was
less substantial than it would have been if she had been medically
salvageable.' 7' Although the court did not pronounce Karen Quinlan dead, it
did allow her life support to be terminated, recognizing that she had a status
akin to death, since she could not hope ever to recover. 172
The Quintlan decision thus had to circumvent an inflexible definition of
death. A less rigid and mechanical definition of death would have presented
fewer doctrinal difficulies. A different approach could recognize that death is
often more a process than an event 173 and explicitly acknowledge that stan-
dards of death can indeed differ-that the conflict of interest involved in
terminating life support to get a transplantable organ to benefit another pa-
tient dictates a more restrictive approach than allowing irreversibly comatose
patients to die because continued life Support is not in their own best
interest. 1 74 A court could thus acknowledge that someone like Karen Quinlan
169. All parties involved stipulated that Karen Quilan was legally and medically -alive.- 70
N.J. at 20, 355 A.2d at 652.
170. 70 N.j. at 25-26. 355 A.2d at 655.
171. 70 N.J. at 4 1-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
172. 70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671. See alo note 232 ila . The notion of' varying degrees of
state interest thus achieves a flexibility in dealing with the process of dying not readily obtain-
able through the usual legal concept of a single instant of death. See note 173 inora.
173. For example, compare Morison, Death: Process or EVeoat?,173 SctH NCE 694 (1971) with Kass,
Death as an Event: .4 Commentary oi Robert Morison. 173 ScIENCt- 698 (1971). See also Shapiro, Organ
Grai/tng in Man, 14 J. FOR. NI t. 41, 41 (1967): "[B]iologicallyN we die in bits and pieces. Not all
parts of the body . . . are equally 'dead' at the same time. Indeed it is this simple thanatological
fact that makes organ transplant possible at all."
174. No one def inition is likely to be satisfa ctory for all purposes, and using different defini-
tions in different citcumstances would provide needed flexibility. It would t0, s.owever, reduce
tie difficultv Of' defining a precise instant of death during a protracted process of' dying.
Moreover, even where an official "bright line" could be drawn, thus permitting the taking of
certain actions with respect to the body which would otherwise be troublesome, the saute deter-
uination could underscore providers' doubts and fears about the medical management of' pa-
tients who had not yet crossed the line. Finally, although lawyers may be comifortable in adopting
different definitions of the same ters according to the circumstances and the result sought to be
achieved, see Dworkin, Death in Context, 48 IND. L.J. 623 (1973), many people might find it un-
seeily to adopt a variety of arguably artificial definitions fi-r such a momentous determination.
Another approach to the definitional probles is to recognize that many decisions need not
turn solely on whether a patient is "alive' or "dead." Thus, deciding when to cease treatment
need not be seen as a problem of' defining just when death Occurs, hut may be treated as a
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could be deemed "dead" for purposes of discontinuing heroic treatment. This
approach might help to dampen the heated rhetoric that swirls around such
cases. Moreover, it would restore to physicians much of their traditional au-
thority to determine, as a "medical" matter, whether death has occurred and,
in consultation with the family and perhaps a hospital committee, that treat-
ment should therefore cease.
Redefining concepts of "death" is thus one way that physicians and family
might be allowed to retain considerable discretion in dealing with these
troublesome issues. Nevertheless, there are substantial limits to our ability
credibly to define away difficult problems, especially for something so laden
with implications as the word "death."' 7 5 The stubbornness of the abortion
controversy reflects the resistance the Supreme Court decision has generated
by using this approach on a similar issue of deep moral significance. Despite
the success of the redefinition of death in the transplant area, many delicate,
intractable problems will not be easily resolvable through the use of labels.
B. "State Action" and Government Involvement
The imposition of constitutional due process requirements could worsen
the socially debilitating side-effects of decisions on catastrophic care. Before
constitutional safeguards under the fourteenth amendment apply, however,
responsibility for specified conduct must somehow be assigned to the state.' 76
Criteria for establishing the existence of governmental answerability have re-
cently been reexamined by the courts in a revival of interest in the so-called
"state action" doctrine.177
One might not ordinarily think of medical decisions, made primarily by
doctors, as involving governmental culpability. A determination by physicians
to undertake one catastrophic procedure rather than another, or even to let a
patient die rather than to undertake heroic measures, would not appear to
implicate the state. But, as governmental financial and regulatory involvement
in health care increases,17 8 treatment decisions might come to be seen as suffi-
ciently implicating government to require application of constitutional stan-
separate issue to be decided upon different grounds-as the Quinlan court in fact did. See notes
171, 172 supra, 233 infra.
175. Although they disagree on the nature of death, Kass and Morison, for example, are
allied in opposition to seeking solutions through -definitional wizardry.- Kass, supra note 173, at
699: Morison, supra note 173, at 695.
176. See note 143 supra.
177. See, e.g., note 182 ii!fra.
178. See, e.g., Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1976). See generally Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975);
Jackson v. Stailer Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied. 420 U.S. 927 (1975);
Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974).
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dards. Medical decisions to turn off a respirator, or not to save a defective
newborn, could then trigger an array of constitutional protections, since the
decisions of the physician, even in his most private relation with patients,
would be seen as a state responsibility.
It is perhaps unlikely that the state action principle would be pressed so
far as to cover essentially private doctor-patient encounters. But in the hospi-
tal context, where most catastrophic care is rendered, physician decisions
which in themselves would be deemed sufficiently private to escape the "state
action" characterization might nevertheless occur in circumstances that would
allow them to be seen as institutional decisions of the hospital. Then, if the
hospital itself were a public institution or were considered to be acting under
color of state law, application of constitutional norms would inexorably
follow.1 79 This problem would be most obviously presented by a decision
made by a physician who happened to be an employee of the hospital rather
than an independent contractor, the more typical relationship. But increased
institutionalization of decisionmaking about catastrophic treatments through
"a-responsible" hospital committees8 ° or through the PSRO program could
increase the probability that medical decisions would be deemed the responsi-
bility of the hospital itself, a view that would find some precedent in the law
of malpractice.' s ' Some decisions, of course, would appear more institutional
than others. For example, institutional arrangements for rationing limited re-
sources by selecting among individuals might seem to involve the hospital as
an institution, even though the actual decisions might conform to traditional
medical norms of triage, long practiced by physicians in the face of acute
(short-term) resource scarcity.
Because of the high emotional and financial costs that would likely flow
from judicial recognition that the tipping point toward government entan-
179. It is, of course, possible for the government to have significant involvement in some
parts of an institution but only limited identification with other facets of its operation. For exam-
pie, if one academic unit of an otherwise private university is publicly supported, then constitu-
tional protections may be afforded to those associated with the state-supported school but not to
those affiliated with the rest of the university. See Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968)
(To support a finding of state action, "the state must be involved not simply with some activity of
the institution alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the
injury. . . [T]he state action, not the private action, must be the subject of complaint.") This line
of authority would focus the state action inquiry on "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. ... Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351 (1974). See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-77 (1972). However,
once state action is found-whether for the institution in all its activities or whether for an indi-
vidual component-then the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment apply.
180. Cf. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (ethics committee), discussed infra at
note 252.
181. Recent years have seen a trend toward increasing institutional responsibility for injuries
formerly attributed solely to physicians. See, e.g., Bovbjerg, supra note 137, at 1386-88 & nn.
37-38.
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glement had been passed, courts should hesitate to apply the state action doc-
trine too mechanically. Recently the Supreme Court has evinced an increased
willingness to recognize a considerable realm of private behavior for which
government is not held accountable. The state action concept no longer ap-
pears to reflect an expansive philosophy of pervasive government responsibil-
ity for perceived social inequities; recent decisions seem inclined to permit
and even protect an area of private sector conduct for which governmental
accountability (and authority) will be attenuated. 182 Applying this approach to
the provisions of catastrophic care would allow successful development of a
strategy for maintaining government's distance from tragic choices. This
technique might formerly have failed because of the view that the state had
an affirmative, nondelegable duty to perform certain "governmental func-
tions," but the Supreme Court has seemed distinctly disinclined to extend
such positivistic notions and indeed has already begun to limit and overrule
previous decisions in this area."" Private decisions on what care should be
rendered in catastrophic cases would seem a prime candidate for viewing as
nongovernmental.
Although the state action doctrine could easily be interpreted to avoid
much of the counterproductive interaction of due process requirements and
the lifesaving imperative in catastrophic illness cases, findings of no state ac-
tion would also rule out judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause to
prevent racial or other discrimination.184 The potential for unreviewable, pos-
sibly systematic discrimination is indeed troubling, but this concern is some-
what mitigated by the possibility that courts can find ways, in practice if not in
theory, to view state action differently where racial discrimination is
involved185 and by the existence of statutory remedies against much private
discrimination. 18 6 In addition, even without constitutional or statutory obliga-
182. See. e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (despite strict regula-
tion, government not responsible for actions of private utility company): Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 (1972) (private shopping center not a public forum for exercise of freedom of
speech): Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Ivis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (government issuance of liqior
license insufficient to attribute private club's racial discrimination to the state): Evans v. Abney,
396 U.S. 435 (1970) (enforcement bv courts of discriminating provision of a private will does not
constitute state discrimination). Cf. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)
(private housing patterns creating residential segregation not the responsibility of the school
board).
183. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Blutnstein, supra note 85 at 238.
184. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I: "No State shall . .. dens to any person within itsjurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws." See note 143 supia.
185. See Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 927 (1975); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137. 1142 (2d Cir. 1973); but see
Jackson v. letropolitan Edison Co.. 419 U.S. 345, 373-74 (1974) (Marshall, J.. dissenting).
186. Several civil rights statutory remedies have either been enacted since 1964 or reinvigo-
rated by the Supreme Court. Title Vt of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1970),
bars disciimination bx anx entity that receives support from oi contracts with the federal
government-an extremely valuable safeguard, since federal financial assistance permeates the
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tions, both public and private hospitals will feel some public pressure not to
make decisions arbitrarily and will adopt procedures which they feel defensi-
ble in the face of public opinion and legal attack under theories of tort or
criminal responsibility. Moreover, the pressure for obtaining sufficient
facilities to avoid the necessity for explicit and possibly discriminatory ration-
ing in critical cases will be nearly overwhelming in any event.' 8 7 Thus, other
social and legal controls may reduce the need for the additional protections of
constitutional due process requirements.
C. Legal Liability and Vital Medical Decisions
1. Tort Law
Only recently has tort law begun to impinge upon sensitive decisionmak-
ing in catastrophic medical care, especially critical or terminal care. Given the
variety of theories under which potential plaintiffs might seek legal redress
with respect to care given to dying patients, it is surprising that so few have
ever done so, especially since medical advances have provided physicians with
so many means of affecting the time and manner of "death," however
defined.' 88 With the ever growing sophistication of medical technology and
medical litigants, more legal concerns are likely to emerge in the future, par-
ticularly if more generous funding leads some people to expect more heroic
medical efforts than seem desirable to providers of care.
The current malpractice "crisis" has made doctors and hospitals acutely
aware of their potential legal liabilities,' 8" and their vague fears of suit and
medical sector in general and the research and hospital subsectors in particular. Indeed, the inere
threat of enforcement thirotigh cut-off of federal funds Could be enough t prompt an instittion
to seek accommodation rather than risk its financial integrity by confrontation.
Even discrimination not resulting from state action mav have statutory remedies. Although
ained primarily at hotels and motels, Title 11 of the 1964 Act could plausibly be applied to
discrimination by a hospital, as an "establishment which provides lodging to transient guests," 42
U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(I) (1974)-a provision the Court has seemed to construe broadly. See. e.g.,
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (snack bar and recreational facilities held to make lake resort
such an "establishment"). Moreover, ever since Joates v. Al/t'ed H. Mao Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968),
the Supreme Court has given far-reaching interpretations to Reconstruction Era civil rights legis-
lation. Most recently, the Court has interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), which guarantees all
persons the same right of contract enjoyed b white citizens, to bar racial discrimination by pri-
vate parties. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (private schools). CJ. Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (no "state action" required for suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1974)).
187. See text accompanying notes 104 & 105 sipra.
188. Doctors allowing patients to die might be sued for negligence, wrongful death, aban-
clonnient. or breach of an implied contract to do everything possible to sustain life. Few cases
have been reported. At least one civil suit has been brought, Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831 (Rich-
mond, Va., t. & Eq. Ct., May 23, 1972), discussed its R. VEATCH, stpa note 162, at 21-24 el
passim, KATZ & CAPRON, tpra note 93, at 213-15. See adst) The State oJ Life-aid-Death Law: Chaotic,
National Observer, Aug. 21, 1976, at 4, col. 3 (suit for removal of decedent from respirator said
"first ever").
189. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WNELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF iTHE
SECRETARY'S COMMISSION 20 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DHEW, MEDICAL MALPRACTICF];
MALPRACTICE IN Focus (An AMA Source Document prepared b' the editors of Prisii, 1975).
Page 122: Autumn 1976]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 40: No. 4
their cautious lawyers' advice in this area may be further advanced than the
actual state of litigation. "Defensive medicine"-undertaking particular diag-
nostic or therapeutic procedures more for legal protection than for medical
benefit-is apparently enough of a problem with regard to superfluous lab
tests and the like in everyday medical care. 190 Should it become prevalent
in catastrophic care, not only high costs but also unwarranted suffering for
terminal patients and their families could result. To some extent, the PSRO
statute may provide a valuable safeguard against any such trend. Since ad-
herence to PSRO norms immunizes a provider from malpractice liability for
failure to undertake procedures beyond PSRO norms, 191 PSROs might help
providers avoid extravagant care-provided that PSROs could be persuaded
to find that certain heroic measures, which might otherwise be undertaken for
legal protection, were not medically necessary.
Moreover, liability fears even more than ethics and medical tradition may
lead physicians to neglect the wishes of patients and families' 92-forestalling,
for example, obedience to the terms of a "living will." Such a will encourages
providers to adhere to a patient's own previously expressed wishes about the
nature and extent of catastrophic medical care to be provided. Early versions
were simple documents which arguably failed to present enough information
to elicit truly informed, reflective choices, taken with awareness of their im-
portance. But recent versions are more sophisticated,19 3 and California's
190. See, e.g., DHEW, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. sUpra note 189, at 14-15: Welch, Medical
Malpractice. 292 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1372, 1375 (1975).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (Supp. IV 1974); See geoerallv Carter, Medical Malpractice Immou-
aitv: A Realistic Prognosis Jor the Social Security Act's Civil Immuonity Provisin, 47 Miss. L.J. 621
(1976).
192. One nationwide poll of random]\ selected physicians found that two-thirds named legal
constiaints- as factors which *,might keel) them ftom acceding to a [terminaly ill] patient's
wishes" about care, whereas only one-fifth listed "ethical constraints." 94.5 per cent nonetheless
said they try to follow a patient's expressed wishes. Am. Med. News/Impact, Jan. 24, 1977, at 3,
col. 4. Although theoretically a physician must always obtain informed consent to treatment from
his patients or their surrogates, see note 224 mfra. in practice a doctor (or hospital) has great
control over the style of practice undertaken, especially in the routine management of patients.
Moreover. informed consent need not be obtained in emergencies. E.g., A. HOLDER. MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ILAW 227 (1975).
193. For example, cotttpare Kuttner, Due Process of Euthaasia: The Livig Will, A Proposal, 44
IND. L.J. 539 (1969) With Bok, Petsonal Directiootsfor Care at the Eid qfLije. 295 NEW ENG. J. MED.
367 (1976). See also Note. Informed Coseat acl the Dvig Patient. 83 YALE L.J. 1632, at 1663-64 &
nn. 174-75 (hereinafter cited as Note, hofoired Cotsettt). Providers' reliance on even a sophisticated
"living will" may still be criticized for not anticipating a particular eventuality and for not allowing
signers to change their minds. Of course, ay involtitary treatment decision is less satisfactory
than contemporaneous informed consent, but perfection is unattainable by an%' proxy
decisionmaker-whether family, doctor, or court-and in this light the "living will" is more ac-
ceptable.
[he law properly views with unease any involuntarv cessation of treatment allegedly based
upon the prior consent of an incompetent patient, and courts should demand good evidence of
its seriotisIess and informed nature. Thus, in the Quinlao case, discussed iafta, both trial and
appellate courts dismissed as inconclusive evidence that the comatose patient had repeatedly said
COSTS OF CATASTROPHIC DISEASE
Natural Death Act 9 4 recently legitimized the use of a similar but more formal
"Directive to Physicians."
The California statute creates a carefully limited "right to die"'9 5 and con-
stitutes a first step in assuring legal protection for providers who wish to
honor individual decisions to terminate heroic medical treatment. The Act
finds that "adult persons have the fundamental right to control ... the deci-
sion to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of
a terminal condition."' 96 Any competent adult may execute a directive asking
that life-sustaining procedures for terminal conditions be withheld or with-
drawn. Providers acting pursuant to a patient's directive, executed under the
protective safeguards of the statute,1 97 are immunized from civil or criminal
liability. Although no provider is obligated to follow the patient's directive, a
physician's "failure to effectuate the directive . .. shall constitute unprofes-
sional conduct if the physician refuses to make the necessary arrangements,
or fails to take the necessary steps, to effect the transfer of the . . .patient to
another physician who will effectuate the directive ...... 198 The California
Act thus eliminates any need to act in professional self-defense rather than to
abide by uncoerced, rationally articulated patient choices.
Because catastrophic and especially terminal care present such personal,
value-laden issues, state courts, applying common law principles, should rec-
ognize that a single objective community standard of care may well be too
inflexible and that consensual arrangements should be fostered to accommo-
date the variety of human responses in this sensitive area. 99 Courts will of
that she never wanted to be kept alive b extraordinary means. In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super
227, 260, 265, 348 A.2d 801, 814, 819 (1975), 7) N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976). A
well-executed and sophisticated living will offers rather more safeguards in this regard than evi-
dence from informal past conversations. But, for an argument that a broad-based panel should
rule on whether to accept any such will, see R. BUTLER, WHY SURVIVEr BEING OLD IN AMERICA
378-79 (1975).
194. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1976).
195. See note 218 infra and accompanying text.
196. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1976).
197. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1976).
198. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Stipp. 1976).
199. Malpractice lass has typically required providers to follow the standard of care prevailing
in a given locality, e.g., 1 1). LoUlSELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 8.06 (1973)-
potentially including how much effort to make in catastrophic cases. However, since so much
acute or catastrophically expensive care is the province of hospital-based medical specialists, a
uniform nationwide standard might be applied. See, e.g., Naccarato v. Grob. 384 Mich. 248, 180
N.W.2d 788 (1970). In either case, a single objective standard would not be applied if the practice
objected to (say, refusing to undertake potentially life-prolonging measures) were followed b\ a
"reputable" or "respectable" minority of providers. E.g., I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, oupro. at
8.04.
Clear judicial acceptance of consensual determination of care in appropriate cases xwould
nonetheless be helpful in motivating providers to follow their patients' swishes rather than undue
malpractice fears. Cf. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The CaseJbo Cosxtract. 1976 A.B.F. RESEARCH J.
87 (favors more consensual approach generally).
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course have a central role in assuring that consent is conscientiously sought
and freely given.
2. Criminal Law
Although its precise effect is impossible to quantify, the criminal law both
embodies our society's high valuation of life and bolsters the lifesaving im-
perative in medical care. Indeed, implementing medical decisions whose nor-
mal and natural consequence may be death is theoretically homicide. 20 Yet
providers of catastrophic medical care do and must routinely make such deci-
sions, and even a remote legal threat doubtless has some impact on doctors
treating critically ill patients. In practice, providers probably have very little
reason to fear the application of criminal sanctions, but simple nonenforce-
ment and looking the other way-as prosecutors and others have routinely
done in the past- '-may no longer suit the tenor of the times.2 0 2 The life-
and-death decisions necessitated by advanced medical technology are becom-
ing more and more frequent and visible to the public at large, and several
recent events suggest that such treatment decisions will not always be kept out
of the public domain and the criminal courts. 20 3
Some degree of safety for decisionmakers may be sought through doctri-
nal subtlety. For example, allowing a patient to die without undertaking
heroic life-sustaining efforts might be characterized as an omission rather
than an act.2 0 4 But such distinctions probably provide insufficient security for
200. See, e.g.. G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL lAw 261-64, 326 (1956);
Survey, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAs.
1202. 1203. 1213, 1229 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Survey. Euthanasia]. See also D. MEYERS, sopra
note 160, at 150-52.
201. See generally, D. MAGUIRE, Death by Choice 23-24 & n.5 (1975); Survey, Euthanasia, supra
note 200, at 1203, 1213, 1229.
202. The same kind of considerations that lead many to press for "open" procedures to make
life-and-death decisions, see note 156 supra and accompanying text, would support more ptblic
resolution of similar issues in criminal law as well.
203. Among these are the Edelin case, supra note 165, and the decision by the Attoiney Gen-
eral of New Jersey to intervene in the Quinlan litigation. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 19-20; 355
A.2cd 647, 651-52 (1976).
204. See, e.g., D. MAGUIRE. snpra note 201, at 45-46: Fletcher. Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L.
REV. 999, 1008 (1967). However. since medical providers have a dut to treat patients, even
omission nias be culpable, Unless the duty is somehow limited. Notions of customary standards of
care might set boundaries to crininal as well as civil liability, see note 199 supra, or the diy could
be limited to providing "ordinary care. See, e.g.. Robertson, Involuontar Euthanasia of Defective
Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213, 235-37 (1975). What constitutes "ordinary" care
is. however, highly subjective. See, e.g., P. RAMSEY, supra note 105, at 1 18-32; R. VEATCH, supra
note 162, at 106-10. Alternatively, the notion of patient consent could be borrowed from civil law
to limit the doctor's duty to providing desired care. Here the legal hurdle is the maxim that one
cannot consent to murder. See, e.g., Survey, Euthanasia, supra note 200, at 1205.
Other legal subtleties could also be relied upon: (1) The cause of death might be held to be the
underl ing catastrophic condition rather than the lack of care. Compare Elkinton, The Dying Pa-
tient, The Doctor, and the Law. 13 VILL. L. REV. 740, 743 (1968) and In ie Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,
51-52. 355 A.2cd 647. 670 (1976) with Robertson, snpra, at 237-39. (2) The doctrine of necessit
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physicians, patients, and public alike. 20 5 A better approach is to protect some
private decisions from public scrutiny. Living wills and the California
statute20 accomplish this to some extent. A more thoroughgoing way of
achieving this result is considered next-the possibility of recognizing con-
stitutional limits on the power of the state to intrude upon such personal and
family decisions.
D. Constitutional Delineation of Private Realms-
Karen Quinlan and Beyond
In structuring government's role in catastrophic illness, it would prove
profitable to build upon our society's experience in dealing with other impor-
tant symbolic issues. Our constitutional system does, for example, limit gov-
ernmental intrusions into some religious or quasi-religious affairs because of
the very real dangers which flow from government's involvement. 20 7 Thus, a
restricted sphere for public action has been laid down by the establishment of
the religion clause of the Bill of Rights208 and by the Supreme Court in cases
involving contraception2 09 and abortion.2 10 These recognitions that it is some-
times desirable for government to be kept at a distance from the swirl of
unresolvable policy problems may carry over to other areas, such as cata-
strophic disease, where appearances, symbolism, and individually held fun-
damental values often dominate substantive outcomes. 21 1
The first amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion
gave constitutional effect to its ratifiers' experience that governmental inter-
ference in or involvement with religion endangered not only religious institu-
tions but democratic ones as well. Whereas the free-expression provisions of
the first amendment2 12 adopt the view that an open marketplace of ideas
most constructively channels disagreement and resolves political conflict, the
might be invoked. Compare Robertson, supra, at 239-43 with Williams, Euthanasia ad Abortion, 38
U. CoLo. L. REV. 178, 183 (1966). (3) The quality of intent or motive legally required for crimi-
nality could be re-examined. See, e.g., D. MAGUIRE, supra note 201, at 37-41.
205. See, e.g., Fletcher, The Patient's Right to Die, HARPER'S, Oct. 1960, at 138, 143 ("a Very
cloudy distinction"); Morison, supra note 173, at 696-97 (distinction is as arbitrary as the position
of zero on Fahrenheit temperature scale); Note, lnjormed Conseat, supra note 193, at 1649-50
(1974) (not a distinction, but a continuum).
206. See notes 193-98 supia and accompanying text.
207. See geneiallv Tribe, The Supieme Court, 1972 Teii-Foieword: Towards a Model sf Roles in
the Due Process 01 Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).
208. U.S. CONsr. amend. 1: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion .... ; see, e.g., Lemon %. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
209. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
210. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
211. See section IL.A. supra.
212. U.S. CONsi. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press...."
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establishment clause embodies a judgment that public decisions arrived at
through exchange of ideas and majority vote are inappropriate where the
issues may involve faith more than reason. The establishment clause therefore
removes religion from the political realm, thus avoiding the permanent divi-
siveness that could result from the drawing of political battle lines according
to religious convictions. 2 13 In establishment clause cases, government is ad-
monished not to become "entangled" in religion because of the substantial
risk to democratic and religious institutions alike in permitting any significant
interrelationship between them. 2
1 4
Contraception and abortion are examples of intensely debated issues with
significant religious or quasi-religious undercurrents. One important achieve-
ment of the Supreme Court's invalidation of state prohibitions in these areas
has been to prevent government from having to take a side-"for" or
"against"-in highly charged ethical controversies. 21 5 Although many anti-
abortionists do not accept the state's position as ethically neutral in that con-
troversy, technically, at least, abortion questions have been largely left to per-
sonal choice. Indeed, the intensity of feeling and unwillingness to compromise
that permeate the abortion debate clearly demonstrate the dangers of
politicizing such issues, with their strong overtones of personal ethical values
and religious beliefs about the nature of life. Many issues involved in the
treatment or nontreatment of catastrophic disease present similar concerns
and cannot be resolved without violating some moral tenet which many peo-
ple would not wish to see society offend.2 16
The abortion cases extended the scope of the constitutional interest in pri-
vacy to protect the right of a woman to decide, in consultation with her physi-
cian, to have an abortion. The state was in effect forbidden to prohibit or
even to regulate early abortions, beyond requiring that they be performed by
a licensed physician. 217 This notion of a private realm free of state intrusions
213. In Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602 (1971), Chief Justice Burger noted regarding aid to
parochial schools: "Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan,
are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political
division along religious lines was one of the primary evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect." Id. at 622.
214. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). "Entanglement" is a third test for whether
government action constitutes establishment of religion, the other two being secular legislative
purpose and principal or primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion. Bd. of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US. 602 (1971). the entangle-
ment notion took on two dimensions, administrative and political, of which only the latter is of
importance for this discussion. See Roemer v. Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 373 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
215. See Tribe, supra note 207. But see Maher v. Roe, 45 U.S.L.W. 4787 (U.S. June 20, 1977)
(state refusal to pay for nontherapeutic abortions tinder Medicaid not unconstitutional even when
state pays for more expensive costs of childbirth).
216. See Burt, supra note 157; Calabresi. Tragic Choices, supra note 81.
217. Under Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), permissible state intervention increases as
pregnancy advances. Abortion cannot be proscribed in the first trimester, but may be regulated
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is reflected in other developments and could be extended to exclude the state
from imposing its standards on other private medical decisions, including
those involving life and death-thus establishing a kind of "right to die. '218 A
number of precedents, culminating in the recent and widely publicized case of
In re Quinlan,21 9 illustrate the direction the law seems to be taking toward
reserving to individuals the right to determine their own destinies when con-
fronted with catastrophic disease.
Judicial decisions have allowed competent patients (or relatives acting on
behalf of incompetents) to refuse some medical treatments, even where the
result was likely to be fatal; many cases involve Jehovah's Witnesses' objections
to blood transfusions. 220 Courts have intervened mainly to protect minor chil-
dren from being victimized by their parents' religious convictions, either
where a child's own life is at stake or where the afflicted individual has minor
dependents. 221 In varying degrees, the rationale for self-determination re-
flects the free exercise clause,222 the right to privacy, 22  and the well-
established doctrine of informed consent to medical treatment. 2 4 The free-
in the second trimester in the interest of safeguarding the mother and may be forbidden in the
third trimester in the interest of protecting the viable fetus. Under Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), states may limit the performance of abortions at any stage
to licensed physicians only.
218. Although legally something of a misnomer, since there is no fundamental, unconditional
right to die or to be killed, this expression is firmly rooted in popular consciousness. See, e.g., THE
DYING PATIENT (0. Brim, H. Freeman, S. Levine, & N. Scotch, eds. 1970) (overview with anno-
tated bibliography); Fletcher, supra note 205. See also text accompanying note 195 supra.
219. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
220. See, e.g., In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Il. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (court refused to
order transfusion). But see, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279
A.2d 670 (1970) (transfusion authorized). See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 39, 355 A.2d 647,
663 (1976). For general discussions, see R. VEATCH, supra note 162, at 116-63; Cantor, A Patient's
Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity versus the Preservation of Life, 26
RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 228-36 (1973). Unless the medical provider counseling an undesired trans-
fusion seeks court authorization, the unwilling patient may have little legal recourse. If the pro-
vider simply proceeds with treatment, the patient probably would not have time to seek advance
judicial intervention to prevent it, and after-the-fact suit for battery or negligent failure to get
informed consent is unsatisfactory. Not only is an action for monetary damages unlikely to as-
suage the perceived spiritual harm, but the factfinder is unlikely to make a significant award after
setting off the value to the patient of the transfusion's presumedly lifesaving effects. In the latter
respect, such suits are like those for "wrongful life" brought by plaintiffs claiming they would
have been "better off" dead; courts have greeted these with little favor. E.g., Gleitman v. Cos-
grove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). See also Comment, Liability for Failure of Birth Control
Methods, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1187 n.4 (1976). Legal questions could arise of course over
the patient's liability to pay the bill for the unwanted service.
221. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962)
(child); Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (mother of baby). See generally R. VEATCH, supra note 162,
at 123-36, 155-61.
222. See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 220, at 238-39; Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and the
Free Exercise of Religion, 42 IND. L.J. 386 (1967).
223. See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 220, at 239-42.
224. E.g., Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962); see generally
HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.1 (1956); Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal
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dom thus guaranteed individuals to influence their own treatment, even to
make what most people would regard as patently wrongheaded decisions with
possibly fatal consequences, 225 suggests that judges may be more respectful of
patients' rights and more aware of the distorting influence of the lifesaving
imperative than are more political institutions.
226
Although legal doctrine can easily be found to support voluntary self-
determination for competent adults, serious problems arise where a patient is
unconscious, comatose, or otherwise incompetent to participate in decisions
on catastrophic care. 227 Traditionally, care for such patients has been infor-
mally determined by the victim's doctor, in consultation with the patient's
family. The growing complexity of potential medical interventions and in-
creased concern about possible legal liability has led to a search for a more
formal solution.
The leading case involving an incompetent patient and involuntary cessa-
tion of treatment is that of Karen Quinlan, a young unmarried adult main-
tained in a "chronic persistent vegetative state' '22 8 through artificial life sup-
port. When her condition remained essentially hopeless after several months
of treatment, her parents requested that such extraordinary measures be dis-
continued and released the medical providers from all liability. 2 9 Her doctors
resisted this choice, and her father applied to a New Jersey court to be named
her guardian and given express judicial authorization to have disconnected
the respirator maintaining her vital functions. 2 3 0 The trial judge refused to
intervene, saying Karen Quinlan was "alive, ' 23 ' and that the "compelling state
interest . . . in preservation of life" and the "doctor's duty to provide life-
giving care" meant that "there is no constitutional right to die that can be
asserted by a parent for his incompetent adult child.
23 2
Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970); Note, Informed Consent, sopra
note 193, at 1648: "The patient's right to an informed consent makes no sense without a right to
an informed refusal." Constitutional notions of privacy and free exercise of religion may underlie
the consent doctrine in this area. Id. at 1644-45 & nn.75-76: In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 39-40, 355
A.2d 647, 663 (1976) (apparently limited to terminal patients). In any case, all three rationales
are similar in supporting individual self-determination against government intervention.
225. Cf. Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000,
rehearing denied, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964): "[T]he 'right to be let alone' [is]
. .. intended to include a great many foolish, unreasonahle and even absurd ideas which do not
conform, such as refusing medical treatment even at great risk." 331 F.2d at 1017 (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
226. Cf In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 28-29. 355 A.2d 647, 657 (1976) ("the supposed [medical]
imperative to sustain life at all costs").
227. See generallv R. VEATCH, snpra note 162, at 136-59.
228. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 23-24, 355 A.2d 647, 654 (1976).
229. In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 250, 348 A.2d 801, 813-14 (1975) (trial court).
230. 70 N.J. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
231. 137 N.J. Super. at 256, 348 A.2d at 817.
232. 137 N.J. Super. at 265-66, 348 A.2d at 882. The trial court concluded that the decision
whether to continue care should be "left to the treating physician" as "a medical decision, not a
judicial one." 137 N.J. Super. at 260, 348 A.2d at 819. Here, the attending physician had testified
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed. Though Karen Quinlan was
not dead, she could never hope to recover, and the state's interest in preserv-
ing her life was consequently attenuated.2 33 Her constitutional right of privacy
was held "broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical
treatment under certain circumstances, ' 234 among them her irreversible con-
dition, and could be exercised by her father as guardian. 235
The interest of physicians in practicing medicine according to professional
medical standards was not directly assessed, but the patient's and her
guardian's right to choose whether or not to accept treatment was held
paramount;2 36 she (or her guardian) was entitled to select her doctors (and
thus their style of practice).2 3 7 The court recognized that removal fiom the
respirator would not conform to medical practice, standards, and traditions,
but refused to be bound by a professional medical standard.13 8 Rather it un-
dertook to establish a standard for involuntary cessation of life support that
would be "responsive not only to concepts of medicine but also to the com-
mon moral judgment of the community at large."23 9 The proper rule of deci-
sion was not "life" or "death" as medically defined, 2 4I but rather salvage-
ability-"the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of a return to cognitive
and sapient life."' 24t Discontinuation of life support, even in the face of almost
certain death, could not only be a rational choice but would also be the choice
of an "overwhelming majority" of society. 242
The Quinlan decision therefore allows treatment to be terminated with the
consent of the patient's guardian where a patient is not medically salvageable,
that turtning off the respirator would be a "substantial deviation trot medical tradition,' 137 NJ.
Super. at 250, 348 A.2d at 814. The court concluded that, at least under these circumstances,
discontinuing treatment would be homicide Under the law of New Jersey. 137 N.J. Super. at 262,
348 A.2d at 820.
233. 70 N.J. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664: In the continuum of'life-sustaining treatments, "as the
dlegree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims ... there comes a point at which the
individual's rights overcome the State interest [in preserving life].' See also notes 169-72 supra and
accompanying text. This view of the State interest may Undercut the COtl- Is seeming acceptance
of (competent) terminall' ill patients' unqualified right to refuse treatment. 70 N.J. at 39-42. 355
A.2d at 663-64.
234. 70 N.J. at 39-40, 355 A.2d at 663.
235. 70 N.J. at 41-42. 355 A.2d at 664. The "circumstances" the court found relevant appar-
eitl included its opinion that "the overwhelming majort it'" of society would also choose to cease
life support. Id. In permitting refusal of treatment. the cotu11 did not. howevCi, sUbstitute its
judgment for that of the patient or guardian, as some cotHis have in ompelling ireatrient, See
sources cited note 220 supra.
236. 70 N.J. at 39-41, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
237. 70 N.J. at 54. 355 A.2d at 671.
238. 70 N.J. at 25-26. 44-47, 355 A.2d at 655, 666-67.
239. 70 N.J. at 44, 355 A.2d at 665. Acknowledging that the dilemma was Usuall' t esolved in
a low-visibility decision by familh and physician without judicial involvement, the court argued
that setting the standard was a "nondelegable judicial responsibility." Id.
240. Id.
241. 70 N.J. at 50-51, 355 A.2d at 669.
242. See note 235 supra.
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provided this medical judgment is affirmed by a hospital ethics committee or
similar body.2 4' The principal decision is thus firmly lodged within the
"patient-doctor-family relationship,"' 4 with the physician providing important
information and in a sense validating the treatment choice.245 The hospital
committee review diffuses professional responsibility, easing pressure on indi-
vidual doctors, who may face conflicts of interests.2 46 Yet at the same time it
243. 70 N.J. at 54-55, 355 A.2d at 671-72. The court drew the idea for a committee from
Teel. The Physiciao's Dilemmna: A Doctar's View: What the Lao, Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6, 8-9
(1975). Cf., e.g., KATZ & CAPRON, sopral note 93, at 222-35 (" Institutional Advisory Committee"); J.
WILSON. DEATH BS DECISION 176-80 (1975) ("committee of medical and non-medical specialists").
Few institutions now% have such conlmittees. N.Y. Times, Jtine 27, 1976, § 1. at 36, col. 3. See also
Fried, Terminating Life Support: Out of the Closet!, 295 NEW ENG. J. M ED. 390 (1976).
244. 70 N.J. at 50-51, 355 A.2d at 669.
245. The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the "[t]he participation by the at-
tending physician in the abortion decision, and his responsibility in that decision ...." Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 61 (1976) (discussing Roe. v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)). See also id. at 89-92 (Stewart, J., concurring) indicating concern for the "chill-
ing" of a physicians's professional judgment and emphasizing the importance of minors' seek-
ing nonbinding counsel prior to undergoing an abortion. The device adopted in Quinlan, allow-
ing a parental guardian to choose the attending ph ysicians, protects the patient's right to choose
ft-om the dominance of any particular doctor but retains the physician's validating and legitimat-
ing role.
It is arguable that the requircntent for approval by a hospital committee rtins afoul of the
standard enutnciated in Doe v. Bolton. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). a companion abortion case to Roe v.
Wade. The Georgia statute examined in Bolton had defined circtinstances under iwhich abortions
would he permitted, including a requirement-held unconstitutional-that a hospital abortion
contmmittee approve abortions in advance. However, once Roe made it clear that a woman has a
right to receive an abortion in accordance with her physician's best medical jtldgment, the review-
ing committee became "basically redundant," since the comparatively simple medical judgment
could be made by the physician without any assistance from the committee. 410 U.S. at 197. In
abortion cases, the wotnan is presumably capable of safeguarding her own interests, and under
Roe the state's interest in the potential life of the fetus is not compelling until tile point of viabil-
its; so the existence of the abortion review committee is overls restrictive of the woman's rights.
Bs contrast. a comatose patient like Karen Quinlan cannot exercise her own constitutional
rights, and whether a guardian should be allowed to do so hinges on whether there is a "reason-
able possibility" that the patient will regain cognition. 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 672. This medi-
cal decision conseqtiently takes on considerably more constitutional significance than physician
judgments in abortion cases. The hospital review committee contemplated in Qmoian is expected
to provide significant professional consultation to the attending physician in making this difficult
and important determination. Moreover, in cases like Qoduian tfle state's interest in preserving life
is far stronger than in the abortion context, diminishing only %%-here it appears that the patient
cannot reasonably be expected to regain a "cognitive, sapient state." Id. Having that determina-
tion made by a physician and validated by a consultative hospital committee therefore rejects a
legititate state concern, It is not tile redundant and unduly restrictive review for abortions struck
down in Bolton . Presuiabls, however, Under Qaiola in, j Lst as tile guardian can choose the attend-
ing physician, the guardian or physician could shift a comatose patient fr-om a hospital whose
reviewing comnmittee declined to approve cessation of heroic treatment. Otherwise. the panel
would have a veto power akin to the one fiund objectionable in the Planned Parenthood case,
supra.
246. The New Jersey court was verys concerned about the potential conflict a physician faces
in serving his patient yet protecting himself fron malpractice or criinliral liability. 70 N.J. at 49,
355 A.2d at 668. But cf. Burrt, supra note 157 (maintaining potential physician criminal liability for
withholding treatment from anomalous newborns serves valid function of restraining abuse).
Other possible sources of conflict include the desire to obtain transplantable organs, see note 161
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provides a check on private decisions,2 4 7 thus perhaps allowing government to
remain further in the background than it otherwise could.
The Quinlan court carefully kept the state at a distance in this process,
even while establishing the salvageability standard by judicial decision. It em-
phasized that courts are ordinarily "inappropriate" for making the actual
decisions2 48 and refused to grant express permission for shutting down the
respirator.24 9 The court also removed all civil or criminal liability for private
decisions made under the Quinlan circumstances, whether by family, guard-
ian, physician, or hospital.2 5 0
supra and accompanying text, the desire to save treatment costs (where doctors or hospital beat-
some of the expenses, as in an H MO or for charitv patients), and the desire to transfer scarce
medical resotirces to the use of another patient deemed more needs.
247. 70 N.J. at 50. 355 A.2d at 669: "Moreover, such a systeI Wotuld be protective to the
hospital as well as the doctor in screening out. so to speak, a case which might be contamnitnated
by less than worthv motivations of family or physician." The danger, of cotutse, is that an occa-
sional physician might make himself available as a "gun for hire" to families less conscietious
than the Quinlans and more interested in saving treatment costs or hastening their inheritance
from an elderly relative. Yet medical custom and practice could supply checks on abuses, since
the constitutional right of privacy could be held to shield frout criminal prosecution only actions
in the mainstream of medical tradition. For an argument that formalization of medical standards
would be desirable, particularly in clarifying the physician's duty in counselling families and his
duty not to implement purely selfish choices, see Robertson, supra note 204, at 266-69.
Concern ma' be strongest in the case of defective newborns and their families. Deciding what
care should be provided to such deformed infants (including choices for involuntary cessation of
treatment like that of Quinlan) is particularly troublesome and especially poignant because they
have had no chance for life and have alwavs been incapable of voluntary consent. Sec. e.g., I)uff
& Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nnrsent 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 890
(1973); Hevniann & Holtz,. supra note 163. Nolan-Hales. De/ective Childien, Their Paients. and the
Death Decisin, 4 J. LEGAL MED., Jan. 1976. at 9: Robertson, supra note 204. Some decisioniaking
proxy is essential. There is evidence that in practice a Qainlan -like standard of meaningful life is
applied by some parents and doctors, see D. CRANE, THE SANCTITY or SociAL LIFE: PHYSICIANS'
TREATMENT OF CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS 4-6, 49-52, 199-200 (1975); Dtiff & Campbell, spra, but
both professional and legal clarification of parents' and doctors' responsibilities may' be w%-atr-
ranted. Bat see Burt. supra note 157.
It is hard. however, to envision a better locus for such agonizing decisions than the fainilx in
conjunction with theit medical providers, and the scope of the right of privacy should be con-
sidered in this context where parents have traditionallh exercised their atithority . See, e.g., Ben-
nett, Allocation /" Child Medical Care Decisioanptiaing Authoitt: A Suggested Inlteest A.salsis. 62 VA. L.
REV. 285, 285-88, 311-17 (1976). Whether fatnilv-doctor decisions are to be protected bv a famil-
ial right to privacy-sinilar to the "marital privacy" of Griswold v. Connecticut, 281 U.S. 479
(1965)-remains to be decided. See generally Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 45 U.S.L.W. 4550
(U.S. May 31, 1977); Carey v. Population Services, Int'l, 45 U.S.L.W. 4601 (U.S. June 9, 1977).
Professor Tribe has upheld the family's right to choose to have abortions-a somewhat analogous
decision-despite the family's self-interest and lack of medical expertise; he notes "how the fam-
ily's claims in this area are rooted in a constitutionally recognized associational integrity." Tribe,
supra note 207, at 51. The Quinlan approach of protecting guardian and doctor as necessary im-
plementors of the patient's right-of-privacy choice, 70 N.J. at 52, 355 A.2d at 670, is less likely to
be acceptable in the case of newborns who have never exercised conscious choice.
248. 70 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669. It should be noted, however, thai the cited wkeaknesses of
judicial decisionmuaking were not those given here, but rather "gratuitous encroachment upon the
medical profession's field of conpetence" and "impossibly cumbersome" procedures. Id.
249. 70 N.J. at 34-35, 355 A.2d at 660.
250. 70 N.J. at 54-55. 355 A.2d at 671.
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The most notable thing about the Quinlan case is neither its result, for
similar results are routinely achieved without judicial intervention, nor its
standard, since lack of human potential is in fact the standard applied by
many or most practicing physicians.2 5 ' Rather it is the new actor in the deci-
sion, the ethics committee, and the new safeguard for decisionmakers-sub-
stantial immunity from civil and criminal liability in deference to a patient's
broad right of privacy. As an "a-responsible" agency, the committee can help
make tragic choices without clearly articulating its rationale 25 2 and thus help
preserve a large and important private realm of choice in a very private and
sensitive area. There is, however, some danger that the committee role will be
overextended. Committee concurrence should probably be required only in
involuntary cases, lest it unduly bureaucratize the straightforward voluntary
choices of competent patients,2 53 although such a group might provide useful
aid for difficult decisions on competency itself and on the voluntariness of
consent .
254
Quinlan is not definitive. The exact nature and extent of the protected
zone of privacy remain to be resolved: 255 Many practical questions about the
251. See generally D. CRANE. supra note 247. See also In re Quinlan. 70 N.J. 10. 28-29, 47-48,
355 A.2d 647, 657, 667 (1976): Fried. supra note 243: Levine. Disconntection: The Clinician's View,
HASIiNGS CTR. REP., Feb. 1976. at 11.
252. See notes 89, 90 supra and accompanying text. C/. KATZ & CAPRON, supra note 93, at
189-92 (discussion of the problems of explicit collective decisiomrs and the potential advantages of
not articulating specific value choices). For critical views of such rise of ethics committees, see R.
VEATCH, s11pra note 162, at 173-76; In re Quinlan: Legal Comfort fo Doctors, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
June 1976, at 29, 30-31.
253. But cf. J. WILSON, supra note 243, at 173-74:
Patients who are suffering and-dying usually cannot make responsible medical decisions
on their own. In the majority of cases, the responsibility for their care rests entirely on
their families or their doctors. In a complex and mobile society, however, familial rela-
tionships are often tenuous and undependable. Furthermore, because the practice of
medicine is highly specialized, the doctor-patient relationship tends to be technical and
impersonal.
Wilson therefore supports committee decisions under established guidelines. Id. at 176-85. See also
D. CRANE, supta note 247, at 47-48, 204-06.
254. Cf. note 245 supra (validating role of individual physician).
255. The right of )riv'acy is not absolute and may be outweighed by "compelling' state in-
terests. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973). The line drawn in Quinlan is unclear.
Compate 70 N.J. at 39-42, 355 A.2d at 663-64 (1976) (only the invasive nature of life support and
Karen Quiinlan's irreversibly comatose condition allow termination of life support) With 70 N.J. at
54 n.10. 355 A.2d at 671 n.10 (reasoning may apply to "terminal" patients without "hopeless loss
of cognitive or sapient life").
Nor did the court clarify just what treatments could be withheld, simply saying, "the present
life-support system may be withdrawn...." 70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671. Mr. Quinlan chose to
withdraw only the "extraordinary" care of the respirator. and his daughter was successfully
"weaned" from it. not dying as expected. Transferred to a nursing home under a new physician's
supervision, she continues to receive "ordinary" care. incliding life-supporting intravenous feed-
ings and antibiotics-as her family wished. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1976, at 1, col. 6. See also Bat-
telle, 'Let Me Sleep': The Stor of Karen Atn Quinlan, LADiEs HOME J. Sept. 1976, at 69. Query
whether Quitla allows the Quinlans to change their minds after even more time elapses and
legally withdraw more "ordinary" forms of medical life-support.
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role of the committee and patients' changing of physicians can be expected to
arise, though these may not require judicial intervention. Further litigation of
this type, however, seems inevitable, 25 6 given the continuing growth of gov-
ernment and insurance funding, as well as the technological ability to sustain
life through medical intervention.
2 5 7
Judicial delineation of a sphere of private responsibility for medical treat-
ment at the end of life can foster civil harmony and individual moral respon-
sibility. Some appear to believe that all such judgments must be societal ones
and that individuals are ill-equipped to accept responsibility for such choices,
requiring instead the state's assumption of ultimate responsibility or at least its
explicit ratification of the choices made. While some protections are clearly
necessary in cases of involuntary cessation of treatment, we believe that other
and better moral supports are available, and that people should be encour-
aged to supply their own or to seek counsel. In Quinlan, for example, the
doctor, in conjunction with the hospital committee, serves not only as techni-
cal advisor but also as counselor and moral agent. Physicians should fill this
role to the extent they are able, but not to the exclusion of other individual
helpers and institutional supports.
25 1
An additional benefit likely to derive from leaving many life-and-death
decisions to private individuals in consultation with physicians is an economic
one, which many would perhaps prefer to leave unmentioned.' 5 In judging
the desirability of heroic life-sustaining efforts, private decisionmakers may
well be less attached to treatment at any cost than would be publicly account-
256. The Qinlan court recognized this, 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 672, even while hoping
that most determinations could be made extrajudicially . Since Quinlan, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts has approved withholding a life-prolonging but difficult treatment of leukemia in a
sixty-seven-year-old retarded state patient with a mental age of three. See MEDICAL WORLD NEWS,
Aug. 9, 1976, at 8; Boston Globe, July 13, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
257. A different and far more serious complication is introduced by another form of the
treatment dilemma in critically ill or terminal patients-positive action by doctors or others to
hasten death as a termination of incurable suffering. This is called "active" euthanasia, e.g., C.
TRICHE & D. TRICHE, THE EUTHANASIA CONTROVERSY, 1812-1974, A BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH SELECT
ANNOTATIONS v-'si (1975); D. CRANE, supra note 247. at 67, and is far more controversial than the
"passive" cessation of artificial life support at issue in Quinlan and similar cases. Some conmen-
tators, however, feel the active-passive dichotomy is more a niatter of degree than of kind, is
difficult to apply in practice, and is a thin theoretical reed to support a inajo moral differentia-
tion. See, e.g.. Williams, supra note 204. at 182-83. Note, lulormed Consent, snpra note 193. at 1650
& n.97. But see, e.g., D. MAGUIRE, supra note 201, at 43-47; Surme Takers Active on Euthanasia
Question, HASTINGS CTR. REP. Aug. 1976, at 2. The debate over enuthanasia of all kinds has long
raged, see, e.g., C. TRICHE & D. TRICHE, supra, and this note is meant to contribute only the
observation that the Quinlan right of privacy is relevant to the issue and that its application will
ultimately have to be considered.
258. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 & n.2 (1976) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (physician is often an inadequate substitute for the counsel of parents of preg-
nant minors desiring abortions).
259. Neither Quinlan court mentioned the cost of her hospital care, reported to be $450 a
(lay, Am. Medical News, Nov. 3, 1975, at 9, col. I, and borne primarily by the state of New lersey
through Medicaid, Battelle, supra note 255, at 76.
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able decisionmakers in a political, legalistic environment. Most people are
probably pleased that their government is constitutionally (in the generic even
more than the legal sense) unable to take direct cost-control measures to curb
the treatment of life-threatening illness. One might hope, however, that,
where government is congenitally incapable of acting, it can find ways of
locating decisionmaking authority elsewhere in order to achieve humane
treatment, to improve the allocation of resources, and to advance the sum
total of human welfare. This section has considered some ways to accomplish
this through legal doctrines which both shield individuals from state interfer-
ence and shield the state from direct responsibilities which it is not well
equipped to shoulder. The remainder of the article considers other such
methods.
V
STRUCTURING FINANCING MECHANISMS TO INFLUENCE PRIVATE CHOICES
Leaving troublesome questions about medical care at the end of life
largely to private choice should reduce some overspending prompted by the
lifesaving imperative or the threat of legal sanctions (as well as yielding other
benefits in a heterogeneous, individualistic society), but it will not obviate the
cost-containment problem generally. Open-ended, almost all-inclusive cata-
strophic disease insurance will still invite individuals and physicians to pay
insufficient attention to economic constraints in their decisions. Our inquiry
here is therefore whether, in designing financial protection against cata-
strophic costs, government can legitimately take steps to impose on the indi-
vidual decisionmakers some of the economic costs of their lifesaving efforts,
thereby requiring individuals, families, and doctors to consider economic
trade-offs. The approaches suggested here are intended to allow government
to help protect individuals against undue financial hardship from a health
calamity while at the same time limiting the distorting impact of the lifesaving
imperative and increasing decisionmakers' cost consciousness. The broader
goal is to help individuals and society cope more effectively with the reality of
inevitable death and suffering without holding their government somehow to
blame.
A. Cost-Sharing Possibilities
Cost sharing through coinsurance, copayments, and deductibles is widely,
albeit not universally, accepted as a legitimate means of curbing utilization of
health services, though such price rationing is regarded as less appropriate
for low-income people, who may be induced to neglect basic health needs.
26 °
260. See generally C. Phelps & J. Newhouse, Coinsurance and the Demand for Medical Ser-
vices (Rand Report No. R-964-OEO/NC, April 1973). Some observers object that even nonpoor
insureds do not respond as intended to cost-sharing schemes. See, e.g., Ball, Response [to Prof.
Schelling] in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, IMPLICATIONS OF
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Possibly an acceptable cost-sharing system could be designed along the follow-
ing lines: Cost sharing might cease once a certain level of costs had been
incurred, so that care would be wholly at public expense for a considerable
while thereafter. But another breakpoint might occur later on, after which a
not insignificant cost-sharing obligation would again apply. The entitlement to
such a fixed amount of care free of cost sharing might be deemed a sufficient
public investment without a private commitment. Moreover, the possibility of
its exhaustion might induce providers and families to count costs from the
beginning in anticipation of surpassing the initial allotment.
Government's obligation toward any given patient might be limited further
by setting a dollar lifetime maximum beyond which insurance would cease to
pay anything at all. 2"' Providing for automatic restoration of exhausted
benefits at some constant annual rate would allow expended benefits to be
earned back in periods of good health and would prevent the lifetime max-
imum from being depleted by a series of small expenditures. Another possi-
bility that has been suggested is that any public insurance ceiling could decline
over a lifetime,2 62 beginning at a certain age and disappearing at a specified
rate per year thereafter. These ideas merely illustrate the many possibilities.
The design of a lifetime insurance limit could aim at securing some impact on
private decisions and advancing relevant distinctions about what society is will-
ing to pay for.
263
The justice of imposing some of the costs of catastrophic illness on the sick
is a matter which can be debated only inconclusively. Arguments against cost
sharing are 1) that, in many cases at least, the hazard insured against is grave
and results from a random event and 2) that the potential size of patients'
outlays can be extremely burdensome, thereby defeating the very purpose of
insurance. Yet there is considerable evidence that many catastrophic diseases
are not totally fortuitous but reflect choices of lifestyle and unhealthful be-
havior which the society might not wish to prohibit but which it might prefer
GUARANTEEING MEDICAL CARE 39 (J. Perpich ed. 1975) (half of Medicare beneficiaries buy sup-
plementary insurance to reduce cost sharing).
261. This is the approach of the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act plans (high option),
I A.D. Little, supra note 14, at 4-6; it is widely conceded, however, that a claimant can achieve
additional benefits by switching plans as he nears the lifetime ceiling. Id.
262. See Lachs, Questions o/ Life and Death, Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1976, at 12, col. 4. Avoiding
unfairness in designing such a scheme is a challenge. particularly at the boundaries between
amounts of benefits. See also note 263 infra.
263. For example, benefits might be set to go tIp or down with age, as suggested by some
research on "willingness to pay" or "human capital" approaches to valuing lives economically. See
Acton, Measuring the Monetary Value of Lifesaving Programs, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 46 (1976).
Of course, age would not be the only relevant factor. See, e.g., Zeckhauser & Shepard, Where Now
for Saving Lifes? 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 5 (1976) ("quality-adjusted life years"). The egalitarian
ethic and constitutional constraints would limit the policy-making applications of such research
on the economic evaluation of human lives, and no serious legislative proposal has yet suggested
variable benefits along such lines. But cf. Lachs, note 262 supra (informational proposal).
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not to subsidize.2 64 In addition, many steps in the treatment process itself
might be of such little benefit as to be of relatively low priority compared with
other uses for scarce government resources; they might more appropriately
be paid for privately-or omitted altogether if private resources have better
uses or are not available. 65 Moreover, individuals committed to uncon-
strained financial commitments to all lifesaving as a moral imperative may not
be entitled to have their preferences supported involuntarily by persons who
are not like-minded.
An arrangement forcing individuals and families to bear a share of costs
undeniably makes wealth a potential factor in the outcome. A partial solution
to the justice questions thus posed would be to make sure that supplemental
insurance coverage--over and above that mandated by government-was
available to those who wished to purchase it at an actuarially fair price.2 66 The
availability of supplementary insurance would not of course solve the problem
of uninsurables or the poor. Nor would it allow society, or providers acting in
society's behalf, to be too cold-blooded toward those who, having elected not
to procure such insurance, live, like Faust, to regret their decision. Still, if a
decent level of protection has been provided, the state's fundamental respon-
sibility may be deemed discharged by the mandated coverage and by the out-
lay already made.
267
It is important to observe that exhaustion of a patient's benefits or his
inability to meet a cost-sharing obligation would not automatically be fatal,
both because not all catastrophic illnesses threaten imminent death and be-
cause providers would frequently continue to take care of many such patients
without charge, much as they do now. Indeed, preservation of the financial
ability of providers to furnish some uncompensated services would seem de-
264. See, e.g., V. FucHs, supra note 11. at 30-55; Knowles, The Responsibility oJ the Individual,
106 DAEDALUS 57 (Winter, 1977); Vaupel, Early Death: An American Tragedy, 40 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. - (1976); Veatch, Who Should Pay for Smoker's Medical Care? HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.
1974, at 4.
265. Long-term care provides perhaps the most dr amatic example of this point. Society might
reasonably conclude, especially since so much of the care is expensive, but nonlifesaving and only
semi-niedical, thai family resources should to a substantial degree share long-terin care costs with
a government scheme. If a program defines "catastrophic" coverage solely on the basis of medical
costs incurred by a beneficiary, much of its outlay can be expected to be for long-term care for
people with chronic conditions. See generally note 2 supra.
266. Within the limits of practicality, insurance companies can design coverage to reflect the
varying risks of different groups of similarly situated people. One can imagine smokers paying
more than nonsmokers for health insurance and an insurance market in which subscribers to the
right-to-life-at-any-price philosophy Would face higher premiums to cover costs of elaborate
heroic treatment. Insurers should be encouraged to offer numerous packages of insurance and to
categorize insureds in whatever way the' can. A program of government loans or income re-
placement. discussed in Section V.B. infra, could also help mitigate the effect of wealth or ability
to make cost-sharing payments.
267. Cf. Fried, supra note 5 ("decent minimum"); Rosenthal, supra note 5 (floor); Michelnan,
On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (basic level of
protection).
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sirable as a means of softening the impact of benefit limits imposed by gov-
ernment in a catastrophic insurance plan. 26 8 Moreover, providers, in rationing
their limited discretionary funds, might engage in precisely the kind of ben-
efit-cost balancing that is so difficult to achieve in more formal mechanisms,
choosing perhaps to serve those patients who could be saved most cheaply
or those who could be restored to the most useful existence or to the most
satisfactory quality of life. This reliance on providers, where benefits are ex-
hausted, could be an important buffer against pressures on government to
expend unlimited sums to save a single (identified) human life, although this
strategy might risk offending commonly held notions of equity.
B. Catastrophic Disease Protection Through Income Replacement
In order for cost sharing to serve as an effective constraint, improving the
allocation of resources, the patient's obligation must be more than nominal;
yet in catastrophic expenditure ranges even a moderate cost-sharing require-
ment could be excessively burdensome for many people. It might be possible,
however, to design a system of income support payments triggered by the
onset of a catastrophic illness which not only would soften the economic hard-
ship of substantial cost-sharing obligations but at the same time would spare
families at least some of the hardship flowing from the loss of the income or
services of the family member affected. Such a plan could be a considerable
improvement over the pure medical insurance model being touted to deal
with catastrophic disease. Health insurance alone does both too much and too
little, covering too much of the medical costs to induce economy but provid-
ing too little protection against the disruption of family finances.
So far, the debate about government financing for catastrophic illness has
not adequately recognized the necessity for both promoting cost consciousness
and preventing financial hardship, and medical payment plans which seem to
solve one problem necessarily exacerbate the other. But both problems might
be dealt with by shifting the primary focus of governmental intervention away
from direct payment of catastrophic medical costs, providing instead specific
indemnity payments for victims of catastrophic illnesses. 219 Payments would
268. This admittedly contemplates a form of internal subsidization, but is arguably warranted
in this limited class of cases. See generally note 17 supra. This provision of some slack in the system
has been called "ethical inefficiency-allowing the special humane appeal of some cases to over-
ride more general benefit-cost calculations. Neuhauser & Lewicki, National Health Insurance and the
Sixth Stool Guaiac, 2 POLIcY ANALYSIS 175, 494-95 (1976).
269. Although soume appear to believe that ans government role should be limited to under-
writing an indemnity form of insurance, Newhouse & Taylor, How Shall We Pat,/o? Hospital Care?,
23 PUB. INTEREST 78, 86-92 (1971), that approach Would not solve the problem of the improvi-
dent "fiee rider" who chose not to insure himself against major medical risks. See text acconI-
panying notes 38 & 39 supra. Some government action to see that insurance against catastrophic
illness is provided for also seems indicated. See Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 11, at 423-25. It
should be noted, however, that the "free rider" rationale for government intervention does not
necessarily require direct public support, except perhaps for the poor. A "hard-nosed" approach
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be designed to help 1) replace income or household services lost during the
period of disability and 2) meet substantial cost-sharing obligations under an
underlying insurance policy covering catastrophic medical expenses, the
purchase of which would be a prerequisite for participation. 27'
Not only would a program of indemnity payments provide important in-
come support for individuals or families in time of need, but it would also
serve to disassociate government from decisions on the actual provision of
medical care, which would be left to patients, families, insurers, and provid-
ers. A high degree of cost consciousness would be preserved, since patients
and families would themselves face part of the costs of care and would have
in hand sufficient funds to be able to pay them. 271 The necessity for allocating
the available resources among all familial needs would provide significant in-
centives to spend wisely, selecting lower-cost institutions and doctors willing to
weigh the costs of alternative treatments.2 72 No longer cast in the role of
could simply require the nonpoor to self-insure just as auto insurance (both liability and nonfault)
is now required. Id. at 423. The indemnity proposal reflects a more active, beneficent govern-
ment role and a sense that the lifesaving imperative might elicit public charity even for an ille-
gally uninsured victim of catastrophic disease (or auto accident).
Some observers question whether indemnity payments can effectively create cost-containment
incentives. E.g., Davis, Comment [to Prof. Schelling], in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, IMPLICATIONS OF GUARANTEEING MEDICAL CARE 53, 54 (J. Perpich ed.
1975): "[G]reater reliance on indemnity insurance ... makes little sense when applied to a mar-
ket where any guaranteed payment for a service quickly becomes a floor on which to apply
additional patient charges.- Accord Ball, supra note 260. at 43. The proposed income replacement
plan would differ from many indemnity plans in paying indemnities for an entire episode of
disease rather than for given services or courses of treatment.
270. The underlying insurance could be either public or private and could be either manda-
tory or merely strongly induced by making its prior purchase a condition of receiving indemnity
payments-depending on the degree of coercion and government involvenent desired. (The goal
of distancing government fioti medical decisions would obviously be better net by private un-
derwriting. ) Standards for acceptable basic catastrophic coverage should be set in any exent, and
government intervention to foster an active private market woild also be appropriate. Presum-
ably individtals or families could buy more extensive coverage privately if they chose not to rely
solely on the indemnity program to meet cost-sharing requirelments. Further protection could
possibly be provided by a system of government loans if this could be achieved without undercut-
ting the income replacement program.
271. The income replacement concept does contemplate conflict between patients' medical
needs and their (and theii families*) other needs. Stich conflicts exist now- in case of serious
illness, see note 247 supia, and supplementary funds might as often ease them as heighten them.
Thus, potential conflicts, while troubling, seem an acceptable price of effective cost control, espe-
cially since medical providers may well serve as patient advocates. The opposite danger may be
greater-that patients and families will feel forced to spend all available funds on medical care,
despite the income replacement aspect of the plan. At a minimum, providers should probably be
forbidden routinely to attach, or require assignment of, a patient's indemnity. See also note 280
infra.
The approach proposed here would also aid cost control throtgh its emphasis on income sup-
port payments, which can be determined in advance, rather than on medical or service-oriented
payments, which cannot be easily contained.
272. This system might allow frugal recipients to "profit" from an illness, just as a welfare
family now might be able to save some current benefits for future use. Neither result should be
troubling.
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payer for any and all catastrophic medical care, government could avoid the
thorny symbolic issues presented by tragic choices, leaving those matters in
private hands. Rather than having to say "no" in a life-or-death case-or hav-
ing to say "yes" mainly for symbolic reasons regardless of the cost of lifesaving
efforts-government would be able to serve simply as the supporter of the
family in its time of need, leaving spending decisions to the recipients'
discretion.7 3 Historically, medical support programs have tended to follow
and to be built upon government's income maintenance initiatives.
2 7 4
Moreover, a major reason that coverage for catastrophic illness has become a
pressing public policy issue is the threat of family bankruptcy, against which
medical coverage alone is insufficient protection.
The practical problems of developing such a program of indemnity pay-
ments are considerable, since the amount of income support appropriate to
individual cases would vary widely and there would be danger that some
families would receive payments inadequate to their needs while others would
enjoy windfalls. For this reason, the program's coverage would have to be
highly categorical, and there would still be considerable arbitrariness at the
margins. Payments would be governed by a combination of circumstances af-
fecting probable need, including the anticipated extent of medical
expenditures 275 according to the nature of the illness or condition17' and the
273. G.I. benefits for education are analogous; there, government pays veterans for atten-
dance but does not come between student and school. This allows Veterans, among other things,
to attend even church-affiliated schools without running afoul of the constitutional separation of
church and state; it also minimizes government involvenient in educational institutions. The dis-
cretion to be allowed indemnity recipients is also similar to that accorded beneficiaries of unen-
ployment compensation and other such programs.
274. Income support programs have traditionally preceded categorical medical payment
programs and built upQn their definitions of eligibility. Thus, Medicare and Medicaid added new
medical benefits for people already eligible lor income support. Sinilarly, 1972 amendments
added Medicare coverage to previous disability benefits. See generally Dixon. The Welfare State and
Mass Justice: A Warniog front the Social Security Disabilith Program, 1972 DUKE L.J. 781; Liebman,
The Definition of Disobilit in Social Security and Supplemental Securit) lacopie: Drawiog the Bouds of
Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833 (1976). Adding medical insurance benefits to unen-
ployment insurance was also suggested during the recent recession. This prior pattern of medical
benefits' following a previously determined program of income support has somehow been lost in
the debate about catastrophic illness and costs. Other nations have not ignored the importance of
income replacement as a part of a social insurance program. See. e.g., Reinhardt, Health Cost and
Expenditures in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, in INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
COSTS AND EXPENDITURES 249, 262-73 (Teh-Wei Hu ed. 1976) (Fogarty Int'l Ctr. for Advanced
Study in the Health Sciences).
275. Whereas total expenditures are the sole trigger of catastrophic coverage in current pro-
posals, notably the Long-Ribicoff bill, see section II.B. supra, for this proposal cost is only one of
several considerations. Expenditures could include either total medical expenses or only out-ot-
pocket ones, and the program might or might not consider only expenditures over a certain
proportion of patient or family income or resources. If payments were to be made as a luimp
sum, see note 279 infra, anticipated future expenditures would have to be computed.
276. Not all diseases or treatments need be covered; for example. plastic surgery might be
deemed unworthy even if catastrophically expensive. Diseases threatening imminent death with-
out care are probably the strongest candidates. A 1969 DHEW task force suggested distinguish-
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degree and effect of resulting disability.2 77 Ease of administration might be
found to require creating an eligibility list of covered events the occurrence of
which (or their equivalent) would trigger the indemnity payments.2 78 Benefits
might be either lump-sum, periodic, or a modification of the two, depending
upon circumstances.17 9 Payments would thus need to be related to both
goals-income replacement and support for a portion of catastrophic medical
expenses not covered under the prerequisite insurance policy.
281
In view of its obvious complexities, this idea is offered only tentatively.2 8t
ing between life-threatening illnesses and non-fatal chronic illnesses which may nonetheless have
costly therapeutic regimens. See Catastrophic Illnesses and Costs, supra note 1. But it would seem
unwise to focus exclusively on life-and-death cases; the lifesaving imperative should be skirted in
a program designed to prevent family bankruptcy. Covered diseases generally should be those
most apt to elicit public charity in the absence of a catastrophic program, in keeping with the goal
of dealing with the "free rider" problem. This plan would not define illnesses as "catastrophic"
solely by their costs or by listing specific conditions, but by a combination of the two approaches.
See notes I and 2 supra and accompanying text. (There may, however, be resistance to coverage
by disease or condition. See notes 1, 28 supra.)
277. Some diseases that are catastrophically expensive may nonetheless with treatment consti-
tute manageable disability-hemophilia, for example-so that some criteria for granting income
replacements are needed. One standard might be eligibility for benefits under the current disabil-
ity program of the Social Security Act. The existing program could perhaps itself serve as the
vehicle to cope with the problem of catastrophic illness generally, as it has been modified to serve
victims of end-stage renal disease, though the current eligibility standards are probably too
stringent. See 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(1), (d)(2)(A) (1970), 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501-39 (1976). See generally
Liebman, supra note 274, at 847-55. The proposed plan's emphasis on disability would establish
for government a functional approach towards health, stressing its instrumental nature. See
Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 11, at 398-99, 423.
278. The approach of the current disability program might be followed: Claimants qualify by
showing (1) listed illness, (2) substantially equivalent illness, or (3) actual medical disability. 42
U.S.C. § 423(d) (1970); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 404.1506 (1976). The "equivalent" approach
would mitigate the potential arbitrariness of an exclusive listing of covered events.
279. The typical pattern of expenditures for different illnesses and conditions would be the
important factor in fixing appropriate payment schedules. For example, a chronic patient requir-
ing considerable ongoing care might best receive periodic payments.
280. Determining the appropriate payments will be a difficult but important political task
based on perceptions of the needs of individuals and families with debilitating illness. The medi-
cal portion of the indemnity would be related to the typical expense of the event. On the one
hand, equal payments to all would leave some recipients still necessitous, while others would
realize windfall "profits" from their illness. On the other hand, completely individualized pay-
ments would merely convert the program into a cost-plus supplemental insurance scheme and
complicate administration as well. Determining the income support portion Would be difficult. It
could be a standard amount, to ease administration and sidestep the problem of imputing in-
come, especially for lost household services. Alternatively, it could be tailored to individual circum-
stances and collateral sources.
Despite the bipartite nature of computing an award to cover both medical and income aspects,
a joint, undifferentiated payment should be made; the essence of the program is to leave the
ultimate allocation of resources to recipients. For the same reason, changes in award schedules
should not be made in lockstep with medical inflation. To be effective, the program must be
perceived as support for beneficiaries and families, not as an automatically enlarged hunting
ground for medical providers. See also note 271 supra.
281. An alternative approach to that presented in the text would simply tie indemnity eligibil-
ity to the onset of payments under an approved catastrophic insurance policy. Whether to cover
only expenses above an income-related threshold, note 275 supra, would thus be considered as
part of the basic policy determination on appropriate coverage. Similarly determined by the basic
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But, while it needs considerable elaboration to deal with such problems as
defining categories, making eligibility determinations, and guarding against
fraud, it promises to reward further examination. At the very least, it
dramatizes the policy dilemma presented-namely the need to protect indi-
viduals in widely varying economic circumstances against medical-financial
catastrophe without issuing additional blank checks to the providers of high-
technology medical care. It also suggests a way of keeping government from
becoming a central participant in the extraordinarily difficult but inevitable
decisions in the borderland between life and death.
C. The Universal Fixed-Budget Approach
Despite the demonstrable advantages of giving patients substantial de-
cisionmaking and some cost-sharing responsibility, many observers may still
prefer an allocative system in which providers, not patients, face resource
constraints.182 This entails setting a fixed budget with which providers must
meet the health needs of a defined population. Denied the customary assur-
ance that all services rendered will almost certainly be paid for on a fee-for-
service or cost reimbursement basis, providers operating under a fixed budget
have to adopt and adhere to priorities in their use of resources. This means
of altering provider behavior underlies the HMO concept, as discussed
coverage would be whether certain illnesses were included, note 276 supra-presumably with
some less "worthy" but expensive ones excluded. Degree of disability, note 277 supra, could be
handled as a matter of indemnity amount, note 280 supra, rather than one of eligibility. Such an
alternate approach might be simpler to administer, but would probably control costs somewhat
less well and require somewhat broader government involvement than the text's plan.
282. Policy analysts who are skeptical of emphasizing patient prerogatives and responsibilities
often point to the following concerns, among others:- 1) Patients are ill-informed about and
poorly equipped for medical decisionmaking and are therefore unable to balance costs and ben-
efits effectively; overcoming these problems is either impossibly complex or excessively costly (if
only in increased physician time). 2) Patients who seek medical help are not entering into an
arm's length commercial transaction but rather are seeking counselling fiom a fiduciary, with
whom they are unprepared to bargain as they would with other service providers; this mindset is
exacerbated bv the dependency and anxiety that naturally accompany illness and a patient's deci-
sion to seek treatment. 3) Catastrophically ill patients are unlikely to have a rational perspective in
coping with their medical problems. Not only may desperately ill patients seek the reassurance of
virtually any treatment, but their other priorities will also necessarily pale in comparative
importance-in short, decisionmaking by critically ill patients lacks the requisite element of true
choice because of the extraordinary exigencies of catastrophic illness. 4) Finally, the medical mar-
ketplace is so imperfect because of monopolistic physician dorninance-gained from supply cur-
tailment, hoarding of knowledge, social norms of physician omniscience, and competitive barriers
imposed by professional norms and referral patterns-that reliance on patient sovereignty is un-
realistic and doomed to be ineffectual. Those who stress these factors typically advocate reliance
on some fonrm of government regulation, such as health planning-cum-regulation or utilization
review through such bodies as PSROs.
However, incremental emphasis on patient prerogatives and responsibility does not mean
abandonment of other techniques of social control. The fixed-budget approach discussed in the
text, for example, attempts to accommodate skepticism toward patient autonomy by examining a
nonregulatory approach that relies primarily on providers rather than government regulators to
make allocative choices.
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earlier, 83 but it could also be implemented on a system-wide basis, as is done
in the United Kingdom and as is proposed in the Kennedy-Corman Health
Security bill.2 8 4 The implications of a universal fixed-budget strategy go well
beyond the scope of this paper's investigation of catastrophic care financing,
but, setting the larger issues aside ,285 it is useful to consider how well such a
system might address the problem of controlling the cost of treating cata-
strophic disease.
The fixed-budget approach assigns the legislature the task of assessing
societal priorities at a macro level 286 and earmarking a specific sum for health
care, which is then allocated among the myriad health services by a mixed
professional, managerial, and political process. In this process, the lifesaving
imperative would surely operate, but its impact would be softened because
many important investment and budgeting decisions would be made in ad-
vance, affecting patients who are only unknown, future statistics and not iden-
tified individuals. Moreover, the fixed budget would compel many decisions
to be framed in "either-or" rather than "yes-no" terms, greatly improving
prospects for cost-control effectiveness. For these reasons, the fixed-budget
approach would help achieve the goal of insulating government from direct
responsibility for the system's inability to effect cures in specific cases and
would almost certainly lead to substantially more effective overall cost control
than is achievable under open-ended government financing.
Despite these virtues, a universal fixed-budget system would not guarantee
the achievement of optimal resource allocation between catastrophic and
283. The experience of HMOs, section III.B.3. supra, shows this effect. Prospective reim-
bursement of hospitals is a similar prepayment strategy. See, e.g., PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, FORWARD PLAN FOR HEALTH, FY 1978-82 at 34 (Aug. 1976);
V. FUCHS, supra note 11, at 100-02. See also Roemer, On Paying the Doctor and the Implications of
Different Methods, 3 J. HEALTH & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 4 (Spring 1962).
284. The governmentally operated Veterans Administration (V.A.) system is a functioning
American example of system-wide resource allocation through an estimated budget, negotiated in
advance. V.A. behavior may, however, be atypical of pre-budgeted systems' effectiveness in con-
taining outlays because it lacks institutional incentives for reducing costs. Moreover, the political
funding debates often take on military and patriotic, rather than health-related, dimensions. See
Sapolsky, America's Socialized Medicine: The Allocation of Resources Within the Veterans' Health Care
System, - PUBLIC POLICY - (1977). The V.A. is nonetheless worthy of policvmakers' atten-
tion, since it is the closest model to a publicly operated comprehensive health care delivery system
that currently exists in the United States. See generally Lipsky, McCray, Prottas, & Sapolsky, The
Future of the Veterans' Health Care System, I J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY & LAW 285 (1976).
285. See, e.g., Donabedian, Issues in National Health Insurance, 66 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 345,
345 (1976): "Those who wish to reform the system have a broader range of objectives which
include protective efficacy, cost control, quantitative adequacy, qualitative adequacy, efficiency of
production, efficiency of allocation, equity, and redistribution of capacity. . . . The provision of
comprehensive benefits generates the necessity for a fundamental change in the organization of
health services . ... "
286. See text accompanying notes 131 & 132 supra for an explanation of "macro" versus
"micro" approaches.
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other health needs. Even though Britain's overall commitment to health ser-
vices has been impressively, even oppressively, controlled by central dictation
of the National Health Service's budget, 287 only recently, under extreme fiscal
pressure, has significant rationalization of resource allocation even begun. 288
Even so, many observers feel that relatively too much is still spent on cata-
strophic care and too little on other pressing health needs. 28 9 The problem
would likely be more acute in the United States, where the public is already
accustomed to much greater medical spending and higher technology and
where it is unlikely that comparably draconian budget limits would be im-
posed because of the commitment to the lifesaving imperative. Although it is
at least arguable that the Health Security fixed-budget model might achieve a
better balance between catastrophic and other care than has yet been achieved
in Britain-if only because it contemplates broader responsibilities for PSROs,
utilization-control institutions beyond anything employed in the United
Kingdom 29-1 it is unlikely that patient or societal preferences would prevail in
the face of medical dominance and the symbolic values of the lifesaving im-
perative in allocative decisionmaking. 1 t Under these circumstances, a unitary,
governmentally financed system is likely to compromise or neglect the public's
legitimate interest in cost control and in receiving nonmedical health services.
287. The British system has been relatively successful at holding down costs and has been
described as "probably one of the cheapest in the world." Cooper, supra note 155, at 104. In 1974
a parliamentary committee concluded that "no Government has ever provided sufficient money"
for health. "As a result of the inadequacy of finance, the service is grinding to a halt." House of
Commons, Public Expenditure Comm. (Social Services Subcomm.), 4th Report, Sess. 1974. Expen-
diture Cuts in Health and Personal Social Services, HMSO, 1974 (HC 307) [hereinafter cited as Public
Expenditure Comm.], cited in Klein, The National Health Service, in INFLATION AND POLITICS 83, 86
(R. Klein ed. 1975).
288. See DEPT. OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY (U.K.), PRIORITIES FOR HEALTH AND
PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICES IN ENGLAND 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as PRIORITIES]. See also THE
BRITISH HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 144-46 (Prepared by Economic Models, Ltd., London, for the Am.
Med. Ass'n, 1976); R. CROSSMAN, supra note 100, at 11-17, 26-28; Klein, supra note 287, at 88-92.
Indeed, the very expression "resource allocation" is in Britain taken to mean the "distribution of
financial resources" among different localities, not how the money is spent. RESOURCE
ALLOCATION WORKING PARTY, DEPT. OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, (U.K.), SHARING RE-
SOURCES FOR HEALTH IN ENGLAND 8 (1976).
289. See, e.g., Public Expenditure Comm., supra note 287; see also PRIORITIES, supra note 288,
at 1; Lister, By the London Post: Bleak Outlook, 294 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1224 (1976); note 100 supra.
290. One important British consultative document, while noting the importance of efficiency
as well as quality in medical practice, concludes that clinical practice "must continue to be the
responsibility of the clinicians concerned." PRIORITIES, supra note 288, at 28. See also Anderson,
All Health Care Systems Struggle Against Rising Costs, HOSPITALS, Oct. 1, 1976, at 97, 102.
291. PSROs could be expected to be more effective in allocating a fixed budget than in con-
trolling costs under the present system of open-ended financing. PSROs' structure and orienta-
tion, however, would probably still leave considerable scope for medical politics and would allow
medical rather than societal or patients' personal values to predominate. Nor would adding a
consumer influence to PSROs solve the problem, since the difficulty lies in giving organized
medical interests the high ground and conceding their legitimacy as spokesmen for patient in-
terests.
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VI
CONCLUSION: THE PLURALISTIC APPROACH
The often harrowing dilemmas created by the necessity to limit the con-
mitment of societal resources to catastrophic care suggest that there is proba-
bly no one right way to solve this problem for all people at once. Much turns
on personal values and preferences. From this point of view, the principal
weakness of comprehensive national health insurance plans, such as the
Health Security proposal, is that they would centralize financing and attempt
to settle politically upon a single standard of care for everyone. 29 2 They would
thus remove the necessity for cost-constrained expression of the widely di-
vergent preferences of individuals with respect to medical care generally and
catastrophic care in particular. These preferences reflect varying degrees of
confidence in what doctors can do ' " and a wide range of personal values and
circumstances. People vary greatly both in their fatalism and stoicism about
various qualities of life and health and in their preferences between such
things as security and risk-taking, institutional and home care, and high-
technology medicine and procedures less offensive to personal integrity and
dignity.29' 4 By removing willingness to pay both for coverage and for services
as a measure of the strength or weakness of such preferences, and also by
denying individuals the opportunity to benefit from their economizing
choices, comprehensive national health insurance plans would invite both
overspending for those with preferences for elaborate health services and
nonprice rationing unfair to those with a desire to purchase more or better
care. As we have argued, political processes dominated by the medical profes-
sion and the lifesaving imperative are poorly adapted to making choices with
potentially tragic consequences, leading to a systematic bias toward more
spending on catastrophic care than cost-conscious but nonnecessitous consum-
ers would elect on their own.
292. Although the bill does not detail the quality regulation it would require, its objective is
"to require the highest practicable quality of care that is attainable in substantially all parts of the
United States. Exceptions ... shall be permitted only when necessary to avoid critical shortages of
services. S. 3 & H.R. 21. 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 141(b) (1975) in 1975 Hearings, supra note
41, at 475. It is, of course, unknowable whether in practice the single governmental standard
might ultimately prove too low or too high for most people. Cf. Klein, supra note 287. at 85
(Britain's low proportion of GNP spent for health care may indicate either ioo low priority or
successful cost containment).
293. See, e.g., *lcNerney, The Quadan. of Quality .4ssessment, 295 NEW ENG. J. *lED. 1505,
1506-07 (1976).
294. Various religious groups, for example, hold distinct positions on the use of certain
medical procedures or on questions like the desirability of prolonging dying patients'
lives. Rather than seek a false social consensus, it may be easier and wiser to allow differ-
ent groups to reach their own conclusions and bear the consequences themselves. Such
questions are likely to become progressively more acute as biomedical technology ex-
pands our capacity to maintain life after health and to rearrange genetic and physiologi-
cal processes previously beyond our reach.
Starr, A National Health Program: Orgamung DiversitY, HASTINGS CTR. REP. Feb. 1975, at 11, 13.
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An attractive alternative may be to eschew trying to solve the problem in
any definitive fashion and instead to take steps to enhance each individual's
ability to solve his own personal problem by choosing among a variety of
available options, with public financial assistance where necessary. Such a
strategy lacks the tidiness and specificity which policymakers often desire and
would doubtless leave many residual problems for regulators and the courts
to grapple with. But the fundamental values of pluralism and freedom, as
recognized in such constitutional precepts as the right of privacy, suggest an
obligation not only to tolerate but also to foster diversity on matters as in-
tensely personal and private as the means of coping with life-threatening dis-
ease and the attendant tragic choices. Something like the positive program
sketched below for improving catastrophic insurance coverage may well offer
the best chance for resolving the allocative and ethical dilemmas which this
article has identified. Because dilemmas of this kind are implicit in all medical
care, though in lesser measure, the catastrophic disease problem may fairly be
regarded as the hardest case, and a proposal which addresses it effectively
should have value for dealing with the health sector's broader allocative prob-
lems as well.
The basic, well recognized need to widen the population's financial protec-
tion against medical-financial catastrophes can be met in a variety of ways
consistent with limiting government entanglement and avoiding enforcement
of a false consensus on surrounding issues. One promising approach is based
upon a relatively simple change in the tax law. The current subsidies for
health insurance premiums implicit in the tax law's definition of income and
wages and in the medical deduction would be replaced by a limited credit
against personal income taxes for premiums paid by either employer or
employee. 29 5 In addition to benefiting most taxpayers more than the tax ad-
295. Many congressional bills are of the tax-credit variety. One sunlmarv lists five such bills
(of eighteen summarized in all). DHEW SUMMAY, supra note 41. A major recent academic initia-
tive for "kiddie-care'" and catastrophic coverage would also use tax credits. Marmor, Rethnkioig
National Health Insarance, 46 PUB. INT. 73, 89-94 (1977). Many analysts generally oppose such use
of tax credits (and similar devices) to effect social or political goals through hidden, indirect
spending (loss of revenue) rather than direct appropriations, which Must be regularly and openly
debated. E.g., S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973). 1hi defense of the )roposed credit, it
should be noted that the fiscal impact of such tax subsidies need no longer be hidden. The
concept of "tax expenditures" was formallY introduced in 1968. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
ANNUAl REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE FREASURY ON THE SFATE OF THE FINANCES 322-40
(1969). and allowSs such expenditures to be analyzed along with normal appropriatiolis. But ci'.
Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Sibsidies" in the Natimnal Biudget, 22 NA'iL [Ax J. 244 (1969)
(expressing concern about the "tax expenditure" concept), a reply b% Professors Surrey and
Hellhuth, id. at 529, and a rebuttal by Professor Bittker, id. at 538. Moreover, the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, tits. l-IX, 88 Stat. 297 (codified in scattered sections of
1, 2 and 31 U.S.C.), requires the President to include tax expenditures in the Budget, id. § 601,
31 U.S.C. § II (Supp. IV 1974), and has created the mechanisnis for Congress regularly to
review such expenditures. Also the exact cost of the proposed tax credit would be far easier to
compute than that of the current exclusion from income and deduction approach. Finally, it is
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vantages lost (so as to make the change politically attractive), the maximum
credit should be at least sufficient to permit purchase of substantial cata-
strophic coverage296-with cost sharing no greater than an acceptable propor-
tion of annual income. This would have at least two important effects:
1) Greater emphasis on catastrophic as opposed to "shallow" coverage. Limiting
the credit would put people in the position of spending their own after-tax
money to get extra coverage or broader benefits. This would help curb the
current tendency toward overinsuring against modest and predictable medical
expenses in order to pay such bills with untaxed dollars. People could be
expected to concentrate instead on spending the credit on essential protec-
tion, particularly against catastrophic risks. If policymakers lacked confidence
that the public would indeed come increasingly to prefer catastrophic
coverage, further government steps to deal with the "free rider" problem
would be justified: Certain minimum standards could be set for the insurance
policies and other plans whose premiums would be eligible for the credit. Or
an attractive public income replacement plan could be offered to induce
purchase of adequate catastrophic coverage.2 97 Finally, catastrophic coverage
could be made compulsory, as auto insurance now often is.
2) Expanded catastrophic coverage for the poor and near-poor. Under the sug-
gested tax change, everyone, including those currently uninsured, would be
guaranteed adequate coverage by a 100% tax subsidy up to the maximum
amount of the credit. Those with insufficient tax liability to absorb their credit
could be given a cash rebate or an insurance voucher of equal or greater
value. Appropriate arrangements for subsidizing noncatastrophic coverage of
lower-income persons should also be made.
Of course, changing the tax law would not solve the problem of control-
ling costs in the treatment of catastrophic disease; indeed, without more, the
expected expansion of private catastrophic insurance coverage could exacer-
bate the problem. Nevertheless, by making additional premiums wholly after-
tax expenses, the tax change would, to some extent, increase customer resis-
tance to premium increases, and insurers and other plans would feel greater
pressure to provide cost-effective coverage and to find effective and accept-
able means of controlling costs. A recent study by the Council on Wage and
Price Stability suggests that the private sector's present incentives-and its
ability-to contain costs have been significantly underestimated. 298 A shift to
difficult enough to postulate the removal of current tax subsidies of medical care even supposing
the credit as a replacement subsidy; without the credit, changing the tax law would be politically
inconceivable.
296. A variety of "Major Risk Insurance," supra note 42, could be one such plan, although this
paper does not mean to endorse any of Professor Feldstein's suggested versions. Other pos-
sibilities are discussed in sections V.A. & B. supra.
297. See section V.B. supra.
298. COUNCIL ON WAGE & PRICE STABILITY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE COM-
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limited tax credits would strengthen the existing incentives and stimulate
added cost-control endeavors.
Effective cost containment could also be facilitated by easing the current
restrictions on insurers and other financing entities (including HMOs) which
unduly limit their ability to influence physician decisionmaking on a wide va-
riety of matters affecting costs. Indeed, a truly pluralistic approach to prob-
lems of health care costs and of catastrophic disease would require that
financing plans and their members have reasonably wide discretion as to what
services will be covered and how care will be provided. Current state restric-
tions on the "corporate practice of medicine" by health plans should therefore
be narrowed if necessary to permit active cost-containment initiatives to be
taken. 299 Plans would then be in a position to obtain meaningful recognition
by providers of patients' collective interest in cost-effective allocation of re-
sources. The predictable professional resistance to many of the measures
which might be taken could be curbed by appropriate application of the anti-
trust laws.3 00
With the tax incentives for overinsurance and legal and professional im-
PLEX PUZZLE OF RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS: CAN THE PRIVATE SECTOR FIT IT TOGETHER? (1976).
See Havighurst, Controlling Health Care Costs: Strengthening the Private Sector's Hand, I J. HEALTH
POLITICS, POLICY & LAW 471 (1977).
299. The Colmon law rule that a corporation cannot engage in a "learned profession" has
been supported as a protection of professional services against lay interference or commercial
exploitation. See, e.g., Laufer, Ethical and Legal Restrictions on Contract and Corporate Practice of
Medicine, 6 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 516 (1939). The "corporate practice" rule may not be a
significant problem except for HMOs which do not cqualify under the federal HMO Act and
therefore do not benefit from the "override" provision which exempts qualified HMOs from such
restrictions in state law. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (Supp. IV 1974). See also Note, The Role of Prepaid
Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARV. L. REV. 887, 960-62 (1971) (HMOs'
problems before the HMO Act). Insurers should have no problem because they do not undertake
to provide medical care and insured patients contract directly with doctors Without any inter-
mediary. So long as insurers' cost-control efforts are confined to defining the coverage of their
plans, see text accompanying notes 301-03 infra, no question of corporate practice should arise.
Thus, coverage could even be limited to a group of doctors who had accepted an insurer's fee
schedule and agreed to follow the insurer's procedures for establishing its payment responsibilit.
The critical feature Would appear to be whether patients and doctors were free to make ar-
rangements for care not covered by the insurance plan. Cf. Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 5,
at 54-58 (arguing that PSROs are engaged in defining Medicare-Medicaid coverage, not regulat-
ing medical practice).
300. Antitrust principles would of course prohibit medical societies from organizing formal
boycotts. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per
curiam); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators'
Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). The' Would also
prohibit concerted actions calculated to stimulate collective pressure on the initiators of unwanted
cost controls. Cf. Eastern States Retail Lulmber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914) (information exchange prompting refusals to deal unlawful). The AMA was recently
counseled-correctly, it would seem -not to issue a prepared stateiment attacking certain cost-
control strategies being adopted by insurers. 'Second Opinion' Statement Weakened, Am. Med. News,
Dec. 13, 1976, at 12, cols. 2-3. See Havighurst, The Role of Competition in Containing Health
Care Costs, a paper prepared for the Federal Trade Commission, Conference on Competition
in the Health Care Sector: Past, Present, and Future, Washington, D.C., June 1-2, 1977.
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pediments to cost control eliminated, consumers desiring health care insur-
ance would no longer be induced to purchase only plans providing more or
better (or different) health services than they in fact want. A fuller menu with
more opportunities to economize would be offered. It is impossible to imagine
or set forth all of the possible offerings or all of the methods by which plans
might give each consumer or group just the desired amount of protection
against the risks of catastrophic disease. Nevertheless, some possibilities are
listed below in order to convey a sense of the multiplicity of possibly workable
and acceptable approaches. That one can debate, perhaps endlessly, such is-
sues as the cost-effectiveness and ethical implications of each approach in a
variety of particular circumstances is simply evidence of the desirability of
decentralizing decisions about their respective merits and avoiding adopting
any of them in a single universal plan.
1) Specific exclusions from coverage. Plans could elect to exclude highly
discretionary or medically questionable procedures from basic coverage, pro-
vided such exclusions were disclosed as explicitly as possible. A set of proce-
dures that a particular plan might consider more discretionary and budget-
able and of less absolute importance-possibly including coronary bypass
surgery, total hip replacement, and organ transplants, at least at the present
state (and cost) of the art 3 0 -could be sold as supplemental coverage, al-
though problems of self-selection by high-risk purchasers could necessitate
high risk-related rates and perhaps physical exams, as with life insurance.
2) Utilization controls. Plan-initiated utilization controls are similar to cover-
age limits but normally operate case by case to exclude procedures which do
not lend themselves to blanket exclusion in advance.3 0 2 Such controls could be
appropriately tailored to reflect the expectations of the subscribers to a par-
ticular plan and could differ substantially in their leniency or stringency from
those imposed by PSROs. As tinder PSROs, reviewers would monitor the
steps taken in treating particular patients, assuring that appropriate settings
and treatments were chosen and that questionable procedures were not reim-
bursed. Plans with unreasonable or poorly administered controls would have
trouble in attracting and keeping both consumer patronage and provider
cooperation. Individuals would of course be free to purchase things which the
plan found not of sufficient priority or value to be reimbursed. So structured,
utilization controls might well prove to be a frequently used option.
3) Policy limits and cost sharing. A plan might set up an upper limit on
lifetime catastrophic benefits.30 3 Plans could also use cost sharing to discour-
age overutilization of certain kinds. Creative use of cost sharing might also
include, for example, higher rates for questionable procedures or for smokers
301. See note 10 supra.
302. Quality controls could likewise operate to review the necessity for and value of certain
modes of diagnosis or treatment.
303. See text accompanying notes 260-63 supra.
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or others whose health problems are partly self-inflicted.
4) Income replacement plans. Plans might not only cover medical care but
also provide income replacement, particularly as a means of making more
extensive cost sharing or stricter coverage limitations feasible. The promise of
this intriguing approach would be most effectively explored in a pluralistic
context.
30 4
5) Fixed-budget providers. The fixed-budget approach to resource allocation
would certainly be a major iten on the menu. Earlier discussion highlighted
a major difficulty encountered by one such provider, HMOs, in treating cata-
strophic disease-namely the need to adhere to customary practice a. 3 0 If, how-
ever, clearly announced and reasonable deviations from prevailing standards
and style of practice were legitimized-through contractual arrangements,
for example-this problem could be overcome. A promising alternative
model of prepayment has recently been proposed: promoting cost-effective,
quality care through prepaid "Health Care Alliances (HCAs)," initiated by in-
surers. 3 " Each HCA would be "a limited set of hospitals and doctors who
have been designated by the insurer to function as an economic unit,"' ' a"
providing comprehensive care to a defined, voluntarily enrolled population
and competing for subscribers with a number of HCAs, HMOs, and other
plans in a given community.
HCAs differ from HMOs in that insurers rather than providers bear the
financial risks. Yet, as in HMOs, but not in the insurance programs discussed
thus far, HCA providers are expected to function as a group, helping to con-
trol one another's utilization of resources in order to maintain their plan's
competitive viability. The qualitative and cost advantages achieved could also
supply competitive pressure on other plans. Because of the ability of these
plans to select and influence physicians and because of the decentralized,
competitive nature of a system featuring many HCAs and HMOs, such a sys-
tem would probably achieve much greater alterations in physician behavior
and in resource allocation between catastrophic and ordinary care than would
a highly politicized universal fixed-budget system. The prepaid comprehen-
sive model is not, however, easily adapted to provide only catastrophic care.
Given such a varied menu of plans and controls, an obvious concern
would be whether consumers were making reasonably informed choices and
whether the bargains being entered into in buying catastrophic coverage were
fair ones. Nevertheless, there are grounds for optimism. First, most purchases
of catastrophic coverage would probably continue to be made in employment
304. The nuIltiplicity of possible income replacement plans, section V.B. sipra, provides an
argument for private diversity in this area.
305. See notes 139-41 supia and accompanying text.
306. P. Ellwood & W. McClure, Health Delivery Reform (InterStudy, Oct. 25, 1976) (sum-
marized in Health Services Information, Nov. 1, 1976, at 2).
307. Id. at 4.
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groups, despite the tax change. Groups can hire outside experts and other-
wise bring considerable sophistication to bear and supply substantial assur-
ances of fairness. Moreover, despite the arguable ignorance of the average
consumer, competition normally forces competitors to cater to the better-
informed marginal customers, particularly those organized in sophisticated
groups. Efforts by health plans to attract or retain those who are most likely
to join or leave and who are most alert to differences among plans should
assure that a reasonable balance between quality and cost is maintained for
the benefit of all. 31 8 Finally, many plans would probably adopt a policy of
close consultation with plan members as a means of deciding on, and
legitimizing, otherwise troubling restrictions on payment for catastrophic care.
This would allow decisions to be made by those who are most directly affected
and who must pay the cost. Consumer participation would also help clarify
and publicize the issues so that members unhappy with the outcome would
know to seek an alternative. The federal HMO Act already requires member-
ship participation in such policy decisions by HMOs, 3 " but plans organized
under different authority would probably find that developing consultative
channels would not only enhance their marketability but perhaps strengthen
their legal position as well.
Despite these substantial safeguards, many observers would probably still
feel the need for comprehensive regulation to protect consumers against
abuses. Although the lifesaving imperative might well distort the outcome if
such regulation were too extensive, some oversight could be beneficial. State
insurance commissioners, for example, might promote some standardization
(though, one hopes, not too much) and could provide some additional assur-
ance that the plans' cost-control features were not unfair.3  The courts, too,
would exercise oversight in deciding whether to recognize and enforce limits
on plans' commitments. Courts are familiar in other contexts with problems
of consumer ignorance, sellers' overreaching, unconscionability, and "con-
tracts of adhesion"-in short, with the problems of policing the institution of
private contract to promote fundamental fairness. Courts should be able to
distinguish reasonably well between abuses and rational choices about the
quantity and type of health services to be provided at insurer expense when
catastrophic disease strikes. It is perhaps also reassuring that a patient who
exhausted his benefits would continue to have a degree of informal protection
in providers' unwillingness to terminate treatments instantaneously and in the
308. Special problems would be created by plans catering almost exclusively to disadvantaged
groups, at the same time more in need of services (and therefore more expensive to insure) and
less able to switch from one plan to another.
309. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(6) (Supp. IV 1974).
310. It might be thought desirable, for example, to follow the lead of California's Natural
Death Act, supra notes 194-98, in banning any requirement that subscribers sign "living wills,"
stpra note 193, or any denial of coverage to nonsignatories-although an actuarially reasonable
prenitim differential would not be unfair.
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obligation that most of them feel to treat sympathy-arousing cases without
charge .3
1
A diversified system might use any or all of the foregoing methods to
balance the needs for catastrophic disease protection and for cost contain-
ment, but this list is obviously not exhaustive."' Nor does it present any
single, ultimately satisfying means of resolving the tragic choices inherent in
catastrophic medical care. There would surely be imperfections, but these
would at least not be universally imposed by government and might even
prove self-limiting. What the pluralistic approach does accomplish is to avoid
making the wrong choice of strategy or freezing our entire societal approach
to health care into one irrevocable mold. 3 13
We must face facts: We do not know where future medical technology will
take us or even what priority much of current medical practice is really as-
signed by different people in our society. Accepting a pluralistic approach
would allow experimentation and not preclude future changes. Precisely be-
cause this approach contains elements of all the others and does not limit
people's options or opportunities for future elaboration, it may well be the
most promising one available for beginning to deal with the truly intractable,
indeed tragic, dilemmas of responsibly financing catastrophic medical care.
311. See notes 17 & 268 supra and accompanying text. Some further care might also be made
available in public institutions.
312. Another potential innovation by third-party payers would require all professional ser-
vices to be billed and approved by a primary physician except in unusual cases. The goal would
be to subject the very expensive services of specialists and subspecialists to a form of peer review
by their more generalist colleagues who make referrals to them. Physicians' ethics and tradition
currently require that patients (and their insurers) deal with every provider individually-on the
theory that an inviolate doctor-patient relationship exists for every medical service. See AMA
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS passim (Opinions & Reports of the Judicial Council, Am. Med.
Ass'n 1971). (§ 7(2) provides: "[E]ach physician should submit a bill for the service he has himself
rendered and receive payment therefore [sic] directly from the patient.") No matter how artificial
this mav seem when compared with actual practice (as where, for example, pathologists perform
laboratory tests for patients never seen), direct billing is apparently adhered to almost universally,
effectively bypassing the potential scrutiny of the primary care provider who has ordered the
service or made the referral and who should, after all, be expected to provide overall continuity
in patient management. If third-party payers would accept only a single professional bill, then
primary physicians might be expected to honor their fiduciary obligations to patients by exercis-
ing a restraining influence on excessive procedures or particularly high charges. At the least,
primary care providers would become more aware of specialists' practices and fees-inoriation
which could help guide future referrals.
In this model, primary care physicians are analogous to general contractors, who monitor sub-
contractors' cost and quality performance for their "clients," just as primary care physicians should
be encouraged to oversee specialists on referral. The principle of primary physicians' responsibil-
ity and concomitant accountability for cost and quality assurance is a potentially valuable sources
of improved medical "productivity," although the model would naturally prove impractical in
some cases (like emergency care). Equally naturally, specialists would vociferously oppose any
such challenge to their independence, and many generalists would worry about unethical prac-
tice, potentially enlarged malpractice liability, overwork, and their competence to review the work
of specialists. The proposal would have undoubted appeal, however, for those seeking to enhance
the prestige of today's outnumbered, low-status primary care providers.
313. For a student of the case for a pluralistic approach to the problems of the health sector
generally, see Havighurst, supra note 298. See also Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 37.
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